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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
From May of 1973 to February of 1974, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration conducted a series of three manned missions to the Skylab space 
station, a voluminous vehicle largely descendant of Apollo hardware, and America’s 
first space station.  The crewmembers of these three manned missions spent record-
breaking durations of time in microgravity (28 days, 59 days and 84 days, 
respectively) and gave the U.S. space program its first experiences with long-duration 
space flight.  The program overcame a number of obstacles (including a significant 
crippling of the Skylab vehicle) to conduct a lauded scientific program that 
encompassed life sciences, astronomy, solar physics, materials sciences and Earth 
observation. 
 
Skylab has more to offer than the results of its scientific efforts.  The operations 
conducted by the Skylab crews and ground personnel represent a rich legacy of 
operational experience.  As we plan for our return to the moon and the subsequent 
manned exploration of Mars, it is essential to utilize the experiences and insights of 
those involved in previous programs.  Skylab and SMEAT (Skylab Medical 
Experiments Altitude Test) personnel have unique insight into operations being 
planned for the Constellation Program, such as umbilical extra-vehicular activity and 
water landing/recovery of long-duration crewmembers.  Skylab was also well known 
for its habitability and extensive medical suite; topics which deserve further reflection 
as we prepare for lunar habitation and missions beyond Earth’s immediate sphere of 
influence.   
 
The Skylab Medical Operations Summit was held in January 2008.  Crewmembers and 
medical personnel from the Skylab missions and SMEAT were invited to participate in 
a two day summit with representatives from the Constellation Program medical 
operations community.   The purpose of the summit was to discuss issues pertinent to 
future Constellation operations.   
 
The purpose of this document is to formally present the recommendations of the 
Skylab and SMEAT participants.  As we look to the future of space exploration - our 
return to the moon and quest for Mars - we must remain mindful of those who opened 
the heavens to the long-duration exploration of space.  The ISS and Constellation 
programs are the stewards of the Skylab legacy.  The hard-won lessons of Skylab can 
still guide us as we extend mankind’s presence in space. 
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2.0 METHODS 
The purpose of the Skylab Medical Operations Project was to produce a set of 
recommendations that are relevant to issues in current and future long duration 
spaceflight based on the experience of Skylab Program participants.  Several steps 
were required to arrive at these recommendations.     
2.1 Constellation Research 
First we sought to identify operational issues and concerns facing the Constellation 
Program.  An informal survey of hot topics and program risks provided a starting 
point.  A list of issues and potential questions was prepared and refined by members of 
the Constellation Medical Operations community.  This refined set of topics and 
questions served as a starting point for research into the Skylab Program. 
2.2 Skylab Background Research 
We then familiarized ourselves with the Skylab Program architecture and operations, 
not only to identify areas where the Skylab experience could be instructive, but to also 
ensure that these questions had not already been answered in the Skylab 
documentation.  Skylab Program reports were gathered from the NASA Technical 
Reports Server (ntrs.nasa.gov), the NASA Science and Technical Information Center 
(www.sti.nasa.gov), the Wyle Integrated Science and Engineering Space Medicine 
Library and the University of Texas Medical Branch Charles Berry Space Medicine 
Library. 
2.3 Pre-Summit Questionnaire 
Once a set of key Constellation issues had been identified and compared against the 
Skylab program’s architecture and experience domain, a set of critical questions was 
created and refined.  This question set was vetted by Dr. Joe Kerwin, Skylab 2 
astronaut and crew representative for the Medical Operations summit.  With his 
approval, the questions were presented to the Skylab and SMEAT crews for review.  
The crewmembers had the opportunity to evaluate the questions and provide written 
responses prior to the summit if they wished.  Most of the Skylab and Skylab Medical 
Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT) crewmembers opted to provide verbal responses 
at the summit.  
2.4 Summit Responses 
The Skylab Medical Operations Summit was conducted over one and a half days, on 
January 23 – 24, 2008.  In attendance were representatives from Skylab and SMEAT 
missions and the Skylab Medical Operations community.  The first day of the summit 
was a closed session due to the confidential nature of some of the discussion which 
focused on Medical Operations, Habitability and Water Landing and Recovery.  The 
second day of the summit was open to invited guests from the larger NASA and 
Constellation community.  The second day started with a summary of 
  6 
recommendations generated by the Skylab participants from the previous day’s 
discussion.  The summary was followed by a question and answer period and a final 
set of questions/recommendations related to Launch/Thrust Oscillation and Umbilical 
EVA operations.  During the Summit, a moderator presented each question from the 
Summit Questionnaire to the Skylab participants.  During both closed and open 
sessions, a panel of Constellation Medical Operations Personnel then had an 
opportunity to pursue discussion or present follow-up questions to the Skylab guests.  
The responses and discussions were recorded for further analysis. 
2.5 Post-Summit Review and Validation 
The audio recordings and written notes from the summit were then used to create the 
Skylab participants’ recommendations and an edited transcript of the Summit.  The 
completed document was sent out to the Constellation Medical Operations summit 
participants for their review and approval.  The refined document was then sent to the 
Skylab and SMEAT participants for their review and approval. 
2.6 Document Organization and Formatting 
A complete transcript of the summit is not provided in this document.  The purpose of 
the document is to present Skylab participant comments and recommendations.  While 
participant comments are preserved, tangential and/or redundant conversations are not 
presented here.  In addition, detailed conversations about the Constellation Program 
have also been removed given the uncertainties of design and occasionally sensitive 
nature of the discussion.   
 
Some participants provided both written responses and verbal comments during the 
summit.  Verbal responses are presented here unless that participant’s written 
comments provide additional novel information. 
 
Various formatting symbols are used to reference meta-information throughout the 
document.  Among other things, parentheses enclose references to other sections of 
this document.  Superscript numerals refer to documents delineated in the 
Reference/Bibliography list.  Square brackets enclose editorial comments and 
clarifications. 
 
Consensus recommendations are provided in Section 4.  Each recommendation is 
followed by a brief discussion/rationale that is referenced to specific comments or 
written responses.  These select and representative responses are provided in section 5.  
Crew/participant comments are grouped under the applicable question/topic heading.  
On occasion a participant presented additional thoughts or comments on a previous 
discussion.  These comments were moved to the applicable question/topic.  
Occasionally a participant or a panel member would present a question not found in 
the Summit Questionnaire.  These questions and their responses have been added to 
Section 5 as well. 
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3.0 RESULTS 
3.1 Data 
We received feedback from 100% of the surviving Skylab/SMEAT astronauts.  
Eighty-two percent (9 of 11) of the astronauts were able to participate in the summit.  
The remaining two crewmembers provided written responses and their comments were 
presented during the Summit discussion.  In addition to Skylab and SMEAT 
crewmember input, we received written responses from Dr. Harrison Schmitt, Apollo 
scientist-astronaut and chair of the NASA Advisory Committee.  Dr. Chuck Ross, 
Skylab/SMEAT Flight Surgeon, participated in the summit and provided invaluable 
medical operations perspective.  These data are presented on Table 1 below. 
Table 1.  Skylab Medical Operations Project Participation. 
Participant Role Available Pre-Summit 
Responses 
Summit 
Participants 
Total Unique 
Responses 
Skylab Crewmember 8 4 6 8 
SMEAT Crewmember 3 2 3 3 
Apollo Scientist-
Astronaut 
1 1 0 1 
Skylab/SMEAT 
Program Flight 
Surgeon 
1 0 1 1 
3.2 Participants 
The following personnel were key participants in the Skylab Medical Operations 
Summit discussion: 
3.2.1 Skylab Program Representatives 
 
Mr. Paul J. Weitz  Skylab 2 Pilot 
Dr. Joseph Kerwin  Skylab 2 Science Pilot 
Capt. Alan Bean  Skylab 3 Commander 
Col. Jack Lousma  Skylab 3 Pilot 
Dr. Owen Garriott  Skylab 3 Science Pilot 
Col. Gerald Carr  Skylab 4 Commander 
Col. William Pogue  Skylab 4 Pilot 
Dr. Edward Gibson  Skylab 4 Science Pilot 
Capt. Robert Crippen SMEAT Commander 
Col. Karol Bobko  SMEAT Pilot 
Dr. William Thornton SMEAT Science Pilot 
Dr. Charles Ross  Skylab Flight Surgeon 
Dr. Harrison Schmitt Apollo Scientist-Astronaut 
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3.2.2 Constellation Medical Operations Representatives 
 
Dr. Kjell Lindgren  Moderator, Flight Surgeon, Constellation Medical Ops 
Dr. Jeff Jones  Flight Surgeon, Constellation Medical Operations Lead 
Dr. Richard Scheuring Flight Surgeon, Constellation Medical Operations 
Dr. Pete Bauer  Flight Surgeon, Constellation Medical Operations/Orion 
Dr. Serena Aunon  Flight Surgeon, Constellation Medical Operations/Orion 
Dr. Keith Brandt  Flight Surgeon, Constellation Medical Operations/EVA 
Dr. David Alexander Flight Surgeon, Constellation Medical Operations/EVA 
Mr. Michael Chandler Constellation Medical Operations/Landing and Recovery 
Dr. Doug Hamilton  Flight Surgeon, Wyle Advanced Projects 
Dr. David Gillis  Flight Surgeon, Wyle Advanced Projects 
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4.0  CREW CONSENSUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
4.1 Medical Operations 
4.1.1 The presence of a physician as a crewmember was helpful but not 
mandatory for the low-Earth orbital profile flown during Skylab.  
While there was no firm written requirement to have a physician fly on Skylab, Dr. 
Kerwin’s assignment was beneficial to a research and operations plan that was 
heavy in biomedical research and life sciences (5.1.1a). Crewmembers felt that pre-
flight medical training, an excellent on-board medical checklist, the availability of 
the flight surgeon in mission control and an ability to de-orbit in an emergency were 
adequate to address most medical concerns (5.1.3a,b; 5.1.4a,b; 5.1.6b).  There was a 
mixed consensus regarding the assignment of a physician to future long-duration 
crews.  Some felt that a physician should be included in more remote missions 
where a quick de-orbit is not possible (5.1.4a,c).  Others felt that the best qualified 
astronauts should be assigned to missions, regardless of their prior professional 
training (5.1.4b). 
4.1.2 Real-world, hands-on activities (splinting, dental extractions, establishing 
intravenous access) are an important part of the medical training 
curriculum. 
There was general agreement that the medical training and more specifically the 
hands-on training that both the SMEAT and Skylab crews received was beneficial.  
The training provided in the Ben Taub Emergency Department, and military dental 
clinic was effective from both a procedural perspective, as well as in breaking down 
barriers/inhibitions to performing invasive procedures (5.1.3a-d). 
4.1.3 Crews should have equipment to sample, identify and quantify potential 
atmospheric contaminants. 
The loss of the thermal shielding during the launch of the Orbital Workshop resulted 
in high temperatures and a concern for toxic off-gassing within the habitable 
volume.  The SL-2 crew was able to sample the atmosphere for suspect toxic 
contaminants, including carbon monoxide and TDI (toluene diisocyanate) (5.1.9c).  
Based on experiences during both Skylab and Shuttle flights, it is important to have 
the ability to sample the atmosphere (especially in the presence of an unknown odor) 
and identify/quantify potential atmospheric contaminants (5.1.9d-f).  
4.1.4 Long-duration crew activities should be scheduled in a manner that 
provides flexibility, minimizes ground micromanagement, and 
acknowledges the crew commander’s prerogative.  
Skylab provided NASA with its first opportunity to manage long-duration crew 
activities.   While there was disagreement as to whether or not Mission Control and 
the Flight Director should be actively protecting sleep/eat/exercise time, it was 
generally agreed that the crew commander should be actively involved with 
scheduling issues (5.1.10a-c,h).  The schedule should be flexible and avoid 
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micromanaging trivial tasks (5.1.10a,c,d,e).  The Skylab 4 crew felt that they were 
much more productive when the “shopping list” method was adopted for non-time 
critical tasks (5.1.10d).  However, there are time blocks that need to be protected, 
such as the sleep period prior to de-orbit and landing (5.1.10f,g). 
4.1.5 An entire ISS Expedition of six months’ duration with a crew of six 
should be planned, equipped, staffed and carried out exclusively or 
primarily for Life Sciences, and devoted to verifying countermeasures. 
Life sciences research formed a major pillar of the Skylab research agenda.1  The 
“Biomedical Results from Skylab” was a seminal work in the field of space 
medicine and physiology, having carefully documented many of the physiologic 
changes induced by long-duration spaceflight.2  This document played in important 
role in subsequent long-duration flight preparation and continues to serve as a 
reference for physicians and researchers alike (5.1.13f, 5.14.9j).  A similar 
undertaking in the form of an expedition-class life science research program would 
allow the ISS program to not only further our understanding of deconditioning and 
countermeasures, but pave our way to Mars (5.1.1b). 
4.2 Umbilical Extra-Vehicular Operations 
4.2.1 Crewmember EVA umbilicals should receive oxygen from individual 
loops, rather than from a single common loop, if at all possible. 
When conducting EVAs from the Skylab vehicle, each crewmember was on an 
individual regulator hooked to a single high pressure loop, so that if one 
crewmember lost suit pressure, the others would be unaffected (5.2.3b).  When 
conducting EVA operations from the CM, all crewmembers were on a single loop.  
In this case, if one crewmember lost suit pressure the others would also be affected.  
This was not felt to be an ideal system (5.2.3b,d).  
4.2.2 A well designed umbilical system will work fine for extra-vehicular 
activity.    
The umbilical system used by the Skylab astronauts during EVA on the Skylab 
cluster utilized an open oxygen loop that proved to be simple, reliable and safe 
(5.2.1a).  Unfortunately this type of open loop system vents excess gases from the 
suit and requires a sizable oxygen reservoir (5.2.1a).  Care should be taken to insure 
that the umbilical is long enough to reach all potentially repairable parts of the 
vehicle.  During the solar panel deployment, Pete Conrad found himself at the end of 
his umbilical and almost unable to effect the repair (5.2.1a). 
4.2.3 Pre-positioned handrails and mobility aids are ideal, but deployable 
mobility aids should work okay, as long as the connectors and path have 
been well thought out and properly designed. 
Handrails and mobility aids were pre-installed for planned EVAs to the distal end of 
the Apollo Telescope Mount, and were a “joy” to use (5.2.1a).  Unplanned EVAs 
were conducted to parts of the Skylab cluster (i.e. solar panel deployment) that had 
no preinstalled mobility aids.  The crew completed these activities using improvised 
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translation paths and tools (5.2.1a).  If mobility aids are not pre-deployed, a plan to 
attach them where they are needed is both feasible and attractive, as long as it well 
thought out (5.2.1j; 5.2.8a-c).  Be careful not to declare any part of the vehicle 
“immune” to the need for EVA (5.2.8b). 
4.2.4 Training in the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory and “Zero-G” plane are 
not sufficient for EVA planning and preparation.  Planners and crew 
should get a crewmember with actual EVA experience involved in 
training and preparation.   
Early in the Shuttle program, neutral buoyancy training and “Zero-G” flights were 
thought to provide adequate preparation for the procedure development and the 
execution of Shuttle EVAs (5.2.1o).  Problems encountered during early satellite 
rendezvous disproved this thinking and underscored the importance of utilizing 
input from crewmembers experienced in EVA (5.2.1o). 
4.2.5 Ensure that EVA training covers all anticipated tasks. 
During Skylab EVA training, one crew did not perform one small part of a task in 
the pool, because it involved flight hardware (5.2.1r).  As it turns out, this task was 
the most difficult obstacle encountered in all 3 EVAs during the mission (5.2.1r). 
4.2.6 If strenuous work is anticipated during EVA, a liquid cooling system is 
preferred over an air cooling system. 
EVAs conducted from the Skylab vehicle utilized liquid cooling, which worked very 
well (5.2.7a).  The EVAs conducted from the Command Module were very limited 
in duration and degree of exertion, so the air cooling system proved to be adequate 
(5.2.7c).  If strenuous activity is anticipated, the life support system should provide 
liquid cooling for EVA, as was clearly demonstrated during the Gemini program 
(5.2.7c). 
4.3 Launch 
4.3.1 The crew did not recall significant thrust oscillation or pogo effect.  The 
vibrations that were encountered did not interfere with operations. 
By all accounts the ride was fairly smooth (5.3.1b,i,j; 5.3.2a). 
4.4 Water Landing and Recovery 
4.4.1 Cost and weight aside, land landings were preferred over water landings. 
While land landings were largely preferred (5.4.5m,o),  two crewmembers preferred 
water landings (5.4.1hh; 5.4.5q).  Land landings provide for quicker accessibility to 
the crew for medical care/rescue if needed (5.4.1a). This recommendation was made 
understanding that putting weight and cost aside are not easily done (5.4.5r).  
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4.4.2 The program should consider an architecture that allows the crews to re-
enter without pressure suits. 
The Skylab crewmembers took their pressure suits off after undocking and reentered 
in coveralls (5.4.1r,z,aa).  Given the state of post-mission deconditioning, a 
crewmember expressed concern about being able to egress the side hatch into a raft 
(5.4.1aa; 5.6.1a)  The suit should definitely come off before getting in the water 
(5.4.1w; 5.6.1cc; 5.11.2e).  One participant commented that the crew would have 
more flexibility in dealing with contingencies if they were unencumbered by the suit 
(5.4.1v).  Hazards encountered in the past that would seem to support suited entry 
(the toxic exposure experienced by the ASTP crew, and the fatal decompression that 
occurred during the re-entry of Soyuz 11) are felt to be outliers (5.6.1dd).  From a 
hardware point of view, a Soyuz-type of depressurization couldn’t occur on the 
Apollo Command Module or CEV (5.6.6a,e; 5.7.4b).  Precautions against fatal 
depressurization could still be taken, by wearing pressure suits during vehicle 
separation; but these should be doffed prior to re-entry (5.6.1dd, 5.6.6a, 5.7.4b).  
Atmospheric contamination could be addressed with emergency breathing apparatus 
(5.6.5b). 
4.4.3 Rather than spend a lot of time on how to support the crew in the vehicle 
for long periods of time post-landing, the program should focus on 
conducting precision landings, within close range of recovery forces. 
This was a problem that was discussed during Apollo.  But with the appropriate 
mid-course correction and all the improved technology available today, a precision 
landing should not be a problem (5.4.2g,h). 
4.4.4 Crews should be hoisted onto the recovery vessel while still inside the 
capsule, and not forced to egress the vehicle and hoisted individually 
from a raft. 
There was a strong consensus among the participants that hoisting the crewed 
capsule was much safer than hoisting individuals from the water (5.4.4a,d).  Safety 
aside there is a lot of financial and training overhead that goes into individually 
hoisting crewmembers from rafts (5.4.5f). 
4.4.5 Post-landing activity planning must take physiologic space-related 
changes into account. 
In addition to loss of strength and balance, neuromuscular deconditioning could 
limit a crewmember’s ability to immediately egress the spacecraft after landing 
(5.5.5b,d).  In the absence of any post-landing emergency, the crew might be able to 
self-egress if given the opportunity to hydrate and acclimate for a few hours (5.6.1j). 
Given the difficulty in defining the constraints caused by deconditioning, consider 
having ISS crewmembers returning from three to six month missions attempt Orion 
recovery procedures soon after return (5.10.1b). 
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4.4.6 In all but the most extreme of circumstances (fire, toxic atmosphere, 
sinking) the crew should stay in the capsule until they are recovered. 
As long as the capsule is seaworthy, it is the safest place for the crew (5.6.1dd; 
5.8.4g). 
4.4.7 Emergency breathing masks should be within reach of each individual 
crewmember during all unsuited phases of flight. 
Crewmembers should not have to dig through stowage to access the emergency 
breathing masks (5.6.5a), nor should the masks be accessible to only one 
crewmember, who is then responsible for their distribution.  This could be a problem 
if the responsible crewmember was incapacitated (5.6.5d). 
4.4.8 After re-entry, returning crews should be able to maintain constant, 
direct communications with Search and Rescue forces.   In addition, 
other resources (MCC, recovery vessels, medical personnel) should be 
monitoring the loops and be available for direct communication with the 
crew if needed. 
Aside from a few glitches, Skylab crews were happy with the performance of their 
Location and Recovery communications equipment, which allowed them to be 
“aware of what recovery was doing at all times.”3  It was felt that future crews 
should continue to have constant, direct communication capability with Search and 
Recovery forces (5.9.1a, 5.9.3c,h).  Furthermore, it was felt that with the current and 
future state of networked communications, resources such as Mission Control and 
medical personnel should be monitoring capsule communications and be available 
for immediate, direct consultation with the crew (5.9.3a,f,h,j; 5.9.4a,f-h; 5.9.5a). 
4.4.9 Returning crews should be equipped with a GPS receiver and a satellite 
phone. 
Given the advances that have been made in even consumer technology, a GPS 
receiver and an emergency locator beacon are absolute necessities for returning 
crews (5.9.1d-g, 5.9.2a).  A satellite phone would be a valuable tool in a contingency 
(5.9.6a). 
4.4.10 Strongly consider whether or not a life raft is necessary.  If a raft is used, 
it must be deployed in a fashion that allows the crew to fall into if from 
the hatch and not require ingress from the water. 
One crewmember suggested that is seems somewhat impractical to haul a hundred 
pounds of raft to the moon and back.  It was suggested that the raft is a holdover 
from Mercury and Gemini when landing accuracy was a little more suspect 
(5.10.1o).  Many crewmembers felt that it was probably impossible for a 
deconditioned crewmember to ingress a survival raft from the water (5.10.1c,e,f,n).  
If there isn’t a raft, crews should re-enter wearing LPUs or an inflatable life 
preserver (5.6.2b). 
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4.4.11 Care should be exercised when determining post-flight activities.   
Lifting heavy loads, climbing ladders and doffing a pressure suit would be difficult 
(5.6.1c,e; 5.10.1a,n).  Crews should not be expected to swim to stay afloat or climb 
into a raft (5.10.1n).  At no time should returning deconditioned long-duration 
crewmembers get into the water wearing a pressure suit (5.4.1w; 5.6.1a,cc; 5.11.2e). 
4.5 Habitability 
4.5.1 An assessment program like the Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude 
Test (SMEAT) could be a useful endeavor, depending on the specifics of 
the mission, equipment and protocols to be studied. 
The 56-day SMEAT test contributed to Skylab’s success by vetting protocols and 
identifying faulty equipment.4  A program like this would be most beneficial for 
evaluating long duration missions using new equipment (5.14.1a-b).  Many Skylab 
systems would probably have failed in orbit had they not been tested in the manner 
undertaken by SMEAT (5.14.1.c-d, 5.14.2a).  The most benefit will be derived if 
testing is conducted with flight hardware under rigorous, real-world conditions 
(5.14.1c-d, h). 
4.5.2 A Skylab-like Waste Management System (WMS) should be considered 
for future vehicles. 
The Skylab WMS was highly regarded.26  Once the deficiencies identified by 
SMEAT were corrected, the system performed well and was considered by many to 
be superior to the system utilized by the Space Shuttle (5.14.2j-l).  While somewhat 
constrained by the mass of the consumable containment bags, the system was felt to 
be effective and efficient, especially when stripped of the scientific research 
overhead (mass/volume measuring, sampling, drying, storage) (5.14.2h-l, 5.14.3e).  
The WMS should be positioned in a sealed compartment with a latchable door to 
contain odors and “debris” (5.14.3g). 
4.5.3 Odor control in the habitable volume is important. 
Odors were not much of a problem during Skylab.3  This was felt to be a function of 
the activated charcoal filters (5.14.3a), the reduced atmospheric pressure (5.14.3b), 
the low humidity (5.14.3c), the clean environment (5.14.3c) and good containment 
for both WMS areas (5.14.3g) and trash (5.14.3h-j). 
4.5.4 The use and architecture of the habitable volume is important. Separate 
volumes should be allotted for private and group use.  Private 
quarters/sleep compartments and a wardroom-like space are both 
important and should be incorporated into future vehicle designs where 
practical.   
Crewmembers had private sleeping compartments on Skylab.  While some slept in 
other parts of vehicle, many of the crew felt that it was important to have a private 
space (5.14.4b-d).  The wardroom was a place where the Skylab crew could 
congregate, play, work and the crew felt that it was a necessity (5.14.81-d).  One 
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crewmember commented that for a Mars Mission, it would be important to have “a 
place to be alone and a place to be together.  You need them both” (5.14.8d). 
4.5.5 Future vehicles should incorporate designs that facilitate on-orbit repair.  
Internal systems should be accessible via removable panels, and 
compatible with common tools. 
Some Skylab crews encountered situations where equipment needing repair were 
located behind “permanently” mounted panels (5.14.4f,i).  Equipment should not 
only be accessible, but also compatible with everyday tools (5.14.4g).  Specialized 
tools can quickly increase the volume and mass of a toolkit (5.14.4g). 
4.5.6 Future vehicles should be designed to minimize light and noise near the 
sleeping compartments. 
The Skylab WMS was located next to the sleeping compartments, such that its use at 
night could wake up other crewmembers (5.14.4e).  Both light and noise should be 
minimized (5.14.4f). 
4.5.7 Future vehicles and habitats should be designed to facilitate 
housekeeping and cleaning. 
The Skylab WMS was built with smooth walls and nonabsorbent surfaces to make 
cleaning easier.  Making “nooks and crannies” generally accessible for cleaning 
should prevent unfavorable growth and odor production (5.14.4j). 
4.5.8 Future vehicle designers should remember that lunar gravity offers a 
whole new set of opportunities. 
Issues associated with the Waste Management System, mass measurement, exercise 
and fluid shifts in microgravity may not be as problematic on the lunar surface 
(5.14.4.h). 
4.5.9 Food is important and the menu must be carefully considered.  Special 
care must be taken to avoid making the crew subsist on food bars. 
Skylab had a large dry volume and a freezer allotted for food storage.  Many 
crewmembers thought the nominal Skylab menu was excellent, and better than that 
available to early Shuttle crewmembers (5.14.4k-l).  Despite the palatable menu, 
nutrition and metabolic experiments required the crewmembers to consume a certain 
number of calories each day, which proved difficult for the members of the extended 
third Skylab mission, requiring them to augment their diet with calorie dense food 
bars (5.14.4m). 
4.5.10 While a shower is probably a luxury item for long duration spaceflight, 
the Skylab shower was refreshing and might be an especially welcome 
tool for dealing with lunar dust. 
While some crewmembers felt that the shower was a pleasant experience (5.14.5b,e) 
others felt that it was a luxury easily replaced by sponge baths (5.14.5c,d).  A major 
complaint is that it took too long to set up and clean up (5.14.5a-c).  In spite of these 
concerns, a shower may be desirable in a setting like the lunar habitat where lunar 
  16 
dust contamination is a problem and the presence of a gravity field eliminates some 
of the engineering obstacles encountered in Skylab (5.14.4h, 5.14.5f, 5.14.6e). 
4.5.11 Humidity control is important.  The low humidity experienced in Skylab 
and SMEAT led to skin cracking and fissuring. 
Some crewmembers felt that the dry Skylab environment led to skin fissuring and 
cracking, and that a relative humidity of 45 – 50% is ideal (5.14.6a-d).  Low 
humidity leading to skin dryness is not an insignificant issue, since fissuring and 
cracking can lead to skin infections and sores (5.14.6a-b). 
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5.0 PARTICIPANT RESPONSES 
5.1 Medical Operations 
5.1.1 Dr. Kerwin, Skylab had a large medical cache and an intensive 
biomedical research agenda.2  How did your experience as a physician 
affect/influence the SL-2 flight and the program as a whole? 
 
a.   Kerwin (Written): There was no firm written requirement for a physician on any of 
the Skylab missions either. However there was a physician astronaut in the corps 
and this mission was uniquely suited to that set of skills, because for the first time in 
NASA’s history the medical experiments and research were the top priority activity 
on the program and on the first flight.  
 
There were a couple of facts about Skylab which justified physician presence on the 
flight crew: 
1) Medical research had major priority on the mission – for the first time in 
NASA’s short history. A physician to perform certain procedures, and importantly 
as an observer and judge of crew well-being was value added. 
2) The relatively long duration of the flights made medical problems more likely 
(still not very likely,) and it was in NASA’s interest to avoid aborting a flight to 
bring home an ill or injured crewman. 
 
Consequently, I had many crew assignments before flight as the Astronaut Office 
representative – feasibility and risk of the medical experiments, the food system, the 
medical kit and training for it, and so on. 
 
We came to an agreement that two members of each crew would receive training as 
‘Crew Medical Officers’, able to perform a few basic medical examinations and 
treatments and to relay their findings to the Crew Flight Surgeon. Not much training 
time was available – about 80 hours – so it had to be used efficiently. 
 
First, the medical staff did some thinking about what illnesses/injuries were probable 
enough and treatable enough to be included (including first aid for things serious 
enough to abort the mission.) 
 
Based on that thinking, a document was prepared, the “IMSS Checklist.” IMSS 
stood for In-flight Medical Support System. It was aimed at being a practical, visual, 
easy-to-use manual for the crew, showing and telling how to examine and report, 
and how to conduct basic treatments at the direction of the Crew Flight Surgeon. 
 
In parallel with the manual, of course, was the assembly of the actual system – four 
lockers full of medical equipment and drugs. All the equipment was classified ‘A’ or 
‘B’.  ‘A’ items could be utilized by the crew at their discretion (e.g. aspirin, 
otoscope, bone saw (!); ‘B’ items required the presence or approval of a medical 
doctor.  There was considerable discussion about whether ‘B’ items could be 
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justified at all. I urged their inclusion, explaining to Deke Slayton that a certain 
amount of experimentation with the use of diagnostic and laboratory equipment 
would prepare NASA for longer missions, even if we didn’t strictly need them 
aboard Skylab; and that view prevailed. 
 
Then the training took place. Pilots learned to draw blood, perform CPR, use an 
otoscope and ophthalmoscope, extract teeth and do other wonderful things. They 
witnessed Friday nights in the Ben Taub emergency room. They extracted molars 
from patients (Air Force volunteers). They did all these things with their Crew Flight 
Surgeons, and some of them with the team of specialists which NASA assembled as 
in-flight advisors.  
 
The result was a pretty well integrated medical team, from the CMOs (and me) in 
flight, through the flight surgeons, to the specialists, none of whose services were 
actually needed in flight, but whose presence and interest was gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
So was the physician needed, and/or useful? You might ask the other crewmen about 
that. My personal judgment is that he/she’s not needed on the Moon, at least until 
stays become long and crews large; but is mandatory on a Mars mission – and 
therefore some medical doctors should be included on Lunar crews for training, 
experience and hardware & procedure development. That’s one of the main reasons 
we’re going to the Moon, right? 
 
b. Kerwin (Written): I have one recommendation that goes beyond the Skylab data 
and conclusions, but I believe in it: ‘An ISS Expedition of six months duration with 
a crew of six should be planned, equipped, staffed and carried out exclusively or 
primarily for Life Sciences, and devoted to verifying countermeasures.’  This would 
take at least three years to plan and provision, and international participation to 
crew, and would rescue ISS from the present triviality of its scientific results. 
5.1.2 Did you have any evidence base for why you brought the equipment you 
included?   We are going to look at what has actually occurred during 
space flight, look at risk assessment data and see what we need to bring 
along.  ISS transfers have medical issues but they will be different for 
moon missions.  What was the kit based on?  Did you have it because you 
could? 
 
a.   Kerwin: To some extent we had it because we could have it.  Skylab was unique in 
that we had, especially compared to CEV, no weight constraints.  There was some 
work done looking at US Navy incidents, particularly on submarines – PJ [Weitz] 
did some work on that.  In the dental area, we went to the dental clinic and asked Dr. 
Fromme what his experience was with the astronaut corps.  Now this is from 
memory and this may be wrong, but there was around 1 serious incident per 6 
man/months for terrestrial care.  This added up to a 5% probability that a serious 
dental incident could occur in-flight, just randomly, not based on weightlessness.  
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That appeared to justify the dental kit and training, and the ability to deal with those 
injuries so we wouldn’t have to abort a flight. 
  
b.   Ross: During Apollo we did have small medical kits that came in useful for issues 
like sinus blocks and headaches.  We did have some issues with diarrhea (some of 
which was possibly caused by the water system with hydrogen bubbles in water or 
potassium added to the Tang).   We did have to use Lomotil – so things like this 
need to be anticipated.  
5.1.3 It was reported that crews “spent 98 hours in medical training, receiving 
practical training in diagnosing illnesses at an outpatient level.”4  One 
crewmember commented that “I thought the paramedical training we got 
was very useful.”  Another stated that “I think we were really prepared 
for a large number of things up there.” Was there a designated crew 
medical officer or did all crewmembers receive training?  Any other 
comments on the medical training? 
 
a.   Garriott: There were no designated crew medical officers on the last two flights; all 
3 crewmembers went through everything on our flight.  
 
One thing we did routinely was blood draws.  We took turns drawing on each other.  
We all did everything, and if there was a question then we could ask the ground or 
the commander could tell us what he wanted to do.  We all agreed that it was very 
useful training that we got and we wouldn’t have wanted to go without it.  We 
planned to rely on the telemedicine when necessary and I think that is the way to go 
for the future. 
  
b.   Carr:  The same went for SL4, we all got the training. Our crew [SL4] designated 
Ed Gibson as the crew medical officer because he was the only one with a doctoral 
degree [in physics]. 
 
c.   Gibson (Written): All of our crew received medical training, both operational and 
experiments. We were as well prepared as we could be considering the small amount 
of training we received. Actual hands on training (ER and other) was useful to have 
us breakdown what inhibitions we might have for hands-on treatment. 
 
d.   Ross: We took crews to Ben Taub Emergency Room on Friday nights.  The guys 
got some experience doing suturing, got to see some fractures and how they might 
be attended to. 
 
e. Lousma (Written): All crewmembers were trained.  Training was excellent for 
Skylab and much of it was applicable to non-space field medicine scenarios for 
activities in remote areas. 
 
f. Schmitt (Written):  In addition to the cross-training [discussed below] crew should 
be well-trained in protocols designed to understand adaptive responses to one-sixth 
gravity.  The Lunar Biomedical Workshop strongly recommended that basic 
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biomedical data should be rigorously collected on all lunar crew as a critical 
component to preparation for Mars exploration.  The Skylab protocols should be 
examined as potential prototypes for lunar data collection.  As the use of the CEV 
will be no more prolonged than for Apollo missions, specialized medical training 
may not be warranted beyond that of a general nature related to the use of medical 
supplies.  Some CEV missions may have a physician on-board as a consequence of 
other crew manifest requirements. 
5.1.4 When do you move from paramedic training to having an actual 
physician on-board?  In the level-of-care system we outlined, we have 
kind of done that by mission distance and duration.5  Where is that line?  
When is it good to have a physician? 
 
a.   Lousma: The criteria we used were based on the fact that we could get home rather 
quickly if we needed to from Skylab.  We did not want to come home for something 
that could be solved during flight, but on the other hand, we weren’t all that far 
away.  When you talk about going to the moon, you’re talking about being 3 days 
away, rather than 24 hours.  I think that is a good dividing point.   
 
b.   Bean:  I always feel like the people who go on a rocket flight into space are willing 
to take some chances – now that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t solve every problem we 
can.  But I would have to say that some of the conversation is not what we worried 
about on a day-to-day basis.  I always felt like we had great communication with the 
doctors on Earth and I would have had full confidence in Owen or Jack to do any of 
those things that could have come up – where the doctors would brief them and then 
they would do it, so I think taking a doctor to Mars is the wrong idea.  I think we 
ought to take the best qualified people to do the exploration.  We ought to take the 
best people up there to do what we need to do on the Space Station and then allow or 
provide for telemedicine which worked great for us. 
 
c. Schmitt (Written):  Once a lunar outpost is established and crew sizes reach 
beyond four, a crew physician should be available; however, this physician should 
be cross-trained in at least one of the other required disciplines and one of the other 
crew should be cross-trained to at least a level of a Physician’s Assistant as a back-
up to the primary physician.  The most likely crew to be so-crossed trained would be 
one with some other professional scientific specialty. 
5.1.5 In the Constellation medical concept of operations we anticipate a 
capability to bring advanced medical equipment back with the crew if 
there is an illness or injury on the moon.  Did you have a capability to 
carry advanced medical resources with you down to the ground? 
 
a.   Kerwin: No.  We had no plans and no real capability to carry medical diagnostic or 
treatment equipment with us back to Earth.  The first I ran into that was with Mike 
Chandler when we were working on the Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) in 
the late 1980’s.  Only then did we begin to develop significant plans for bringing 
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equipment back, and where to put it on a special couch, and to have the crew 
medical officer in the adjacent couch.  But nothing on Skylab. 
 
b.   Thornton: I hope you are interfacing with the USAF air evacuation community.  
Those people are doing incredible things with great small carry-on medical 
capability. 
5.1.6 Did crews without a physician receive any medical "refresher" training 
on-orbit? 
 
a.   Pogue (Written): No.  However we had a daily radio link with our flight 
physicians. As with our radio links with the family, these interchanges were 
recorded but not released to anyone. The only person who heard these interchanges 
other than the participants was the COMTEC who set up the link and monitored to 
maintain the link. The interchanges with the flight physicians covered operational as 
well as medical topics. Deke [Slayton] insisted on the recordings so that if an 
accident or incident occurred, they might be useful in an investigation. The family 
conversation recordings were all returned to the applicable crewmen. 
 
b. Lousma (Written): Not that I recall.  Medical ops manuals were very thorough. 
 
c. Gibson (Written):  No, not on our mission. 
5.1.7 Skylab had a well stocked medical suite. 6  In a technical debrief, a 
crewmember stated that “as far as quantity of medications and supplies, 
I would guess we used about 0.01 percent of the available medication.”3 
Another crewmember agreed that quantity was not an issue, but 
organization and inventory could have been better.7  Skylab had 
adequate supplies, but were they the right supplies? 
 
a.   Ross:  We had 62 medications in the IMSS kit, and we had to look at their shelf life.  
And with the heat problem experienced on the first mission, we had to restock after 
that because it was felt that we could not take a chance on degradation of the 
medications that were up there.  So that may be another thing that you all may need 
to talk about, medication turnover and possibilities of degradation, etc. 
 
b.   Kerwin:  I think you people are probably miles beyond us with all the shuttle and 
ISS experience.  Sure they were not the right supplies for today, and sure they were 
more than we needed for then, but we had the basic stuff – we had pain medication, 
we had skin medication, we had stuff for URIs and for sleep, but there was a lot of 
stuff we didn’t use. 
 
c.   Lousma:  We also had extensive sensitivity sessions for those medications.  We 
each took all of them to see how we reacted to them if we had to use them.  We did 
this 6 months or so prior to flight. 
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d.   Pogue (Written):  I’m not qualified to say other than for time-critical treatment (e.g. 
cardiac arrest), the CPR equipment should be stowed where it is readily available, 
identifiable with dedicated power supplies, etc. So you don’t have to assemble 
anything or string out conductors/look for a power outlet. On Skylab we had one 
locker in the wardroom used for this. It included a heart needle (cardiac arrest or 
pneumothorax), an ampule of epinephrine, and a tracheotome for blocked airway. 
 
e.   Lousma:  We had a bone saw that we didn’t use on anybody, but we used it to fix 
some things!  [The bone saw was used to score bolt heads so that they could be 
manipulated with a screwdriver] 
 
f.  Lousma (Written): They seemed right for Skylab durations, but longer missions in 
harsher environments will undoubtedly need additional and more recently developed 
meds and equipment. 
 
g. Gibson (Written):  Since we used very little of the medications, it is hard to assess 
if the right medications were available. I did not feel that I could adequately 
prescribe medications for myself or my crewmates since we did not focus on that in 
our training. We always assumed that consultation with the ground docs would be 
available.   
5.1.8 The Constellation project is evaluating CEV seat design.  Apollo reports 
suggest that the shift from the unitized, contoured, individualized couch 
to an adjustable, foldable couch allowed the crew to quickly disassemble 
and stow the seats for IVA and EVA activity.8  One crew reported some 
difficulty installing the CM center couch in preparation for de-orbit.7  In 
CEV, a modified crew seat (electrically isolated) is being evaluated for 
use as a patient restraint.9  How quickly could a stowed seat be deployed 
for medical use? 
 
a.   Lousma:  It depends on how you make it, but it needs to be quick and simple.  
 
b.   Thornton:  You know the criticality of time under those circumstances when using 
the defibrillator.  I’d look carefully at this. 
 
c.   Kerwin:  My recollection is that unstowing and restowing the command module 
middle seat was pretty easy to do.  We didn’t have any problems with it and I think 
it’s practical. 
 
d.   Gibson (Written):  We had little difficulty stowing and unstowing the center couch. 
If the seat is well designed and the stowage is simple, it should not be an issue. 
 
e.   Lousma: I wouldn’t compromise the ability of the seat to withstand a landing to 
make it into a restraint system. 
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5.1.9 According to a crew debrief “There was a terrible smell in the workshop 
– really indescribable” upon entering the Orbital Workshop (OWS) for 
the first time – likely a byproduct of heating due to the loss of the 
micrometeoroid shield.3   Did you have any concerns about toxins, despite 
your charcoal-filter masks and the carbon monoxide and toluene 
diisocyanate testing you conducted? 
 
a.   Weitz:  According to the reference, that must be my statement and I sure don’t 
remember that being the case.  I don’t remember the smell being that bad.   
 
b.   Kerwin:  There was an odor, but it went away. 
  
c.   Ross:  This problem was looked at and apparently the heat never got up to the level 
where pyrolysis would occur and break the chemical bonds to release TDI.  
However, we were very much impressed by the possibility that carbon monoxide 
could be present.  The equipment that we had was able to do some sniff testing and 
that showed we were free of TDI and there was no appreciable load of carbon 
monoxide. 
 
d.   Lousma:  I think you should worry about it!   
 
e.   Bean: I do too. 
 
f.   Lousma:  I remember in the Space Shuttle Columbia I smelled things that I didn’t 
think I was going to smell and I didn’t know what they were and they were probably 
normal, but on the other hand maybe they weren’t.  I think that can happen any time 
– it could have happened on Skylab – I don’t remember any event like that where I 
was concerned about an odor but I do remember that in the Space Shuttle.  And the 
first thing that enters your mind is “What is it?” and “Is it dangerous?” “Is there 
some way to figure out what it is and is there a way to solve the problem if there is 
one?”  So it is a concern and it ought to be addressed.  
 
g. Gibson (Written):  No, I never had a concern even with the initial strange smell in 
the OWS because of the survival of the two “evaluation” crews before us. 
 
h. Pogue (Written):  I was on the third visit and we had no problem with odors. I think 
the overheating of the workshop before the first crew entered was the problem. In 
between missions the workshop was dropped to 0.25 psi and repressurized to 5.0 psi 
before the next crew arrived. The charcoal canisters did a great job of removing 
odors. Only in the MDA did I ever smell anything unpleasant. The air exchange 
wasn’t as good in the MDA and flatulence could be detected in there. 
5.1.10 Operational pressures have a tendency to impinge on personal time. The 
crew debriefs repeatedly touch on the topic of preserving time to sleep, 
eat and exercise.  One crewmember stated that “Not only must we plan to 
do it this way but we must have our flight planners on the ground, flight 
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directors, and the crewmembers realize that the most important thing 
that they can do is keep healthy and happy at that critical time.  And 
make sure that, for example, if they’re hustling along with a few things 
that come up like they always do and if it gets much past dinner time, the 
flight director should remind them to eat.  Everybody should settle down 
to offload the crewmembers so they can eat right on time.  And the same 
thing goes for exercise and going to sleep on time.”7  Any further 
comments on this issue? 
 
a.   Garriott:  I think there will be disagreement on this issue.  I would throw all of 
these out.  I think the crew knows when to eat.  I don’t think there is a problem with 
delaying the time at which you eat by 30, 45 minutes or an hour or something like 
that.  The crew knows when an issue is important enough to delay their sleep time 
by an hour or so.  And so I would leave a lot more of this up to the crew.  We did 
modify those things on occasion on our own time.  We were strongly motivated to 
do what we thought was important on that flight.  And we would not have liked for 
the ground to superimpose these kinds of timing issues on our activities.  Now I 
know I’m speaking for myself here and I don’t know if Jack [Lousma] or Alan 
[Bean] feel as strongly on that issue as I do or not.  I did not feel like we were 
imposed upon and I would have wanted the flexibility to remain up longer, as we 
did.  That flexibility is important to getting a larger fraction of the total work 
accomplished, which was our prime objective.  
 
b.   Lousma:  I agree with Owen, I think it is the commander’s prerogative.  People on 
the ground ought to plan for there to be time, but the crew should be prime to decide 
how on how to use their time. 
 
c.   Crippen:  I’d like to comment from a CapCom perspective, as I was CapCom 
during Skylab.  The ground really doesn’t have a very clear picture of what is going 
on on-board.  So I really agree with what Jack [Lousma] said – the commander 
ought to be directly involved with scheduling issues.  On Jerry’s [Carr] flight the 
ground kept scheduling like they had when Al’s [Bean] flight was at its peak.  We 
started off slow and they got good so we kept scheduling at that rate.  We started 
scheduling the last Skylab flight at the same rate as the other guys had finished up 
with – to the point that we overdrove them.  So the ground needs to be involved, but 
the crew needs to be involved as well.  Jerry [Carr] did the right thing and came 
down and said “Hey, whoa, this is too much.”  Do you want to comment on that 
Jerry? 
  
d.  Carr: Yeah I refer to that call we made as the “First sensitivity session in space,” 
where we told the people on the ground what they were doing that was driving us 
crazy and we had to sit and listen to them tell us what we were doing wrong that was 
screwing up their schedule.  The crux of the issue was over scheduling.  When you 
get to the point where you are scheduling trivial things to be done at a precise time 
you are going to start affecting productivity.   When we loosened up the schedule on 
Skylab 4 and went to what we called “the shopping list” and only scheduled at a 
certain time that which was important because of where we were in the trajectory we 
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became more productive.  I think that’s something we got to keep in mind. I’ve 
heard interchanges with the old SpaceHab where the MCC started pushing the crews 
and then you start getting some snappy remarks back and forth.  There is a little bit 
of it from ISS I’m told.  There are issues when people forget about flexibility and 
productivity just goes to pot when you have to follow the carrot all of the time. 
 
e.  Lindgren:  So the consensus is that we should reduce micromanagement and that 
flexibility is a key to improving efficiency, is that correct?  [General agreement]  
 
f.  Ross:  One issue is sleep time.  We learned from the first Skylab mission that there 
was about 17 hours from the time of wake-up to landing.   I think it is a real problem 
if the guys have to work half way through the night to de-orbit and try to make a 
landing and feel good.  I agree with everything Owen [Garriott] said, except on this 
landing day sleep time 
 
g.  Garriott:  I agree with that too. 
 
h. Lousma (Written): Better planning is good in theory, but the crew will usually put 
work ahead of eat, sleep and exercise.  The commander should make sure the crew’s 
personal needs (eat, sleep, and exercise) are met, not the Flight Director, who should 
focus on directing the ground planning to accommodate the crew needs. 
 
i. Pogue (Written):   My only comment relates to scheduling an exercise period too 
soon after a meal. I was scheduled right after breakfast one day and upchucked about 
15 minutes into a 30-minute ergometer protocol.  I reported the event to our flight 
physicians and that never occurred again. 
 
j. Gibson (Written):  For long missions, the productive work-relaxation cycles 
evolved over many centuries on the ground should be used. Also, the crew should 
not be chasing an overly detailed flight plan that usually puts the crew in the position 
of being behind. This subject has been treated in detail in our crew debriefings. 
 
k. Schmitt (Written):  The primary keys to behavioral health, in my experience, are 
(1) a well defined and agreed to command hierarchy, (2) useful and productive work 
and (3) periodic recreational and private time.  Hopefully, ISS planning already 
takes this into account.  Again, CEV mission times will be limited so this will not be 
much of an issue.  Lunar Outpost (and Mars mission) planning, however, will need 
to carefully take these keys into account, remembering that there will always be 
useful and productive work to do (including refresher operational training) and that 
lunar EVA activities have a strong recreational component to them. 
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5.1.11 One of the problems still seen today is in the relationship between the 
science and operations communities.  Skylab maintained an excellent 
rapport with the scientific community, both programmatically and day-
to-day.  The relationship between the crews of the second and third 
Skylab missions had a particularly good relationship with the science 
principal investigators.  How did you manage the schedule so well? 
 
a.  Carr:  Well, you remember on Skylab 4, they finally allowed the unspeakable, one 
of the scientists was allowed to speak to Ed Gibson directly without a CapCom and I 
think that was the beginning of a much better relationship between the scientists on 
the ground and the crew trying to do the job for them.   
 
b.  Garriott:  We did a number of things that improved that relationship substantially.  
We talked also with Bob McQueen, the PI on the solar occultation experiment 
directly. I think the most important thing was we went to extra effort.  As soon as we 
got up [in the morning], one of us went straight to the ATM, one of us fixed 
breakfast for all three and the other set about doing the housekeeping activities.  
After dinner in the evening, one of use went back to the ATM.  So we were 
monitoring that thing, almost every waking hour.  And we did that partly because we 
felt that we were behind.  So I think working with them on that, talking with them 
individually and talking about the kinds of activities that they were interested in I 
think made a great relationship, and I think it continued on into SL-4.  And so I 
think it is just getting to know these folks personally, understanding what their 
objectives are and doing everything possible to maximize their research.  I look 
upon us as being their “hands on-orbit,” their “graduate students in-flight.”   I think 
that kind of relationship developing with the PIs on each of the experiments was 
what mattered.   
 
c.   Thornton:  Just a word of warning on that.  The scientists need to get some training 
in communication, other than from the TV.  Exact communication, that is.  It was a 
huge problem with people talking just for sake of talking.  Scientists need to be able 
to make real time inputs, but at the same time, there needs to be some discipline on 
the scientific side. 
 
d.  Garriott:  In fact, if you go back and look at what the communication really was, it 
was not all that important, it was trivial things.  As much as anything it was a help to 
establish rapport between the flight and the ground activities.   
 
e.  Carr:  One of the most important things that was done on the Skylab Program was 
when the scientific community and the astronauts got together and developed the 
JOP (Joint Observing Program).  I think that document went a long way to make 
things a lot better on Skylab in making sure that all of the scientists knew what they 
were going to get and what their part of the pie was.  
5.1.12 With regards to scheduling issues during the pre-flight period, some of 
the Apollo crewmembers stated they were frustrated at having trivial 
training introduced into their schedules in the month prior to launch.  
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How can we protect the crews in that last month prior to launch so that 
we don’t launch a tired crew?  
 
a.  Weitz: I don’t know how you decide what you ought to expose the crew to as far as 
trivial procedures go, but I remember one time that our training guy, Jake Smith 
decided to give us an extra lesson in collapsing the probe in the command module, 
which turned out to be time well spent!  We couldn’t get a proper docking when we 
made our final hard dock and Joe [Kerwin] and Pete [Conrad] had to apply that 
procedure to collapse the probe. 
 
b.  Kerwin:  We also had an 18-day quarantine period before flight which turned out to 
be almost a month with the delay.  That kept us from a lot of external pressures and 
made it easier for us to do that final prep.  
 
c.  Lousma:  I think that in the final month when you are getting ready for a flight and 
everybody comes to you with all of the things that ought to be done, I think it ought 
to be the Commander’s prerogative to decide what the crew needs to know the most.  
I think Al [Bean] did a good job with that on our flight and I did it on a shuttle 
flight.  Because otherwise your priorities are all wrong and you don’t get the training 
you need.  It ought to be up to the commander to decide what training they get all 
through the training process and especially that close to flight. 
 
d.  Ross:  There are a couple of incidents that you have to consider.  I agree with 
commander’s prerogative, but with some cooperation with the crew surgeon.  For 
example, one Apollo crew delighted in running on the beach.  And to make a long 
story short, this crew probably launched slightly dehydrated which led to problems I 
won’t get into.   Some crews wanted to go flying.  That was a great activity as they 
wanted to test themselves out because of some of the vestibular issues that had come 
about and had been noted in the earlier mission.  You have to allow astronauts things 
that are right for them.   
5.1.13 Mission planners did not understand many of the issues faced by crews 
during flight.  As a result, tight operations schedules were often felt to 
decrease efficiency.  How did intra-crew relationships and crew 
leadership styles affect crew efficiency? 
 
a.  Garriott:  Skylab 3 had a great commander.  We got along extremely well and I 
liked his style of leadership.  Al [Bean] takes a laid back approach, a very sensible 
approach.  He didn’t say “Jack, Owen, you go do this.”  He allowed decisions to be 
made among the group but yet the final decision had to be the commander’s.  I 
appreciated that very much.  He and I were motivated by different things, it’s a 
difference of approach and yet it worked extremely well.  He allowed us to motivate 
ourselves as we chose, but provided the example for all of us.  You need that kind of 
a commander. 
 
b.  Carr:  I might point out that we were all mentored by the same guy, Pete Conrad, 
who was in my opinion, one of the really great leaders in NASA.  
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c.  Kerwin:  It is interesting to note that all 3 of crews think they had the best 
Commander, and that’s the way it ought to be! 
 
d.  Bobko:  I was going to make the comment that the team that we are working with is 
not only the crew on the spacecraft, but includes the ground folks as well.  You 
know I think we had a nice tight group here in SMEAT as well as the Skylab guys.  
Mainly the problems that I have heard that have taken place have been between the 
ground and the folks on board. You have to expand your concept of team to include 
a lot of the folks on the ground as well.  
 
e.  Lousma: One of the reasons we had such good relationships with the medical 
groups and our flight surgeons was that we had all these medical experiments to do 
and it was one of the major objectives of the Skylab mission.  We not only wanted to 
survive and see if we could do it, but we wanted to bring back all the data we could.  
So we were motivated to get everything done that the Principal Investigators did, not 
only in the solar physics and Earth resources, but especially in the medical area.  
And so I think it was the dedication on their part to convey that information to us 
and they knew that we wanted to do the best we could and that really improved team 
coherence on the ground and in flight as well. 
 
f.  Carr: Several years after my mission, I spoke with Valeri Polyakov, and several of 
the other cosmonauts that flew on MIR and to a person they all told me that they 
were very grateful for the medical aspects of the Skylab that were published because 
it made their planning much easier to accomplish. 
 
g. Pogue (Written):  Tight scheduling is really difficult to deal with because of the 
domino or cascading effect. That is, if a job can’t be completed in the time allocated 
one task has to be sacrificed (the one at hand or the next one up). In my experience, 
intra-crew relationships a crew leadership styles were not an issue. 
 
h. Gibson (Written):  [Leadership affected crew effectiveness] tremendously. Jerry 
was a great leader and made sure that, despite the problems we encountered early in 
the mission, we worked well together as a cohesive team. 
5.1.14 The absence of a standard method for private communications affected 
the relationship between Skylab crews and mission planners, as there was 
a desire not to highlight problems on the open loops.7, 10, 11  Aside from 
improvements in communications, how else can we optimize the crew-
ground relationship? 
 
a.  Kerwin:  Again, you’ve probably come a long way on that.  Do today’s crews, on 
ISS and shuttle – can they call home when they want to? 
 
b.  Jones:  Yes, they have the IP phone and email.  They can communicate directly 
through those routes to personnel on the ground.  There are a means to privatize the 
space to ground communications.  We have the ability to do private medical 
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conferences daily or weekly on a routine basis.  The ground or the crew can call one 
at any time and we can privatize those loops. 
 
c.  Garriott:  Thirty years ago the medical community in particular did not want a 
private loop where you could discuss medical problems that they were not aware of.  
And I don’t know if that same concern would be present today. 
  
d.  Kerwin:  It wasn’t the medical community, it was the press.  It was the organized 
press that prevented us from effectively utilizing private communications.   
  
e.  Jones:  The Medical Privacy Act of 1974 basically enabled us to do that private 
communication because now that communication is privileged and protected by law.   
 
f.  Carr:  I might add that we probably would have had our “sensitivity session” in 
space at least 10 days earlier if it hadn’t been for the concern about having 
everything in the open media. 
 
g. Pogue (Written):  I think the TDRSS (Tracking Data and Relay Satellite System) 
has solved a lot of those. We only had comm for about 18-20% of our orbit. A lot of 
time we had a question for ground at the next AOS. As soon as the quindar 
squawked, ground started talking and we couldn’t get a word in edgewise before 
LOS occurred. With e-mail available and the almost continuous voice comm. 
possible, communication flow is greatly enhanced and the cessation of the asinine 
PAO policy of releasing everything has gone a long way in taking care of the 
“private communications” issue. 
 
h. Gibson (Written):  1. Plenty of crew-ground interactions before flight in 
simulations and discussions of this subject; 2. PRIVATE communications on a 
regular basis with the planners on the ground without the intrusion of the press. 
5.1.15 So if you had private communications, would you have reported more 
medical conditions? 
  
a.  Kerwin: We wouldn’t because we didn’t have any.  We talked to Chuck Ross on a 
daily basis.  We didn’t have any serious medical problems, but we did have the 
exercise problem which was a major problem – learning how to ride the bike.  We 
discussed that with Chuck.  [With regards to the cycle ergometer] Pete had a private 
management conference that he called on his own, outside the rules, but it solved the 
problem.   
 
b.  Lousma:  It allowed Al [Bean] to ride the bike around the Earth! 
  
c.  Ross:  One of the problems in the private communications session was that I was 
tasked to take a sheet [of paper] and to get information that the crew would give me 
to translate back to PIs at the morning PI session.   So I had to take a bunch of data 
down, numbers, remarks, whatever and cover this whole sheet.  Well I don’t think 
that should have to be done.  I think the private communication ought to be for 
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legitimate medical concerns and problems that are evolving, and they ought to be 
kept privileged and confidential. 
5.1.16 Did you feel like these communications were truly private? 
 
a.  Thornton:  Let me say that certainly our experience on SMEAT - we just gave up 
on that, there was so much cross-talk on the line.  It was obvious there were people 
listening in on the line.  That doesn’t help.  It shouldn’t just be medical privacy. 
 
b.  Jones:  We concur and I think we’ve gone a long way to implement that so that the 
crew can have some confidence that their discussions are private.   
 
c.  Bauer:  It’s a whole lot different now than it was before.  Even in the Shuttle-Mir 
program the only access the crew had to the ground was through the mission control 
center in Russia.  They would have regularly scheduled weekly conferences with 
their family.  And then when they would fly overhead in Houston, we’d talk to them 
on the ham radio.   There is electronic communication, they have a phone up on 
station – they can dial any number they feel like dialing, and it is very interesting to 
pick up the phone and it’s the guy up on station, and it sounds like he’s down the 
street.  They have great access to all sorts of resources and their friends and family 
easily on the ground. 
  
d.  Scheuring:  Based on the Apollo debriefs; many crews did not report medical 
problems because they didn’t want things broadcast across the flight control room.   
Did you have any in-flight medical conditions that were not brought down to the 
ground because of the privacy concerns?   
 
e.  Bean:  I can’t think of a thing on our mission where we didn’t tell everybody.  I 
have always had the feeling that if you sign up to go on one of these missions, at 
government expense and they trained you all this way, that you’ve got to do 
everything to make the mission as good as you can.   I can’t think of a single thing 
that could have happened to me up there medically, that I wouldn’t have come on 
normal radio, and I didn’t care if it was in the press or not, to talk about.  Now, I’m 
in the minority, but in general if you’re going to be a crewmember, then you’ve got 
to do whatever it takes to pass any information to Earth, whether its science or 
medical, to make the mission as good as you can.  We’d never have held back 
information. 
  
f.  Lousma: I got an extra $1.30 per day for doing that.
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5.2 Umbilical Extra-Vehicular Activity “We can fix anything!” 
5.2.1 The Skylab missions are held in high regard for their ability to recover 
from serious setbacks with well executed repairs, many of which were 
EVA based.  It has been reported that neutral buoyancy simulation and 
hi-fidelity training were well-regarded.3 What else contributed to the 
success of Skylab EVAs? 
 
a.  Kerwin: As to what contributed to the EVA success, we had a long period of 
training; we had an excellent water immersion facility at MSFC.  We were very 
well-trained and had a lot of experience in the suits, even though we had no 
maintenance missions on Skylab.  The only EVA mission we had was the film 
retrieval mission on the Apollo telescope module, the ATM.   And for that we had a 
prepared set of handrails, foot rails; we had a special device for transporting film 
canisters from the EVA hatch up to the ATM.  It was a very well designed system.  
When we came on our flight and discovered that we had to do an EVA to try to pry 
up the solar panel we were faced with a situation where we had no lighting, no hand 
holds and no foot holds and a relatively difficult situation.  I want to talk about 
umbilical management on that because I think that is the core of what we can 
contribute.  We found that, and I wish Pete was here to talk about this because he 
was the lead guy on this having walked on the moon.  Pete went out of the airlock 
first, and the first thing I did was undo most of his umbilical and he sort of guided 
and tucked it behind him.  He was standing in a set of footholds outside the hatch.  
Then we assembled a 25 foot pole out of 5 foot sections with a number of sections; 
and I would take the section out, connect the other section and hand it to Pete.  We 
eventually build this pole with a telephone company “limb lopper” at one end and a 
couple of ropes tied down at the other end so it could be operated remotely.  Once 
we got that done I deployed my own umbilical pulling it out of the sphere in which 
it was stowed in the airlock and these were 60 foot umbilicals, pushing it outside 
away from the path that I was going to take, over the circumference of the S4B to a 
point adjacent to that base of the solar panel as close as we could get.   Pete stayed 
where he was with the pole and I went up and over the circumference and Pete 
guided my umbilical and he told me when I had to stop or turn to prevent snagging.  
It was a pretty easy operation; it was just that you had to spend a little time 
managing one another’s umbilical when you made a major move.  When I got there 
Pete handed me the pole as he came up and I stowed it away somewhere, then he 
came up and I did the same thing.  I could see his umbilical behind him which he 
could not.  Once or twice I had to tell him to stop and make a 180 degree turn in 
order for the umbilical to remain clear.  Once we were out there the umbilicals 
didn’t really bother us at all.  The only potential snag arose when Pete had taken the 
25 foot pole and put the jaws on that aluminum strap that you may have remembered 
seeing in the picture.  Pete now had to use that pole as a handrail to go down, and 
connect some other ropes to the solar panel cover.  His umbilical almost didn’t make 
it, he started down and ran out of umbilical and we said “oh hell” or some word like 
that.  I just went back and pulled his umbilical around and eased it out and we found 
5 feet or so.  He had just enough umbilical at 60 feet to get to where he was going.  
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And the lesson there for an umbilical EVA is to assure the length of your umbilical 
is sufficient to reach all areas that you might need to reach because once in flight 
and you reach the end of that umbilical you have had it.  You can’t go any further.  
We didn’t have to fool with tethers, the umbilical was our tether.  We had great 
confidence in it as a tether so when Pete got down there and connected his ropes and 
I tightened the rope at the other end and we both got under that rope, we finished 
cutting the scrap and the panel pooched up about 6 inches and stuck on a frozen 
hinge.  We both had to stand up under that rope, crawl up under it and then stand up 
the wall of the S4B and exert as much tension as we could on that rope until it pulled 
the frozen hinge loose.  When it did, we went “pop” and went “ass over tea kettle” 
as the phrase goes into outer space and came to rest at the end of our umbilicals, and 
pulled ourselves back.  It had a nice stout cord to hold it and we deployed the panel 
successfully.  Managing the umbilicals on that EVA was time consuming but not all 
that difficult; it was much easier than it was in the water tank.  I was pleasantly 
surprised and using the umbilical to go to the sun end of the ATM with handrails in 
place was just a joy, it was a piece of cake.  For that reason my personal vote is if 
conditions are such that you could practically use an EVA with an umbilical of 
reasonable length to do your work it is a good thing because it is a simple system, 
it’s reliable, it’s safe.  Ours was open-loop; we were flowing oxygen at an 
intermediate pressure through the umbilical, through our suit and out vents in the 
suit.  So you have to have enough oxygen consumables to do that.  And that is the 
only drawback.      
 
b.  Jones: Joe, what if your umbilical was thicker because it was a closed loop system 
as opposed to an open loop system?  Would your umbilical have been as 
manageable with a thicker umbilical to accommodate a closed loop system where 
you are returning your atmosphere back into a scrubbing system to scrub CO2?   
Because we don’t have that big oxygen reservoir that you are talking about.  Is that 
reasonable to have a thicker cable and will you still have that mobility that you were 
talking about?  
 
c.  Weitz: Go try it in a water tank.  
 
d.  Carr:  What are you talking about extra thickness, how much more is the diameter 
of the umbilical?  2” added to the diameter or the circumference?   
 
e.  Attendee: 2” is the total diameter of the umbilical.   
 
f.  Weitz: Well that is about what ours was. 
 
g.  Jones: This will probably be stiffer. 
 
h.  Weitz: With regards to the question about the neutral buoyancy center, obviously 
this was a situation for which we had not trained ourselves before launch, although 
we did do a lot of EVA training in the neutral buoyancy simulator.  Rusty 
Schweickart and Story Musgrave did go to Marshall and did a lot of work once they 
got the downlinked photos from our fly around and understood pretty much what the 
situation was and they developed the procedures which then took several hours to 
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read up and then we had a practice day.  So if you are talking about neutral 
buoyancy simulation when you have an EVA capability, it’s my opinion that you 
need it.  
 
i.  Scheuring: Dr. Kerwin, did you say the handrails were already pre-deployed?  You 
did not have to go out and deploy them? 
 
j.  Kerwin: Yes, all the aids outside the airlock and around the ATM were pre-
installed, and we didn’t have to do any work on that.  However, I think we would all 
say that it is quite feasible to install hand holds and foot holds where connectors 
have been properly designed for them to create your trail as you go.   
 
k.  Scheuring: That’s good to know because I think the current CEV plans are to 
deploy them as you go.   
 
l.  Carr: If you want to see the handrails we had I think they are probably over there at 
the visitor’s center in that big mock-up because that is the mock-up that we did a lot 
of training on.   
 
m.  Lousma: I also think if you are talking about installing handrails you should talk 
about installing them on Skylab.  I think it would be a bigger problem to install them 
on CEV so let’s make sure we are talking about the same thing.  They are going to 
burn off on the CEV or be a special kind of mobility aid so I think we are talking 
about apples and oranges in terms of pre-positioning of handrails.  
 
n.  Pogue (written): Good motivation all the way around on the part of procedures 
developers, training specialists, training facilities providers and crew in my opinion 
contributed to the success of Skylab EVAs 
 
o.  Lousma: While we are talking about training then I have a few comments on that 
because I think we have been misled in some of the earlier Shuttle missions on the 
EVA performance.  I think the reason is because the neutral buoyancy tank is 
thought by those who have only trained in the neutral buoyancy tank to be the “end 
all” of zero-G.  So you not only train on your mission but you also develop 
equipment by using the neutral buoyancy tank and the zero-G airplane.  My 
observation is neither is perfect.   If you do not know what those imperfections are 
you are going to mislead yourself when you go up there and I think that was clearly 
seen on the early satellite rendezvous and we weren’t able to connect with the Solar 
Max and we weren’t able to connect our gear with the other satellite.  I can’t 
remember which one it was, Crip [Bob Crippen] maybe you can remember.    We 
had some severe problems because the astronauts who were out there and had 
trained with the equipment had only done so in the water tank or the zero-G airplane 
and didn’t have any real input from people who had actually done it.  I think we 
wised up after that when we got to the Hubble telescope and Story Musgrave and a 
couple of others who had done it before were able to make those EVAs very 
successful.  So the point is if you are training and developing equipment for EVA, 
don’t rest your total faith in what you learn in the water tank or in the zero-G 
airplane.   Have somebody who has already been there help you do those kinds of 
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things and help you understand where the deficiencies are in both of those training 
and development aids so that you will get it right when you get there.   
 
p.  Brandt: Where was the IVA crewmember during your EVAs? 
 
q.  Kerwin: On the command module side just in case.  And if for some reason you 
could not close the airlock hatch we had a system for depressurizing the MDA, 
getting the 2 EV crewmembers into it, closing that hatch and repressurizing it.  And 
you were on the side where the mission was done because you could not get back to 
the workshop but you could get to the CSM and go home. 
 
r.  Garriott:  It turns out Jack and I deployed the twin pole sun shade on our first EVA 
consisting of two 11 section poles and on which we had to pull up the sail and went 
to practice that about 3 months after these fellows came back.  We practiced 
everything under water except the one aluminum panel on which these 22 poles 
were mounted.  When it came time to practice that procedure in the pool, it turns out 
the panel on which these poles were mounted was flight hardware.  They said “Do 
you really want to take that under water and risk getting it rusty and that sort of 
stuff?”  We said no, we’ll just do that here on the top panel before we went under 
water, and took a simulated panel down to do the procedure.  Well, when we got into 
space, I found that the most difficult task I had to do on all 3 EVAs was the fact that 
with my gloved hand, each finger was about twice the diameter of the ungloved 
hand here and I couldn’t just pull the elastic band off the way they were strapped.  I 
had to squat down, with one hand raise that whole stack of poles, and put another 
hand underneath that aluminum band and try and slip it out.  So I was really working 
by the time I did that.  And it all comes about that we did not train for the one 
specific task that was the most difficult that we had to accomplish.  The point that I 
was trying to make after that rather lengthy discourse is that if there is any way to 
train for the task, make sure you do the whole thing because those little things that 
are not so obvious are apt to come up and be the most difficult to complete.  In terms 
of the mobility to directly answer your question, we had no problem with that.  We 
thought the suits were pretty good except that you can’t really move your legs up 
and down, it takes a lot of effort to move shoulders and arms, it took a lot of effort to 
move arms and legs and any improvement in the mobility of the suit would certainly 
be a benefit to any of the EVAs you might need to accomplish.   
 
s. Carr: We’re probably singing to the choir, but it was the glove mobility that 
hindered us the most out there and I would come in and my hands were so tired they 
almost ached.  
 
t.  Gibson (written): [Success was a result of] many practice sessions in the tank on 
nominal and off-nominal tasks. What is really needed is the equivalent functionality 
of spray-on gloves. 
5.2.2 Skylab EVAs were conducted using umbilical lines.  One crew reported 
that their umbilical lines got tangled during a nominal airlock-based 
EVA.10  Yet, another crewmember commented that “One of the nice 
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things that occurs in zero g is that the umbilicals tend to mind themselves 
and not get into trouble.”7  What other operational issues did you face 
that are not encountered in self-contained EVA operations?   
 
a. Gibson (Written): The umbilicals did manage themselves to some degree, but some 
thought is required before making traverses or rotations. At the end of our mission, 
we tried the clotheslines for ATM film transfer. These lines did get tangled with the 
umbilical connection to the suit and opened it up causing a spurt of frozen cooling 
fluid to be ejected. It was a good lesson in design that got ignored when we 
debriefed it. 
 
b.  Pogue (Written): Ed Gibson and I did the “dog leash around the clothesline pole” 
routine but it only took a few minutes to correct. We stuffed the 60-foot umbilicals 
back in the spherical stowage receptacles in the airlock until we could do “ring 
around the rosy” to remove the tangle and went back to work. Ed Gibson’s water 
line leaked at the point where the PCU (Pressure Control Unit) attached to the suit. 
 
c. Schmitt (Written):  My experience with this is limited to CMP (Command Module 
Pilot) EVA during TEC (Trans-Earth Cruise) on Apollo 17.  I was involved 
primarily to manage the CMP umbilical that had significant storage memory (curls).  
I am not a fan of using umbilicals in general; but if necessary, some device or human 
management of them may need to be planned for.  EVA training in the water tank 
probably needs to incorporate artificial curl memory to simulate the problems in 
weightless vacuum. 
5.2.3 In a crew debrief it was noted that “ventilation…, liquid cooling and 
circulation were adequate.  We had all three guys on one loop.  That 
worked well.”3  CEV engineers are planning a similar system.  Did you 
have any valves available to isolate other crew from a leak in an 
individual suit?  
 
a.  Weitz: So you could get rid of them you mean?  No, I don’t remember anything like 
that, do you?   
 
b.  Kerwin: Well, I want to probe that a little bit.  The system on Skylab, we were all 
on one high pressure loop but each crewmember was on a separate regulator 
attached to the suit that regulated the suit gas.  The thing is if one crewmember lost 
pressure in his suit the other two were not affected except in the command module.  
In the command module the suit loop was one loop and in that case if PJ [Weitz] on 
his out the door EVA had managed to cut up his suit we would have all gone with 
him which is not a good system.   
 
c.  Weitz: The reference on this is from our debrief and I think this is probably Pete’s 
comment from our command module.  
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d.  Lousma: When I was answering that question I was thinking about the EVAs that 
we did from the airlock where we were all separate, and I got to thinking that you 
are more worried about doing an EVA from the CEV which is like our command 
module and like we have already said we were all linked together which I think is a 
bad idea.  If you can avoid doing it and you would like to have everybody separate.  
I think we learned that lesson on Apollo 13 with the cryo oxygen tanks when one 
leaked, they all leaked.   This is an analogous situation and I think you would like to 
separate them if you could.  
5.2.4 Did the front mounted umbilical interface interfere with work?  
 
a.  Carr: We got it all done. 
 
b.  Pogue (written): I didn’t notice it. Most of the arm work is done at chest height and 
the only detriment to the front mount is reduction of access to a work site. That 
wasn’t a problem on Skylab. 
5.2.5 Did umbilical line rigidity/memory make movement or positioning 
difficult?  
 
a.  Carr: No. 
 
b.  Pogue (written): No. I didn’t notice memory was a problem. The umbilicals were 
all coiled up in the spherical stowage provision but I didn’t notice any tendency of 
the umbilicals retain a coil as we pulled them out. 
5.2.6 During EVA prep and post were there any issues with umbilical plug-in 
locations, umbilical length, stowage or management in general?  
 
a. Gibson (written): Not that I remember. I would have liked the freedom of 
movement without an umbilical, but training and a little thought in the use of the 
umbilical made their use perfectly acceptable. 
 
b. Lousma: They were all pre-plugged EVAs from the airlock which was in the 
sphere, attached inside the sphere and the other end to the suit and that worked just 
fine.  
 
c. Lindgren:  What kind of length were the umbilicals from the Command Module? 
  
d. Kerwin: From the CM?  I don’t know numbers, but I suspect they were pretty short.  
PJ was at the full extent of the umbilical when he was two-thirds out the hatch.  Now 
during Apollo they did SM EVAs and I recall Ken Mattingly talking about doing 
one and they must have had an extension added to the hoses to do that.  I think the 
only umbilical management problem was just the work of putting those 60 foot 
umbilical cords back in those two spheres was the most physically difficult thing 
that we did during the EVA.  It was hard work and there is probably a better way to 
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do it.  If you are going to do a lot of nominal EVAs you might want to consider a 
different hose arrangement, but for our contingency EVAs it was fine.  
 
e. Lousma: I think you ought to go back and read the reports on Apollo 15, 16, and 17.  
I know that for sure Al Worden on 15, Ron Evans on 17, and like you say, Ken 
Mattingly on 16 all did an EVA on the way back from the moon out of the 
Command Module hatch which they had to go to the rear of the service module.  
That would be a whole lot better data point for that question.  
5.2.7 Could you please comment about the difference between liquid and air 
cooling for the suits? 
 
a. Kerwin: Ours was liquid cooling system and it was fine.   
 
b. Lousma: But that was on Skylab and when we did the Command Module it was air 
right?  Maybe that is what you are asking.  If you are going to do an equivalent out 
of the CEV without water you better not make it too strenuous, but I think Paul 
[Weitz] and Joe [Kerwin] are be better able to answer that because they did both. 
 
c. Kerwin: Yes, we did a pretty limited EVA in time and in effort.  I would vote 
strongly that if you are going to do real EVA work out of the CEV that you have a 
liquid cooling system.  We learned that during Gemini.  Let’s not forget that lesson. 
 
d. Carr: I was just trading notes with Jack [Lousma] and at the end of our EVAs on 
SL-4 we just got in to the airlock and we pulled all that stuff back with us and we 
were just covered with snakes.  Once we repressed and got out of the suits then we 
went back and stuffed the umbilical’s back in to the spheres. 
5.2.8 EVA mobility aids are important.12  It was stated in a crew debrief that 
“on future vehicles, provisions should be made for attaching crewmen to 
structures, for handholds, and for places to put foot holds, even if you 
don’t think you’re going to need it.”3 The CEV will be scarred for EVA 
mobility aids, which are to be installed on-orbit as needed.  Any concerns 
or risks associated with this approach?  
 
a.  Gibson (written): It’s a good approach, although designers and mass managers 
probably do not think so. It is essential that one’s feet are anchored if they have to 
do any challenging work. Bill and I went where there were no foot restraints to 
repair an EREP antenna and it made more difficult because of it. 
 
b.  Pogue (written): I’m assuming the CEV suit will have lights like the current Shuttle 
EMU. Lack of lighting, crew restraint and lack of handholds/transfer aids were the 
biggest problems on Skylab EVAs. Also, certain areas were declared immune to 
EVA. Lighting, transfer aids, crew restraint provisions and handholds were not 
provided. Well, we did do EVAs where it had been assumed that they would not be 
needed. All the preflight wisdom and policy accomplished was to make the job more 
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difficult. I really like the idea of having lots of receptacles for mobility aids, which 
can be installed in a variety of configurations. 
 
c.  Carr: My impression of the EVA mobility aids on the Stations sounds to me like, I 
haven’t seen them, but it sounds to me like they have been able to define way ahead 
of time what their EVA trail was.  We had the capability built in to attach handholds 
when ever we needed them.  I think that was a good thing and you need to continue 
to think in that kind of direction.   
5.2.9 Paul Weitz and Joe Kerwin performed a “stand-up” EVA from the 
command module during SL-2 in an attempt to free the solar panel wing.  
According to debriefs, things got a little sporty.  Please compare this 
activity with the nominal EVAs conducted from the Skylab Airlock. 
 
a.  Weitz: The sportiness applied more to Pete trying to station keep rather than to 
management of the umbilicals or the performance of the EVA.  First thing we tried 
before we tried to cut the strap is we flew with what was called a shepherd’s crook.  
It was a big crook.  And some of our friends in blue suits had given us some 
information about what was going on up there and they had this hook and we were 
going to hook it under the end of the solar beam that held the solar array and see if 
we couldn’t just pull it loose.  Now the hatch is open and I am out the hatch and Joe 
is holding on to my ankles, firmly.  But the hatch opened over this way so that half 
of Pete’s field of view was blocked from the command module hatch.  Pete had us 
right in position when it started but I’d pull on that shepherd’s crook and it would 
pull the command module in towards the Workshop.  Surprisingly the workshop 
weighed about a hundred tons and one time I noticed that when I gave it a good yank 
the cold gas thrusters on the Workshop started firing so we were moving the 
combination of the command module and the workshop.  So it got a little frustrating.  
That didn’t work and we tried to cut it and that didn’t work because of the wrong 
angle on it.  The sportiness of it came from Pete trying to maintain good station on 
the thing.
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5.3 Launch – Thrust Oscillation and Vibration 
5.3.1 The pogo thrust oscillation phenomenon was an issue for the Saturn V.  
Was it a problem for the Saturn 1B? 
 
a. Weitz: Not in our case. 
 
b. Bean:  Not in our case either, and I don’t remember it on Saturn 5 either.  Maybe it 
was on there, but it did not appear to me to be a problem and, and I’ve never heard 
any of my fellow crewmembers say it was a problem or even noticed it.  I think that 
was solved before manned flight of the Saturn V came up, or it was around for 
Apollo 8 which flew it first.  But I don’t remember any of this as being a problem. 
 
c. Crippen:  It was the unmanned launch of the Saturn V that really had the pogo 
problem.  
 
d. Weitz:  An engine on the S2 shut down on Apollo 13.  Joe was the launch CapCom 
and I was at the Cape. 
 
e. Bean:  When you are scared you don’t see a lot of things going on! 
 
f. Weitz:  Yeah you had a couple of things on your mind Al. 
 
g. Scheuring:  Did they have sensors to measure oscillation? 
 
h. Weitz:  Yeah, all kinds of acceleration sensors on the vehicle.  Both on the launch 
vehicle as well as in the Command Module and Service Module.  
 
i. Bean:  You could get accurate data on all of this.  But if you take a look at either 
flight that I flew, whatever that level was is ok.    
 
j. Pogue (Written):   No. I never noticed a pogo on either stage. 
5.3.2 With respect to thrust oscillation during launch, one crew reported 
“There was no pogo. The S-IVB was really smooth as silk all the way” 
“The whole ride was smooth.”3  A crewmember from a different mission 
noted that “Lift-off was three or four very distinct, rapid, hard 
vibrations, enough to rattle my head in a helmet, or almost enough to 
rattle my teeth…”7  Did anyone think the vibration environment 
interfered with operational duties, like monitoring for overspeed?  
  
a. Kerwin:  We’re getting denial here.  Nobody remembers that.  Lift off was fairly 
rough, but the S-IVB stage was very smooth. 
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b. Pogue (Written):   On the Saturn IB, during first stage flight, the vibration was 
sufficient to prevent me from using a hard copy checklist to determine if we were 
approaching the 16 g limit line for abort. My arms were shaking the checklist so 
much I couldn’t read it. I had no trouble reading the computer readout on the 
instrument panel. Once we topped 50,000 feet everything smoothed out. As 
advertised the S-IVB ride was as smooth as silk. Monitoring for overspeed (I’m 
assuming that’s insertion stage cutoff) manually would really be a good trick. In the 
seconds before cutoff the numbers are increasing so fast that it is almost impossible 
to watch for a specific velocity value. 
 
c. Gibson (Written):  The ride on the first stage is noisy and rough, like a high-speed 
train with square wheels.  At about around one minute into the flight, you go 
through the speed of sound and also reach the maximum of the aerodynamic forces 
and turbulence.  For about 10 or 20 seconds, the vibration becomes severe; you feel 
like a fly glued to a paint shaker.  Then it smoothes out a little until staging at two 
minutes, which is like a head-on crash quickly followed by a second impact from the 
rear.  The second stage is like a long, smooth elevator ride that accelerates ever 
faster as the mass of the propellants burns away.  Eventually you weigh five times 
your normal weight, which is not bad because your heart is at the same elevation as 
your head.  But it’s hard to lift a hand, and you notice your cheeks and ears sliding 
towards the back of your head.  Monitoring for overspeed was not a problem and we 
could have performed a manual shut down if it was required.  Training for this type 
of shutdown is essential.  It takes close monitoring of the apogee and leading it.  A 
graphical display would help. 
 
d. Schmitt (Written):  My one major surprise as a rookie on Apollo 17 was the level 
of instrument panel vibration on the S1C that actually prevented monitoring of 
system indicators during launch.  This might be incorporated in the new simulators 
if Ares vibration will be comparable.
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5.4 Water Landing and Recovery – Architecture 
5.4.1 According to NASA TN D-6979 Apollo Command Module Impact Tests, 51 
test land landings were conducted with full scale boilerplate and 
spacecraft command modules to simulate post-abort land landings.13  
Despite extensive vehicle damage (often resulting in RCS rupture), crew 
survival was judged to be excellent.13  From a crew standpoint, what are 
the risks and benefits of land landings? 
 
a.  Kerwin: As the old saying goes its terra firma, and the more firma, the less terra!  
Land landings are safer with quicker accessibility to medical care and rescue if you 
need it.  You are not going to sink.  The drawbacks are it weighs more, it requires a 
more accurate entry and landing guidance system.   Whether it requires a parachute 
that is steerable or not I guess depends on how much accuracy you require, and it 
has all those programmatic drawbacks.  I believe that land landings would be a 
wonderful improvement over water landings for the reasons I mentioned.  However, 
our Skylab experience with water landings is probably what you are interested in.   
 
b.  Weitz: Except you still have to design a vehicle to handle a water landing in the 
event of a launch abort.  Do you want to design it for both or just for one? Can you 
have a system that accommodates both perhaps?  It’s both?   
 
c.  Garriott: From what I understand they are doing that now.  You can plan for a 
water landing but you still have to be able to at least survive a land landing if there is 
a launch abort.   
 
d.  Weitz:  I know in Apollo we didn’t have the stroking couches like in Skylab.  We 
had a mission flight rule that you had to that make sure that the winds were such that 
they didn’t blow you back to land.  I think that is where we are.  You are playing the 
balls one against the other.  You have to design the vehicle for a water landing, 
right? 
 
e.  Garriott: I think so to at least survive it for a reasonable length of time, 48 hours or 
whatever the right number is.   
 
f.  Weitz: I know we have been fortunate.  Who was it, Oleg Makarov?  Did he have 
two launch aborts or just one?  Just one.  The Russians have had several launch 
aborts.  One Soyuz rolled off the edge of the cliff on a parachute landing.  
 
g.  Crippen: That is the point, that land is not as nice and flat all over.  In the water you 
may get some waves, but… 
 
h.  Kerwin: When doing ACRV back in 1990 - 1991 we were looking for circles of 5 
mile radius as I recall that were or could be made clean and flat enough that they 
didn’t have trees, large building, cows, and other things that could move and 
endanger landing.  A 10 mile diameter circle was plenty big enough for a decent 
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descent trajectory program and a good parachute to find, even without steerability.  
It’s kind of like building airports, it is feasible, but you made the point that if you are 
coming back from the moon you might not be able to hit one of those.  And there is 
a lot more ocean out there that is available. 
 
i.  Crippen: And we still have failure modes that if you need to go ballistic, then you 
are not going to land where you planned. 
 
j.  Kerwin: That’s where the contingency planning comes in.  We are trying to design 
something and we don’t know all the parameters.  This is a key question and maybe 
it will come up later, but with our physical condition after extended periods in space, 
how well were we able to handle the landing and post-landing situation?  Is a 
survivable condition doable with de-conditioned people?  
 
k.  Lindgren: That does come up later, but it may be pertinent now to talk about risks 
and benefits of land landing versus water landing for a deconditioned crew and 
whether the risks of getting in the water and trying to stay afloat versus trying to just 
stay within the capsule or being able to get out on land.  Programmatically it has 
been decided, but…  
 
l.  Lousma: I don’t think the idea of floating out there in your suit is any good at all.  
Maybe in a raft, but you got to get in there too…maybe falling out of the hatch into 
the raft.   
 
m.  Ross: May I ask a question?  Where are the landing zones for the water recovery 
operations?  For Apollo we were going out the mid-Pacific line down by American 
Samoa tracking the mission for recovery.  For Skylab it was a different zone for 
recovery.  The whole issue of where you are recovering becomes very pertinent to 
landing operations and your survival gear and everything else, so can you give us a 
little background about where the considerations are and where your contingencies 
are?   
 
n.  Chandler: The plan is to recover south of San Clemente Island.  They found an area 
out there where they have some buoy data that is a good sized place where the water 
is calm there for a good part of the time.  They are also looking at an area down by 
the Baja Peninsula.   
 
o.  Ross: What are the water temperatures there? 
 
p.  Chandler: It was cool enough.  The cold is not the problem, the problem is landing 
in hotter areas because of the humidity in the area and because of the suits they are 
anticipating a heat stress problem. Because right now you are going to overheat if 
you are in this vehicle for very long, and that is the problem they are working right 
now.  We need to keep crews cool.   So that is why they are looking at cooler water, 
because that becomes a real driver for them.   
 
q.  Weitz: So the water temperature is the driver.   
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r.  Crippen: I had forgotten until Jack reminded me this morning that you guys 
actually got out of your suits prior to de-orbit?  Was that a problem?   
 
s.  Kerwin: Not in the least. 
 
t. Garriott: No. 
 
t.  Carr:  On Skylab 4, and my memory is pretty old, but I don’t even remember 
wearing a suit for undocking.  It seems like the command module was so full that we 
couldn’t take the suits with us.  So we came back in unsuited.   
 
v.  Crippen: I thought that was the case.  I was wondering why they were choosing to 
wear the suits on entry because that can become a problem.  You have more 
flexibility dealing with contingencies if you are unencumbered by that suit.  
 
w.  Kerwin:  I agree that that answer should come out.  Above all, get that damn suit off 
on the water. 
  
x.  Bauer:  Those are discussions that have happened and probably will happen again.  
To oversimplify a bit, in a nutshell, there are concerns that Apollo-Soyuz had that 
nitrogen tetroxide leak and of course the Russians had deaths on re-entry due to the 
depressurization so the fear is that you have no redundancy if there is a cabin 
pressurization problem, so that is where there is some angst to suit the crew, and I 
don’t think the issue is entirely closed yet.  They don’t even have a suit seat interface 
established yet because we don’t have a final suit architecture.  That’s a very open 
issue and I think your input will be very important here. 
 
y.  Weitz: Let me endorse something that Al said earlier.  People sign up for this 
knowing there is risk associated with them.  I think sometimes you just have to go 
on and accept it.  Do the best you can in design and training to make sure those 
untoward events don’t happen. 
 
z.  Lousma: We took the suits off after undocking during our de-orbit coast and it 
wasn’t all that difficult to do.  We had to do the opposite when we went up, and the 
same thing; we took our suits off during the rendezvous and got in our brown 
coveralls.  And just coming back, why we came back in the coveralls, but after we 
had undocked.  So I don’t think that caused any problem after being up there a 
couple months. 
 
aa. Kerwin:  No, but Jack, and we did it the same way you did.  I personally don’t 
believe I could have gotten out of the side hatch or into the raft safely or made it 
across the carrier deck to sick bay wearing that space suit.   
 
bb. Ross: Well Joe here is an operational question.  Didn’t we on all three missions have 
one person designated to wear the counterpressure capstan [anti-g suit], to help with 
the principle evaluation of people? 
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cc. Kerwin: We didn’t have a designated person.  That was an individual decision.  I 
know I wore it pressurized, I think we all did. 
 
dd. Ross: Did you pressurize it though?  Well I can see being out of the suits.  I don’t 
have a problem with that, but based on our own experiences it seems to me based on 
the deconditioning issues that we were concerned about that and we wanted to have 
some measurement that inflation of the countermeasure garment was important.  The 
reason I am saying that is I was a control for that and did some of these same things 
that the actual astronaut flyer did.   
 
ee. Weitz: I did.  I know Pete did too.   
 
ff. Carr: We all wore the g-suit and inflated it.   
 
gg. Pogue (Written):  Land Landing Risks:  In my view, most of the risks come from 
high winds and rough terrain/surface (including structures). During Apollo there was 
a lot of talk about “stubbing your toe.” That is, the crew survives a touchdown in 
high winds (the couches stroke, absorbing the shock of touchdown) but the 
spacecraft is yanked by the wind with enough force that the spacecraft stops sliding 
and begins to tumble thus exposing the crew to injury. A rough surface simply 
aggravates the problem. Contingency/emergency landings conceivably could be 
made in a country, non-signatory to the Space Treaty. Signatory nations agree to 
assist astronauts/cosmonauts, etc. who land in their country.  Land Landing Benefits:  
No need to deploy recovery ships.  One advantage of water recovery is that there’s 
more surface to work with in the event of an emergency return and outside coastline 
limits the waters are international. 
 
hh. Gibson (Written):  Benefits: More of the vehicle could be reused.  Landing and 
recovery forces at sea not required.  Downside:  One-chute-out case would bust up 
the vehicle and crew much more than the three-good-chute case. Water works, use 
it.  The land landing with airbags requires the vehicle be aligned directly into the 
wind, which is hard to accomplish.   
5.4.2 Despite the Command Module’s ability to sustain a crew for 48 hours, 
recovery forces were required to retrieve the Skylab crews in under an 
hour.4, 14  It has been suggested that key driver for this requirement was a 
desire to preserve crew physiology for biomedical research.4  Is this 
correct?  Were there other drivers for the 1 hour recovery requirement? 
 
a.  Kerwin: It sounds to me like a requirement Apollo probably had.  I don’t remember 
changing the Navy recovery process just to accommodate physiology.  
 
b.  Lindgren:  If I recall correctly there was one recovery ship for Skylab?  You were 
able to effectively target the primary landing site?  For the lunar skip landings we 
don’t have a large amount of resources for landing as far as the recovery vehicles.  If 
we have to do search and rescue, then we have a requirement that they be protected 
by the vehicle for 36 hours.  
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c.  Lousma: Tell me about this skip landing.  When you come back on return you could 
skip out of the atmosphere?  But you don’t want that to happen on the way back 
from the moon. 
 
d.  Lindgren: A skip entry that we are describing extends the landing recovery area. 
 
e.  Lousma: So this would be a nominal procedure during some conditions, is that 
right?   
 
f.  Bauer: We have two defined landing re-entries:  direct entry which is what Apollo 
did and skip.  As I understand there is not the risk of skipping off into space, but you 
had an off-nominal skip you could end up anywhere on the Earth’s surface.  They 
seem fairly confident that it won’t happen, but at the same time we can’t get them to 
say we have it solved.  You had either the nominal landing in the short 5 miles 
radius or the off-nominal.  That is not the case in this situation. You can either be 
nominal or off-nominal and be very far away.  This issue is not resolved.   
 
g.  Bean: These are the same discussions as I recall from early Apollo, and we got 
ready to fly it, even in Apollo 8 somebody said I’m not gonna get captured and let 
go again.  So we aren’t gonna skip and this was everybody.  It wasn’t just one or two 
guys.  We said look, we are not going to do that. We are going to get captured the 
simplest way, and when you chance to go out and finally do it that’s one.  And the 
other part of the equation is when you leave the moon after that burn you know 
where you are going to enter on earth.  And if you are not in the right spot you are 
doing to do a mid-course correction because NASA is not going to have you land in 
Alaska or somewhere else.  And you have a day and a half to two to do mid-course 
correction to put you just below San Clemente.   I think it is time for NASA to –we 
are better at this now and more accurate, better technology, better electronics.  We 
ought to be able to land right exactly where we want to.  It costs a lot of money to 
NASA.  The Navy may do it but we pay the bill.  If we can land the Shuttle on 
runways, we can land this thing, and it is easier to land more accurate coming from 
the moon because you have a day and a half to plan for it and get this thing so 
perfect, and they can do it and they have demonstrated they can.  So I think it is, we 
can talk about it, but when the chips are down everybody is going to say we are 
going to land this right where it is supposed to be and we are not going to do any of 
these other things.   
 
h.  Lousma: I want to ask a question because I never heard of that before unless there 
was an emergency or some kind of problem that would be fatal.  I don’t know why 
they would ever consider a skip re-entry.  You ought to baseline a nominal re-entry 
and outlaw the off-nominal idea.  Why worry about it if you spend more time doing 
it right then you don’t have to have this back-up problem? 
 
i.  Garriott: I would just as soon have a back-up capability, but not the one suggested 
here.  But you ought to really try to do it correctly within your 5 or 10 mile radius.  
This 48 hour recovery period is irrelevant, because if you miss it, you’re going to be 
a lot further away than 48 hours from some ship steaming over to pick you up.  I 
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think you ought to provide for the nominal situation, where an equivalent of the USS 
New Orleans is going to pick you up in a nominal way or have a different recovery 
procedure completely which would not require the crew to hop out of the vehicle 
into a dinghy, which I agree with Joe, does not have a very high probability of 
survival anyway.  You ought to be thinking about a recovery procedure that involves 
dropping airborne resources into the water, to help the crew out, put them on board 
something and keep them there safely.  Don’t rely on the crew to do that.  Don’t rely 
on a ship to go get them, rely on airplanes to drop people in there to go get them.  To 
me that would be a better recovery scenario and strategy than what is implied by this 
question.   
 
j.  Chandler: We are looking at just exactly what you talked about.  That is one of 
reasons we just talked to DOD to do just that if we ended up with contingency 
operations.   
 
k.  Kerwin: Al, do you remember where Gemini 8 came down and what ship 
eventually came and picked them up? 
 
l.  Bean: I don’t remember but it was a destroyer and they didn’t have any problems 
that I remember.  They just went over there and picked them up.   It wasn’t that far 
away and they hadn’t been up that long, so they weren’t in the same physical 
condition that might exist after people have been up for six months or something 
like that.  Sounds like we’re in better condition at the end of 6 months that maybe 
we were at the end of 2 months.   Of course Jerry’s group was better off because 
they exercised, so I am sure they have made a lot of progress there.   
 
m. Pogue (Written):  I don’t know for sure but as soon as the band stopped playing on 
the deck of the USS New Orleans, we were hustled below deck for several hours of 
medical/physiological tests.  I don’t know of any other drivers for the 1-hour limit. 
 
n. Gibson (Written):  I do not know.  We were one of the few spacecraft that ended 
up in stable 2.  That meant that we were hanging upside-down in the straps, bobbing 
on the water in a closed damp cabin with the heat of re-entry soaking back in – the 
worst part of the whole flight!  Eventually, we inflated 3 air bags and popped 
upright.  After that and when we got some outside air into the cabin, we could have 
stayed there quite comfortably for several hours. 
5.4.3 A hoist/elevator recovery is being considered by the Constellation 
program.  Skylab astronauts were hoisted, vehicle and all, onto the deck 
of the recovery ship.4  It has been suggested that key drivers for this 
requirement were:  1. a desire to preserve crew physiology for biomedical 
research4 and 2. concerns related to water egress by a deconditioned 
crew.  Is this correct?  Were there other drivers? 
 
a.  Kerwin: This is correct.    
 
b.  Garriott: Obviously #2 is a lot better option than #1.  
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c.  Kerwin: If testing of physiology was the primary thing, they would not have 
allowed us to egress and walk on the deck to the medical trailers, they would have 
carted us over there.  They didn’t do that.   
 
d.  Lousma: They came into cabin before we got out to see if we were still warm.  
There wasn’t a lot of testing as I recall.    
 
e.  Kerwin:  There was some hands-on for a pulse rate. Chuck [Ross] would have 
known the plan, but Pete Conrad wouldn’t allow that on our flight – he was poised 
at the hatch and when it opened up he popped out like a wooden doll. 
 
f.  Ross: Pete’s words to me were “Chuck, get us out of here.” 
 
g. Pogue (Written):  Those are the only two drivers that I recall. 
5.4.4 Hoisting was viewed as too hazardous for use in the early Apollo 
program.15  What changed?  
 
a.  Bean: I don’t remember really.  And I don’t remember anybody saying it was too 
hazardous.  It just seemed to always be in my memory that’s the way we did it.  We 
did it that way in Gemini we did it that way in Apollo.  I think hoisting is the best 
way to go. I don’t think we ever talked about whether we had that option.  I think it 
is a lot safer.   
 
b.  Lousma:  I don’t think hoisting was ever thought of as being too hazardous but I’m 
guessing before anybody ever flew in a command module they hoisted a whole lot 
of them out of the water from test articles.  
 
c.  Kerwin: I was thinking the same thing.  They probably hoisted your command 
module after you were out of it.  So the Navy got a lot of practice doing it, and said 
this is easy. 
 
d.  Ross: That’s true because on the ship, while I was sitting out there waiting for your 
return.  I can’t remember if it was a 5 ton crane or a 10 ton crane.  But they 
absolutely had no problem with the pick up.  However,  I was out on a couple of the 
Apollo recovery missions and I can tell you as a crew surgeon I was practiced to 
jump out of the helicopter into the water, and that was something not to be taken 
lightly. They’d  tell you “We are going to let you jump 10 feet at 10 knots or 5 
knots,” and I can tell you I made an illustrious bona fide faux pas on my jump, so 
you don’t want to do that but let the under water demolition team do it. The point is 
you let DOD take that stuff over.  You’ve got swimmers to put the harness, the 
floatation collar on; you’ve got good UDT guys.  The problem with Apollo was that 
each guy had to go up into the raft, then into the Billy Pugh net and then be hoisted 
into the helicopter to be taken on-board.  I agree that is more hazardous than lifting 
the command module right out of the water. 
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e. Pogue (Written):  I don’t know. Sometimes policy is changed by necessity. It could 
have been a trade. The risk of trying to get the crew in a raft could have been viewed 
as higher than hoisting the entire S/C up to the deck. 
5.4.5 In the scenario where we do a water hoist recovery, what precautions 
would you suggest that the crews take during the time in the vehicle itself, 
during the time that it took to get you out?  Is there anything in 
particular that you would recommend? How did your exercise prepare 
you or could it have prepared you better for that?  
 
a.  Lousma: I don’t remember being in the vehicle more than half an hour before I got 
picked up.  I mean the divers were right there before we even got right side up.  As 
soon as we got right side up they came in and put the flotation collar around, opened 
the hatch and the ship was right along side.   So they got us out fairly quickly. 
 
b.  Garriott: I would suggest that we were all fairly euphoric at that point.  Glad to be 
back. 
 
c. Lousma: On dry water? 
 
d.  Garriott: We were crawling around a little bit while inside because we had been 
bouncing around and we didn’t know what the legs were going to do.  But the actual 
lift-out, it wouldn’t hurt to be back in your couch and maybe put a strap across your 
body so you wouldn’t drop, or if you banged the side of the ship or something you 
wouldn’t go flying all over the place.  That would be about the only constraint that I 
could think of for the post splash down.   
 
e.  Lousma: We were upside down looking through the water, it was green and kind of 
nautical out there, and a diver came and looked through the window and wanted to 
know if we were ok, and we gave him the thumbs up.  And I didn’t know if this was 
up or this was up, but I’m ok.  
   
f.  Ross: If you are looking at operational costs also, I recall that in Apollo we had the 
retriever down at Galveston.   We practiced retrieval maneuvers during all times of 
year, winter, spring, summer, and fall.  It seemed like we were always down at 
Galveston which when you start taking on, all the people that have to support that to 
get the crew out of capsule and into the raft in a recovery situation.  This was costly 
training.  I also remember out in San Diego Harbor when we recovered, it was 
colder than you know what.  I was out in the raft with Story Musgrave and I went up 
in the Billy Pugh net with Rusty Schwiekart.  And I looked at him and I said, 
“Rusty, your lips are purple.”  He said to me, “You don’t have a mirror in front of 
you though either.”  There is a lot of stuff that could be cut from a cost basis if you 
went to the hoist methodology. 
 
g.  Carr: I would think that the downside of hoisting would be heavy seas.  You really 
worry about banging the spacecraft against the ship.  It seems to me that the Navy 
has some amphibious vehicles that are designed to lay Hovercraft in the water and 
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they have equipment like an LST or something where you put an elevator or 
something like that around the spacecraft and lift it out of the water.   That would 
certainly be a very benign way to do it, and a very safe way I would think. 
 
h.  Bobko: Question.  Years ago when they were talking about the assured crew return 
vehicle (ACRV) there were all sorts of things about being able to get to a definitive 
care facility within 4 hours and has all that just passed away? 
 
i.  Kerwin: I guess it has.  The ACRV had the 3 primary missions and the most 
important one was as an ambulance from ISS for a more or less severely ill or 
injured crewmember who had to be gotten back to care.  A water landing would not 
do for that, for a number of reasons one of which was because of time required to 
get to a definitive care facility and because of time and conditions in the water after 
landing.  If that requirement were still taken seriously I would think you would go to 
land landing as a primary mode. 
 
j.  Chandler: This vehicle does not have the medical mission that the ACRV did.  
Therefore we do not have those requirements. 
 
k.  Garriott: One question that is not in here, particularly from the basis of this 
discussion would seem to be important.   And that is weight aside, and cost aside, 
which would you prefer, a water landing or a land landing?  I don’t know if there is 
any unanimity on that or not, but I would think that would be relevant to this 
discussion.   
 
l.  Lindgren:  Can we take a vote?  Weight and cost aside, who would prefer a land 
landing?  
 
m.  Lousma: I like landing on a run-way.   
  
n.  Lindgren: Cost and weight aside, anyone prefer a water landing?   
 
o.  Garriott: None of us are in favor of water landings.  
 
p.  Kerwin: I’d go for a water landing only if the water is 18 inches deep. 
 
q.  Crippen: With the vehicle that you are bringing back, I would vote for the water 
landing.   
 
r.  Lousma:  Weight aside is not an easy thing to throw off however.
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5.5 Water Landing and Recovery – Operations 
5.5.1 What were the major time constraints for emergency de-orbit 
(availability of recovery forces, weather, preparation of the CM, etc.)?   
 
a.  Lousma: Yes. 
 
b.  Lindgren: All of the above? 
 
c.  Lousma: I have written here that the CM could be made ready in a few hours, 
whereas the recovery forces and weather would take several days, depending on 
nominal returns.   
 
d.  Lindgren:  I recall they had a 24 hour turn-around or preparation requirement.  
Does that sound reasonable or did it take longer for recovery forces to migrate to 
where they needed to be? 
 
e.  Lousma: I recall the ground track over the nominal landing site was in the same 
spot in the water every 5 days.  So you might want to come down in the same spot in 
the water.  It all depends on how far you have to go.  I have no idea.  30 knots in 24 
hours is how many miles?  700? 
 
f. Pogue (Written):  Some of the pre-departure procedures on Skylab included manual 
reconfiguration of panel switches over which MCC had no control. It was no big 
deal (didn’t require a lot of time). Other possible considerations were the biological 
samples, namely, fecal bags (250) and frozen urine samples transfer to the CM. The 
urine samples were frozen, stowed in a freezer and then transferred to a return box 
with a thermal capacitor (like the blue ice for picnic boxes) to keep them frozen. If 
recovery forces didn’t retrieve them before they thawed it would have compromised 
the evaluation of the urine samples. 
 
g. Gibson (Written):  If it’s truly an emergency de-orbit, the priorities are: 1. Prep 
spacecraft and de-orbit ASAP; 2. Weather if the time can be afforded to make a 
choice; 3. Location of recovery forces; 4. Close to CONUS. 
5.5.2 Apollo Command Module specifications required the vehicle be able to 
handle ambient air and sea temperatures up to 85ºF,  wind velocity up to 
28.5 kts and sea states with waves up to 8.5 feet, all for up to 48 hours.14  
Could recovery force elements (recovery vessels, swimmers, support 
aircraft) operate in the CM’s worst case environmental conditions?    
 
a.  Ross: Part of my duties when I was in flight medicine during Apollo was to work 
directly with the recovery crew operations teams.  I knew nothing about some of this 
recovery operation, but it is important that crew surgeon or deputy work with the 
recovery operations people to look at these parameters.  I think it is critical.  And try 
to put some common sense ideas forward when there is a difference of opinion.  But 
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then again it is operational maturity that has to develop between the people that are 
coordinating.   
 
b.  Lousma: I think given those 3 methods for recovery, my gut feel is that the recovery 
vessels and support aircraft could operate very well in heavy seas but the swimmers 
would probably have a hard time.  
 
c.  Bobko: What about at night?   
 
d.  Lousma: Wait till morning. 
 
e.  Ross: Jack, we were up to about 8 feet during the first Skylab return.  Joe, you can 
attest to that. 
 
f.  Kerwin:  I would have said they were less than that. 
 
g.  Ross: It was up to, I’m not saying they were constantly that way.  But it was not a 
really calm sea that day.   
 
h.  Kerwin: It was not a bad environment for us.  I would have said 5 feet instead of 8, 
but I’m not sure.   
 
i.  Weitz: Didn’t it say somewhere it was 2 and a half foot waves with 8 foot swells, or 
something like that?   
 
j.  Lindgren: I had read that it was 2-3 foot waves with 8 foot swells. 
 
k.  Weitz: Swells are easy to ride out in row boat. 
 
l.  Carr: Bo’s question about night I think is a good one.  You just need helicopters to 
have lights at night.  The helicopter recovery people would have to have 1 or 2 
lightships while the other people did whatever else they had to do. 
 
m.  Bobko: We see now with going to the ISS, we have night launches and landings 
because that is the ISS orbit.  If you have to do it that way, and especially if you only 
have one landing recovery area, I think you have to worry about it.   
 
n.  Garriott: If it is an abort, and you have missed your day time landing spot but you 
have landed at night you are thousands and thousands of miles away. 
 
o.  Bean: Or you launch at night and then you have to abort.  They have those 
procedures worked out, don’t they?    
 
p.  Bobko: If you want to land at a certain time in San Clemente, then you might have 
to land at night.   Coming back from the moon you might have to land at night, 
depending on what the orbit is doing.  So I was just curious about that.  To me it is a 
pretty good sized problem to overcome.   
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q.  Bean: I think Bo has a good point, but I have always found it more difficult to find a 
nice landing spot for the Shuttle than it will be for this.  Don’t they have all those 
techniques worked out for landing?  If they can land the Shuttle at night they ought 
to be able to land this thing at night. 
 
r.  Lousma:  Well you can land it but you might not want to be in it.  Did we ever land 
a capsule at night?  No. 
 
s.  Bobko: I would imagine that Soyuz coming back from ISS sometimes lands at 
night, is that correct? 
 
t.  Chandler: Yes, they have landed at night. 
 
u.  Crippen: I personally think for a nominal landing, even though you may have to 
wait a couple days to get it, you should plan on day landing.  And you are going to 
have to deal with an abort from launch at night.  I don’t see how you can get around 
it because you will never get rendezvous, there just aren’t enough spots to go launch. 
5.5.3 With regards to sea sickness, it sounds like your crews were fairly 
comfortable and yet the Apollo crews related some real issues with sea 
sickness.  Did something change in the vehicle environment?  The Apollo 
crews stated that after landing, they got hot fairly quickly which 
contributed to sea sickness. What changed?   
 
a.  Garriott: As a non-medical type I think we had adapted to weightlessness and that 
one thing somehow desensitized the communication between your neurovestibular 
apparatus and your stomach.  Perhaps a physician could describe it better from his 
perspective. 
 
b.  Kerwin: On our flight I was busy there in the command module getting sick and 
threw up in sick bay on the carrier.  I did that because I did the fluid loading wrong.  
I “chug-a-lugged” the strawberry fluid on the water post splashdown and that was a 
bad thing to do.  How about you Jerry, did your crew all not get sea sick?    
 
c.  Carr: None of us got sick.  Despite the fact that one of the guys was Air Force, none 
of us got sick.   That sure was a waste of strawberries. 
 
d.  Kerwin: There was a finding out of the vestibular experiment that resistance to 
motion sickness was somewhat improved after long-duration flights, so Owen may 
have something. 
 
e.  Thornton: Sometimes the vestibular adaptations last a lot longer than a couple days 
after landing.  For example I went out flying with the PLT after my first flight, and 
I’m only moderately resistant to air sickness as was he.  We took turns trying to get 
each other air sick, and we did some fairly vigorous things with the aircraft.  It’s not 
only here that you lose all kinds of sensations after adapting to weightlessness, even 
in a matter of 3 or 4 days.  It seems the vestibular system is reprogrammed and you 
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are remarkably more insensitive to unusual attitudes.  This has been a very common 
experience.  Joe was there anything else?  You didn’t have any gas exposure on your 
landing, did you?   
 
f.  Kerwin:  No, we didn’t have any.   
 
g.  Weitz: As the “deputy flight surgeon” on-board, my conclusion is, and Joe touched 
on it.  We’d all fluid loaded a little before re-entry, and Joe was saving his, and he 
wanted to make sure that Pete and I had more fluid available if we could.   As soon 
as things were relatively under control in the water, I think Joe’s mistake was getting 
out of the seat and busying himself with preparing those drinks.  And I think if he 
would have stayed on the couch he would have not have had any problems at all.   
 
h.  Crippen: I would also submit to the fact that they were not in the pressure suit, and 
not getting as hot was a significant factor in that. 
 
i.  Scheuring:  Apollo 15-17 just wore their constant wear garments.  They didn’t wear 
their suits and they still complained about getting overheated.  Mr. Bean, was there a 
lot of difference between what you experienced during Skylab and Apollo? 
 
j.  Bean:  I don’t remember any difference really.  Both times I was so glad to get back 
to earth everything just passed by and it was ok.  It was not a problem.  You are back 
on earth and all the big risks you are taking are over.  And you are sitting there, and 
maybe you do get sick, so what?  You are going to have so many problems to solve 
that are life-threatening and this isn’t one, so don’t worry about it.   Any solution is 
probably ok. 
 
k.  Carr:  We landed in February and it was nice and cool so we didn’t have the heat 
problem at all.  We didn’t even feel like the spacecraft was holding any residual 
heat.  We landed in the cold pacific and were not hot.   
 
l.  Aunon: Did you take any sea sickness medications before landing?   
 
m.  Kerwin: I don’t think anyone took anything.  
 
n.  Garriott: Why not take the suits off before landing? 
 
o.  Scheuring: All the crews are going to come back suited.  That is a requirement.  
They have to come back suited because of decompression and toxic exposure issues. 
 
p.  Garriott: Why don’t they take their suits off before they re-enter the earth’s 
atmosphere? 
 
q.  Scheuring:  For the reasons that Dr. Bauer previously described, because of the 
history of decompression, toxic environment, that’s really the requirement that they 
have to be suited.  That is a given that they will be suited. 
 
r.  Garriott: There is that one ASTP experience where they missed their own switch. 
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s.  Crippen:  It doesn’t make that much sense to me. 
 
t. Lousma:  I agree.  We had the same two issues [tox and depress] on Apollo/Skylab 
and did not worry about it.  Why now?  We may get so “risk averse” that we will not 
(or cannot) go anywhere! 
5.5.4 What risks or issues concerned you most about the post-landing 
environment? 
 
a.  Lousma: I remember after landing I felt like sitting down or lying down for 2 days 
instead of standing up.  I remember the hardest job was to stand up in San Diego 
during the presentation when we were getting the keys to the city.  
 
b. Pogue (Written):  An uncorrected stable 2 situation after landing in the ocean. The 
contingency egress called for the crewmen to go down through the docking tunnel 
and out the tunnel with continued egress up the side of the CM to the water’s 
surface. 
 
c. Lousma (Written):  This would have been tough, maybe fatal, even in just 
coveralls. 
 
d. Gibson (Written):  Post experience:  Hanging upside down in the straps, bobbing 
up and down in a closed damp cabin with the heat of re-entry soaking back in.  After 
upright, spending many hours in a high sea state could get old.   
5.5.5 According to crew debriefs, post-landing and recovery operations went 
smoothly.3  Was there any additional training or preparation that could 
have been provided to account for deconditioning? 
 
a.  Kerwin: Fluid load properly on orbit and not while sitting on the water would have 
helped.  And an easier landing day so you are not landing after 19 or 20 hours 
awake.     
 
b.  Thornton: Let me offer another gratuity here.  One of the things that has not been 
recognized as far as I can tell is the neuromuscular adaptation that occurs. Now I am 
not talking about strength loss through loss of somatic mass.  One of the old heads 
told me to “be careful when you first get up” and what he told me was exactly right 
because when I first started to get out of that seat I might as well as left the straps off 
because I had to really push and shove just to stand up.  This is a phenomenon that 
I’ve known only one person who claimed not to have experienced it.  Unfortunately 
it hasn’t been studied but is real.  You stagger up and sit down quickly.  Then you 
stagger up and stand a bit longer and repeat the process until you are able to walk 
off, feeling as if you’re pulling 2g’s with a firm grip on the hand rail.  Recovery is 
rapid and my neighbor reported that I was able to put the garbage can out as usual 
the next morning.  This is simply adaptation in weightlessness and readaptation on 
return to 1g by the somatosensory system beginning with the muscle spindles, 
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tendon organs and other sensors.  The shuttle commanders first observed how hard 
the brakes were to actuate on landing.  Crip, I bet you were working on the brakes 
on the way down weren’t you?   Didn’t you exercise?   
 
c.  Crippen: Yes. 
 
d.  Thornton: And for good reason because that is the worst time it can hit you.  All I 
am saying is leave some time to readapt and don’t expect crewmembers to jump out 
of their seat and grab 100 pounds or whatever.  It is a transient phenomenon that you 
recover from, but it takes a matter of hours to recover completely.   
 
e.  Brandt: Bill, this sounds like there is a neuromuscular memory similar to pulling 
G’s in an aircraft. 
 
f.  Thornton: It makes all the sense in the world.  You can dissect out a muscle spindle 
and you can change the sensitivity on that by the way you pre-load it.  There is a 
good solid basis for it. 
 
g. Pogue (Written):  I was on the third Skylab visit and I agree that post landing and 
recovery ops went well. We had more time for exercise than the two previous crews 
and, although we were up longer, we were in the best condition at recovery time. 
The biggest problem related to exercise is clean up afterward. We daily got heart 
rates of 170 so we were hot and sweaty when we finished on the ergometer. I’m not 
sure it’s possible to eliminate deconditioning in a weightless environment. The 
Russians have tried two one-hour exercise periods daily and say that helps but I 
don’t know if they have hard data to back it up. 
 
h. Gibson (Written):  A rehearsal of the period between getting out of the couch and 
into a chair on the deck would have helped although none of us had a problem.   
 
i. Lousma (Written):  One additional suggestion might be to avoid making major 
sleep-cycle changes in too few days prior to entry.
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5.6 Water Landing and Recovery – Flight Crew Equipment 
5.6.1 Reflecting on your state of deconditioning at landing, what challenges are 
associated with donning/doffing a pressure suit in the closed cabin? 
 
a. Kerwin:  I think we have a strong consensus on this side of the table – that we 
would advise against wearing a pressure suit for landing..  If I did land in it, I might 
want to get out of it in the command module because I wouldn’t want it if I had to 
egress and get into a raft.  If I was being hoisted up onto the deck of a ship, I might 
want to leave it on, but I would require assistance on egress. 
 
b. Bauer:  So assuming that you landed and did need to take the spacesuit off in the 
capsule, based on your memories of how you felt immediately post-landing, do you 
feel like you would be able to do it?   
 
c. Weitz:  You wouldn’t, because you’d have to get up out of the couch to doff the suit 
and I don’t think you could do it because of the neuromuscular changes and because 
of the unaccustomed gravity vector that torques your gyros every time you move 
your head.   
 
d. Bauer:  So, it would be difficult with assistance, at best?   
 
e. General Consensus: Yes. 
 
f. Lousma:  I think it’s difficult to do in the simulator. 
 
g. Bean:  I think Joe’s right.  It ups your chance to get sick and you’re not good at it 
and you don’t want to do it.  But if you had to do it, you could do it.  I think one of 
the nicest things I can remember about Skylab was that there were a lot of doctors 
when we stepped out on the deck of the ship.  They were there on either side and I 
kept thinking “Why are they standing there holding me?”  And I found out later after 
thinking about it that I thought the ship was rocking, and it wasn’t – it was me and 
they were catching me.  So I remember that as a good thing.  Any time you can get 
people helping you after a long duration mission, it’s a good thing.   Some of these 
questions could be addressed by crew coming back from long duration ISS missions.  
What are they like? 
 
h. Carr:  I think that is a good question.  Some of these folks have been up there for 6 
months and longer.  What kind of condition do they come back in compared to 
Skylab?  Are they having the same problems we had, or a lot more? 
 
i. Alexander:  Some crewmembers have difficulty even getting out of the capsule, 
much less moving around.  A big part of it is getting their gyros reset – not moving 
about a whole bunch.  Some crewmembers are pretty weak and require assistance 
just getting out of the capsule.  But there is rapid recovery and over the first 4-8 
hours you see their muscles start to work and they are able to walk around.  But 
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originally, they need assistance getting out.  We have to carry them to seats, 
especially after Soyuz landings.  
 
j. Kerwin:  I’ll speculate that if we were in a contingency situation and could not get 
out of the capsule and be rescued for 8 to 12 hours, and if we could get a little fluid 
into ourselves, we might be better off 12 hours after landing than right at the time of 
landing.   
 
k. Scheuring:  Right now the program can’t guarantee that the crews won’t need to 
perform an unaided egress.  So we’re going to have a suited crew doing an unaided 
egress and have to open up a 100 pound hatch. 
 
l. Garriott: Doesn’t make sense. 
 
m. Scheuring:  So this is a big driver in getting exercise equipment onboard. Crews 
would have to be able to maintain at least some kind of strength, even though the 
neurovestibular issue is a prime component. 
 
n. Garriott: What is driving the need to egress by yourself suited?      
 
o. Scheuring:  It gets back to the availability of recovery forces that the crews would 
not be able to be cooled and could be sitting on the water for hours upon hours. 
 
p. Kerwin:  How much water can a capsule take on before it starts to sink?  I was just 
thinking about opening the hatch for fresh air?   
 
q. Aunon:  Our ISS crews train for contingency water landings with the Russians.  The 
Russians will tell you that if you get a little bit of water into the capsule – they won’t 
tell you how much, it will go down in 40 seconds.  Our ISS crews are trained to doff 
their pressure garments after landing and don an immersion suit and then egress out 
of the capsule.  This is done inside the capsule, practically lying on top of one 
another, assisting each other.  Well there are huge thermal loads.  We were doing 
this in people who were not deconditioned and they commented on seasickness and 
the huge thermal loads inside and how much difficulty they had pushing themselves 
up and out of the capsule and seriously questioned whether they would be able to do 
this after an extended orbital stay. 
 
r. Garriott:  Has anyone considered doffing the suit before re-entry?   
 
s. Bauer:  The Russians lost 3 crewmembers during re-entry. 
 
t. Scheuring:  There’s more to the story than that.  It is a survivability issue and there 
are many more reasons for that decision. 
 
u. Garriott:  Well just in general, what are the reasons for leaving it on?   
 
v. Scheuring: Aside from the reasons we’ve already talked about? 
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w. Garriott:  Except for the misthrown switch of course, which depressurized the 
capsule, what are the other reasons for not taking the suit off? 
 
x. Scheuring:  Well, there is toxic exposure. 
 
y. Garriott:  Ok, so that is the misthrown switch on ASTP. 
 
z. Ross:  Is there any commonality with the event back in Mercury, with Liberty Bell 7 
and Gus and the hatch opening and water filling the capsule and how quickly it 
sank? 
 
aa. Garriott:  Well that is still unanswered and I don’t see the commonality in terms of 
depressurization of the Russian vehicle or the ASTP. 
 
bb. Ross:  No, I’m looking at the commonality of what might be an operational 
procedure in the water for the next generation of capsule here.  
 
cc. Garriott:  I think I would rather take my chances in hopping out in street clothes in 
60 degree water and surviving for several hours as compared to trying to hop out in 
a pressure suit and surviving for 15 or 30 minutes.  I think our chances of not 
drowning are much higher in street clothes in 60 degrees.  I’m not sure if that takes 
all the trade offs into consideration.  It’s not a good idea to get out in a pressure suit 
in a half-way stormy sea.  You’d certainly drown yourself if you tried to do that. 
 
dd. Lousma:  It seems to me that there are too many crossed requirements conflicting 
with each other.  Some of the requirements are less important than others.  The top 
requirement is to survive.  Surviving a sinking capsule event is possible unsuited.  It 
is not probable if suited.  I think to use the ASTP situation as a concern about toxic 
gases is an outlier.  And I think the situations the Russians had is also an outlier.  
They weren’t in their spacesuits because they wanted to put 3 men in a capsule so 
they couldn’t get spacesuits in.  The Russian problem can be averted with high 
probability by ensuring capsule pressure integrity after undocking prior to doffing 
spacesuits.  Undock suited.  Doff suits in zero-g; it’s much easier than in one-g on 
the water.  Splashdown in coveralls.  If we were to come back, that’s the way I’d 
want to do it.  Being inside a sinking space capsule is no time to try to doff a 
spacesuit.  Once we were in the water, I wouldn’t open that side hatch for nothing 
unless I was going to get out of it for sure, because that’s where the water is going to 
come in.  You’ve got a top hatch, the question is can you get to it in a deconditioned 
state? 
 
ee. Pogue (Written):  We didn’t have any trouble donning pressure suits on Skylab 
even toward the end of the flight. Our last EVA was about a week before the end of 
the mission and I don’t recall any problems. The CM was cramped but in zero-g I 
think we could have wiggled into and out of them without too much trouble. 
 
ff. Gibson (Written):  Doffing a pressure suit would have been a challenge in a 
bouncing cabin. We were not wearing these suits. 
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5.6.2 According to technical reports, Apollo crews wore a life vest harness 
during launch, entry, egress and recovery, with flotation tubes mounted 
under each arm.16  With the hoist recovery, and absence of water egress 
under nominal conditions, was the life vest harness worn by Skylab 
crews?  Presumably the harness was separate from the pressure suit and 
could be worn over the flight suit. Is this true?  What else was 
incorporated into this harness? 
 
a. Pogue (Written):  The “water wings” were worn on the outside of the suit and I 
recall that the only purpose they were to serve was as a flotation aid if one got 
dumped into the water after an emergency landing following a launch abort.  The 
strap-on life vest (It really didn’t look like a vest) can be easily seen in the pictures 
showing the Apollo and Skylab crews leaving the MSOB and walking toward the 
van for the ride out to the launch pad. 
 
b. Lousma (Written):  Don’t recall, but highly suspect we wore deflated life vests.  It 
would be foolish not to wear a life vest.  Fighter pilots wear an unobtrusive life vest 
routinely despite the availability of a raft also. 
5.6.3 Skylab crews had a three-person life raft designed for use in off-nominal 
and contingency situations.16  It was to be crew deployed and inflated by 
carbon dioxide cylinders with a manual inflation backup.16 Are there any 
procedures or equipment needed for raft deployment and use by a 
deconditioned crew? 
 
a. Lousma (Written):  No, except to make it readily available and easily deployed and 
inflated.  Deconditioning?  If you had to deploy a raft to survive, you would get it 
done! 
5.6.4 Do you think an immersion suit is needed in addition to a life raft?  Is a 
pressure suit with neck and wrist dams sufficient?  Do you think you 
could don an immersion suit in a deconditioned state? 
 
a. Lousma (Written):  I don’t know what an immersion suit is, but it seems to me that 
coveralls, a life vest harness, and a raft are all a survivor needs.  A jet fighter raft has 
an integrated cover to preserve body heat.   
5.6.5 Current planning suggests that in the CEV, portable breathing masks 
will be stowed in the aft compartment during dynamic phases of flight.17 
According to technical reports, in the event of a toxic atmosphere in the 
CM, each crewmember had access to a full-face hose-fed oxygen mask 
providing 100% oxygen via demand regulator.18, 19  Was this system 
available during all phases of flight, including post-landing? 
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a. Lousma:  I think it was.  I think those oxygen masks were handy whenever you 
were in the couch, and I think the notion of trying to dig them out during a dynamic 
phase of flight is the wrong way to go.  I think everybody ought to have one that is 
available, and putting them where they can’t individually get to them is a bad 
mistake. 
 
b. Garriott:  Not only that, wouldn’t that obviate the need for coming back in pressure 
suits, you’d have these available in case of a toxic environment.   
 
c. Lindgren:  If you have pressure suits, portable breathing masks are not necessary.   
 
d. Lousma:  What if the person who is supposed to hand out the masks is 
incapacitated?   
 
e. Lindgren:  That is a good point. 
 
f. Lousma:  I’ll take the breathing mask and coveralls vs. pressure suits for 
splashdown.  It’s safer! 
5.6.6 Given the tragedy suffered by the Soyuz 11 crew (vehicle depressurized 
during re-entry), what redundancies existed for protection against cabin 
depressurization in your vehicle? 
 
a.  Garriott:  The procedure that Jack [Lousma] has outlined, where you separate and 
then take off the suits, is different than the procedure that the Soyuz had where there 
were two separate units that had to be separated.  And it’s the separation of those 
two units that caused the depressurization.  That wouldn’t happen, with either the 
command module or the CEV.  And so it looks to me like that you are adequately 
covered if you just delay it until you perform the separation and everything is 
airtight and then you also have an oxygen mask available in case of toxic gases.  
That way it looks like you’ve got both bases covered in almost all cases.   
 
b. Weitz:  Well, we had to separate from the Service Module. 
 
c. Garriott:  Yeah, but there’s no atmospheric connection between the two. 
 
d. Weitz:  Oh, I see.  I thought you meant the shock of separation causing problems. 
 
e. Garriott:  Of course it was a valve that wasn’t closed manually.   
 
f. Gibson (Written):  At least two actions were required to open hatch or perform 
some other action that would decompress the cabin.
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5.7 Water Landing and Recovery – Vehicle 
5.7.1 According to various reports, the CM was required to provide a 
habitable environment for up to 48 hours.14  In addition, the 
environmental control system was required to maintain a relative 
humidity of 40 to 70% with an ambient temperature of 75 ± 5°F (except 
during re-entry where temperatures up to 100°F were permitted).18  Did 
the system live up to these requirements?  In one debrief, crewmembers 
reported that “prior to egress, prior to hatch opening even,…it tends to 
get hot in there.” “It sure does.”11 Could the vehicle really have 
supported you for 48 hours?   
 
a. Pogue (Written):  The standards were not met for Apollo 13. We were in the CM 
for 15-30 minutes and I don’t remember it getting hot but then it was February 8, 
1974 and we landed about 150 miles southwest of San Diego. I just don’t know if 
the CM could have supported us for 48 hours. If the sea state was moderate one 
could open the side hatch for ventilation and temperature control. 
 
b. Gibson (Written):  Yes, if the upper hatch was removed and we could get airflow. 
 
c. Lousma (Written):  It might seem warm inside the capsule after splashdown, but 
the heat due to reentry would stabilize at sea water temperature soon.  I don’t recall 
feeling warm after Skylab 3 splashdown.  Also, I don’t expect to be “comfortable” 
in a 48-hour survival situation.  If I had to do so, I would, despite temperature and 
humidity, as long as the capsule was still afloat. 
5.7.2 What was the definition of ‘habitable’ used by the 48 hour requirement?  
 
a. Pogue (Written):  Good question. I assumed in reading the introduction to this 
section the definition of habitable was the RH of 40-70%, and temp range 75+ or – 5 
degrees. From question 5.7.1 there is an implication that opening the hatch alleviates 
the temperature rise. If one concludes that an open hatch is essential to preventing 
overheating (48 hrs) then it suggests that a habitability requirement should include 
an upper limit for the sea state (one that would allow the side hatch to stay open for 
48 hours). Also, a cooler temperature reduces the tendency to get seasick (personal 
experience). On Skylab we used a drag-through duct to pump fresh air into the CM 
from the Multiple Docking Adapter. A contingency duct affixed to a delivery vent in 
the ECS could provide even better control of the CM temperature. 
 
b. Gibson (Written):  I would use the words, “survivable without illness.” 
5.7.3 Does the definition of ‘habitable’ change when applied to long-duration 
vs. short duration fliers? 
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a. Pogue (Written):  It seems obvious that the definition changes simply because a 
person can tolerate out-of-comfort conditions for a short time knowing that relief is 
on the way, whereas long-term out-of comfort conditions would soon compromise 
operations. I have no idea of how to define habitable in the long-term other than rely 
on the conditions provided on the various space stations that have been flown. 
Incidentally, I think the definition of habitable should include limits on the noise 
level, especially in the long term. 
 
b. Gibson (Written):  Probably because of the amount of deconditioning. Short 
duration troops should be able to withstand more. 
5.7.4 Was crew activity needed to meet the ‘habitability’ requirement (like 
opening a hatch)? 
 
a. Lousma:  You had to throw a switch to get right side up, as I recall.  
 
b. Bean: I missed something I guess, now, trying to talk about the Soyuz 11.  Now in 
our spacecraft, we don’t have any way to depressurize it with a switch.  The only 
way we can depressurize it is manually opening a valve, or some explosive event, 
like maybe Paul [Weitz] was thinking about could open it for us.  Maybe jettisoning 
a docking probe that blows off the front of the tunnel, maybe that would blow in the 
hatch or something.  So that’s a good time to wear the suit even though a lot of times 
we didn’t get to it.  But there’s no connection between what we’ve got and Soyuz 
11.  So we shouldn’t be defending ourselves against that, because that can’t happen.  
Some guy would have to get up and open the thing manually during the parachute 
descent to kill anybody.  So if we’re making the CEV protect us against what 
happened to Soyuz 11, and I’ll bet that the CEV doesn’t have an electrical switch 
you can throw or short out that will vent the cabin, then you can forget thinking 
about this.  And also, protecting ourselves from that accidental failure to throw a 
switch – there’s probably better ways to do it than staying in your space suit.  We 
should be able to interlock the switches, we’ve done that before.  We’ve done things 
like, you have to put in the circuit breaker before you throw the switch – if you fail 
to do either, then it won’t happen.  Those sorts of things, I think, were good and we 
felt safe about it.  We don’t have to defend ourselves against some of these.  And I 
don’t know if you can ever defend yourself against things like throwing the wrong 
switch at the wrong time.   
 
c. Lousma:  It’s a government thing to protect everybody from everything.   
 
d. Bean:  You can’t do it, you end up not being able to operate.  You’re going to have 
enough problems here without defending yourself against these two situations, in my 
opinion. 
 
e. Lousma (Written):  Risk averseness can kill the whole program.  It surely would be 
safer to stay on the ground and watch someone else do it! 
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5.7.5 Was the side hatch usable in all sea states? 
 
a. Kerwin:  Well, we could physically open it…but then we would drown [laughter] 
 
b. Lindgren:  Ok, safely usable? 
 
c. Kerwin:  I don’t know what the dividing line was, but our marching orders were, 
don’t open that side hatch until somebody has put a flotation collar around the 
command module.  And that implies a sea state low enough for that to happen. 
 
d. Gibson (Written):  No. I would not want the side hatch open in high sea states. 
5.7.6 According to reports8 a double acting attenuator system utilized in all 
three axes protected crews against contingency land landings.  A 
crewmember mentioned that during a nominal sea landing “we hit like a 
ton of bricks at 12, and I thought it was a very gentle impact.”3 This 
suggests that in spite of a dramatic impact, the attenuator system worked 
well.  Did anyone else experience any untoward transient g-forces in spite 
of this system? 
 
a. Weitz:  Let me offer what I think is a clarification here.  Your reference for the 
second bullet is from SL-2 crew debrief, and I suspect that if you change “at” to 
“on”, that that was Pete [Conrad] comparing their water landing on Apollo 12, and 
what he experienced on Skylab 2. 
 
b. Lindgren:  Ah, ok, that makes sense. 
 
c. Lousma:  I don’t think anyone here stroked the couch. 
 
d. Garriott:  I’m not sure how we would know. 
 
e. Carr:  I don’t remember hearing any report that we had stroked the couch.  We 
landed in sort of a slicing maneuver anyway, that flipped us over. 
 
f. Kerwin:  Which Apollo flight was it that landed on 2 chutes?  Fifteen?  They 
probably stroked the couch, didn’t they? 
 
g. Weitz:  I think if you stroked the couch, you’d know it. 
 
h. Carr: Yeah.   
 
i. Pogue (Written):  I only landed once and it was a noticeable whop in the back but I 
don’t think our struts stroked. 
 
j. Gibson (Written):  No, just a firm hit. 
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k. Lousma (Written):  I don’t recall feeling any side forces.  I was not surprised by 
the “smack in the back”. 
5.7.7 According to crew debriefs the CM’s self-uprighting system20 reportedly 
worked well.7  The CEV will have a similar system.  Egress options and 
environmental control systems are presumably affected by vehicle 
orientation.  How important is this system to the deconditioned returning 
crewmember?  
 
a. Weitz:  In the Apollo CM system, I think it was a circuit breaker followed by a 
switch.  I think you could reach it from the couch. 
 
b. Lousma:  For a deconditioned crew, I think the crew would rather be lying on a 
couch than hanging from a ceiling.  So I think it is a pretty good idea to have one of 
those. 
 
c. Pogue (Written):  We went “stable 2” but the up-righting bags worked fine.  I think 
the worst-case scenario would occur if “stable 1” could not be achieved and 
contingency egress through the docking tunnel had to be used.  In recalling our 
training for the worst case, there was no inordinate physical demand.  The most 
exertion required was when we pulled ourselves up into the life raft.  Is a raft 
automatically deployed to be available for either type of egress?  I can’t remember. 
Something I just remembered is the pooling of water condensate in the bottom of the 
CM.  As we were descending on mains a pressure equalization valve opened to 
equalize inside and outside pressure.  When that warm moist sea air came in and 
circulated over cold panels at 70 degrees it condensed and then began to drip off and 
drop to the bulkhead above the heat shield.  When we went stable 2, we heard water 
sloshing across the lower bulkhead and we all said simultaneously, “Oh No!”  We 
had 250 fecal bags stowed in the lower equipment bay (below the optics station) and 
feared they would get doused.  They didn’t, but the accumulation of water in the 
bottom of the CM during descent should be considered.  This condition was caused 
by the 5 psi pressure in the CM.  The extent of the condensation could be greatly 
reduced if the pressure were increased to near one atmosphere.  A pressure 
equalization valve will still be required but air exchange would be much less. 
 
d. Lousma (Written):  With regards to raft deployment – in stable 1 (upright), we had 
to throw the deflated, tethered raft out of the side hatch.  If stuck in Stable 2 
(inverted), it would have been necessary to swim with the deflated raft down 
through the top hatch and deploy it when we swam to the surface. 
5.7.8 After landing, one crewmember commented that “You could smell the 
explosives, the pyro fumes come into the cabin.”7  Was this unexpected?  
Had precautions been taken to prevent fumes from entering the cabin?   
 
a. Lousma:  I don’t recall pyro fumes, what flight was it? 
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b. Lindgren:  I’d have to look it up. 
 
c. Lousma:  Is this ASTP? 
 
d. Lindgren:  This is not referring to the ASTP experience.  This is from Skylab crew 
debrief. 
 
e. Garriott:  I don’t remember it, do you remember it? 
 
f. Weitz:  According to the reference list in the back, that’s from the SL-3 debrief. 
 
g.  Garriott:  Well, I don’t remember it. 
 
h. Carr:  Must have been the other SL-3.  [laughter] 
 
i. Crippen:  There shouldn’t be any way that the pyro fumes could get into the cabin. 
 
j. Garriott:  Increase the atmospheric pressure from 5 up to 15, and then you’ve got 
those gas fumes on the outside, and some of it gets sucked in.  I think that’s how it 
happened. 
 
k. Pogue (Written):  I didn’t notice any pyro fumes after landing. 
 
l. Gibson (Written):  Not procedurally, as I can best recall. Going to Stable II 
precluded us smelling anything immediately after landing. 
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5.8 Water Landing and Recovery – Procedures 
5.8.1 What conditions would have required you to egress the CM and enter the 
water?  
 
a. General response:  If the CM was sinking.   
 
b. Weitz:  The same reason the people got off the Titanic.  [laughter] 
 
c. Kerwin:  Also if you are in Stable 2 and it fails to go back to Stable 1, you might 
have to get out eventually.  In Stable 2, are you going to eventually get hypoxic?  Is 
your source of ventilation blocked off?  If you’re stuck in Stable 2 you might have to 
egress because the air would get too foul.  You’d have to go out the tunnel hatch, 
swim out from underneath.  And if you were deconditioned…good luck.  But 
basically, if the ship is sinking, you’re going to want to get out.  
 
d. Carr:  I guess everyone got the training in the tank at JSC where they flipped it over 
and you had to get out with your suits on.  I don’t know if everyone knows our story 
on that one but we were in there with our suits on and they flipped it over.  Now 
they told us that you are going to watch the water rise up in the Command Module 
and when it gets to about here, it’s going to stabilize, kind of like a milk bottle 
floating upside down.  It’s all going to stabilize, so you can take your time and get 
your neck dams and wrist dams on and get the hatch out and get out.  Well we sat 
there and put our neck dams and stuff on.  We watched the water rise and when it 
got to that point, it didn’t quit, it kept on going.  Well I told the guys, I think we 
better step it up a little bit.  And we got out of there, but we found out that somebody 
had left a valve open.  Well it wasn’t a milk bottle floating upside down; it went all 
the way down to the bottom.  And we had all our families there watching us too.   
 
e. Pogue (Written):  The two things I can think of are contamination of the 
environment and a fire. Neither of these is likely. 
 
f. Gibson (Written):  Toxic gases that could not be vented and/or fire. 
5.8.2 What actions would have been required of you for an emergency egress?   
 
a. Gibson (written): Open hatch, secure to CM then throw out raft, take supplies and 
food, and exit. 
 
b. Lindgren:  From a written response, I have “turn off power, unstrap and disconnect, 
pop open the hatch, deploy the raft, help the center seat astronaut egress, egress 
himself and help the commander exit.”  Is that a pretty good summary? 
 
c. Carr:  Now that’s just for Stable 1, it would be different for Stable 2. 
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5.8.3 Were you only required to egress the side hatch? Were there any 
conditions that required you to egress from the top hatch with the 
capsule in Stable 1?  Could you have done it? 
 
a. Carr:  My first thought is how heavy is that hatch?  Is it going to fall in your face 
when you unlatch it?  Does it have a hinge and swing?  With 3 deconditioned guys - 
that’s going to be a wrestling match.  
 
b. Bean:  We’ve got to be careful about piling too many off-nominal things on top of 
each other.  The minute you do, you can’t go fly in space.  You end up building a 
heavy spacecraft.  I can’t imagine putting the weight on there for hatch lowering or 
something like that.  You can imagine a number of failures but as I remember for 
Skylab and Apollo there was kind of a rule about how many off-nominal situations 
you could have in a row.  And whatever that rule was you quit trying to solve 
problems after that, because you never could do it all. 
 
c. Pogue (Written):  Not that I’m aware of unless you had a side hatch that wouldn’t 
open.  Climbing up through the docking tunnel would have been difficult. 
 
d. Gibson (Written):  Deconditioned, toxic gases, fire lapping at your butt, opening 
hatch, removal of probe, all in a high sea state – it would be tough. 
5.8.4 According to reports21, crewmembers trained to egress the CM from the 
“Stable 2” position, and swim up to climb into a raft.  In retrospect, was 
this egress scenario compatible with your post-flight state of 
deconditioning?   
 
a. Carr: You could tough it out and try to do it but it would be very dicey, especially 
after hearing Bill Thornton talk about your neuromuscular situation.  You might 
have a really tough time getting that hatch out of there and figuring out how to swim 
down and up the side of it.  
 
b. Scheuring: Is there something you could have done during the mission to improve 
your chances if this happened?   
 
c. Kerwin:  I think this is one of Al Bean’s cascading failure scenarios.  If it happens 
and you are in stable 2 and you have to get out, you are going to try to wrestle that 
hatch out somehow and swimming out – that may actually be a little easier than 
climbing up.  It’s kind of like returning to a zero-g condition and I think we could 
handle that.  It’s risky, but I wouldn’t go out of my way to prevent its necessity.  
 
d. Lousma:  We trained for this in the water tank.   
 
e. Garriott:  I would think that the first option for Stable 2 is just stay there, stay with 
it.  Now are you also assuming that it is filling up with smoke or other requirement 
that forces you to egress?  Why try to egress in Stable 2?   
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f. Lindgren:  This question was not driven by any Constellation requirement.  It was 
simply to understand whether crewmembers should attempt something like this after 
long duration spaceflight.  
 
g. Garriott:  My opinion is that in stable 2 you don’t try to egress.  If you have to 
egress for some other reason…  First of all the docking probe doesn’t fall down onto 
you, it falls down into the ocean.  So you just have to get outside and you’ll float by 
yourself.  You don’t have to worry about mass of the hatch falling in your lap like 
you did in stable 1.  The best option, though, is to stay put.   
 
h. Bean:  And not to beat a dead horse, but let’s think about it.  It means if this 
situation arises.  It means: 1. you didn’t land in your primary area where frogmen 
land about the same time you do putting a collar around you, 2. you’ve gone into 
stable 2 and you’ve got redundancy on those [uprighting] bags and somehow those 
have failed, 3. you’ve probably got redundancy on the pumps and those fail, 4. 
you’ve got a high sea state that’s not part of the plan, and 5. you’re leaking so 
you’ve got to get out.  We need to quit thinking about these things and back up and 
say are we sure we are capable on a normal landing in a nice place where we plan 
that this is an easy way to do it, and it’s safe and nobody is going to accidentally fall 
out of the raft and drown. Then maybe take a failure or two, isolated by themselves.  
But if we concentrate on this we spend money and time and effort when the chances 
of it actually happening are so far down the list that we shouldn’t do that.  We are 
going to have so many problems that we really have to solve that are worth the 
money, time and effort.  We are stacking too many failures – it just took four to get 
into this discussion. 
5.8.5 How do answers to questions 5.8.3 and 5.8.4 above change when 
considering an abort scenario (healthy crew) vs. an end-of-mission 
(deconditioned crew) scenario? 
 
a. Pogue (Written):  The crew of an aborted launch would be able to do everything 
easier.
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5.9 Water Landing and Recovery – Location and Communication 
5.9.1 According to reports the CM was equipped with a VHF/AM transceiver 
and a VHF recovery beacon.14  This system was supplemented with a 
specially developed handheld VHF “Apollo Survival Radio” that 
provided beacon and voice capability.22  In a technical debrief it was 
mentioned that the “L and R communications worked well.  We were 
completely aware of what recovery was doing at all times.”3  Another 
crew had a communications failure (transmit only) after landing.7  Any 
comments or concerns with regards to recovery communications? 
 
a. Carr:  I think it is important to have the crew in the loop with constant 
communications.  If somebody is having a problem you don’t need people relaying 
back and forth, you need to be right in the middle of the loop.  It’s just a matter of 
communications discipline, y’know, keep the small talk out and keep it to 
professional discussion. 
 
b. Brandt:  Would any of you have been comfortable had there been no radio 
communication after landing? 
 
c. General Consensus:  We would not be comfortable without communication.  
 
d. Lousma:  Especially now with GPS and all the stuff you could have to keep in 
contact.   
 
e. Kerwin:  I would assume that you would provide GPS data to the crew, so that they 
would know exactly what their latitude and longitude was, so they could relay it if 
necessary to the recovery forces. 
 
f. Chandler:  We had a meeting last week with the DOD, search and rescue and the 
Coast Guard.  We got them all together and had the SAR people tell us what they 
needed.  In a splinter group the SAR folks told NASA that you need to have a 
beacon that has GPS capability, because GPS takes the “search” out of Search and 
Rescue. 
 
g. Lousma:  I can’t believe that you’d do it any different.  I mean every little Cessna 
172 has to have an emergency location transponder to a satellite so everyone can 
see, and we can’t have it in the most modern space program in history? 
 
h. Weitz:  Keeping in mind what I was saying before, you need backups for backups.  
Are you all going to fly a sextant also? [laughter] 
 
i. Pogue (Written):  I think GPS is the way to go. My Honda CRV can be tracked if it 
is stolen so the technology is available to locate an errant spacecraft. 
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5.9.2 During lunar return a skip re-entry could result in loss of CEV position 
tracking and an unknown landing location.  During Apollo/Skylab, 
recovery aircraft utilized the specially developed AN/ARD-17 direction 
finding system with an orbital VHF range of 1123nm and a surface VHF 
range of 195nm.23  Recognizing that skip returns were not an issue for 
Skylab, did you have any concerns about this localizing system? 
 
a. General Consensus: GPS is an absolute requirement. 
5.9.3 Command module VHF/AM hardware permitted voice communications 
with recovery aircraft and swimmers.24  One crewmember commented 
that “I was happy to see that the ship did not talk with us too much.”7  Is 
it necessary to be able to communicate with surface recovery ships? 
 
a. Carr:  Yeah, I think so, for instance if you had some sort of medical emergency.  
The ship is in the loop as a listener only, but you could quickly reconfigure your 
comm system if you need to, in order to talk with a doctor on the ship, or something 
like that.  You could have a lot of people on the loop, but most of them in a listen-
only mode. 
 
b. Chandler:  This is one of the things we have been having discussions on.  They 
were in a weight reduction mode and were trying to set up the comm so that you 
could talk with the ship, but you wouldn’t be able to talk with a Search and Rescue 
aircraft or helicopter that was going to come out.  We thought it was more important 
that you be able to talk with the SAR helicopter, with the pararescue specialists, and 
those kind of people. 
 
c. Weitz:  Absolutely. 
 
d. Bean:  So someone on water would be able to talk to Mission Control and these 
other people? 
  
e. Chandler:  Yes, what we are hoping for is the communication from the ship would 
be able to go back.  What we were really interested in was that the people in the 
capsule would be able to talk with those rescue guys on the other side of the hatch 
and in the helicopter.  We think that there is going to be comm back to mission 
control, if I understand the requirement correctly. 
 
f. Bean:  I may be in the minority, but you want communication back to Mission 
Control.  You’ve got people in there that are smart and can solve any problem.  And 
when you are on the water and bobbing around and can’t see out very well and don’t 
know how to solve these problems, and so if you can talk to Mission control, and 
they can talk to you, that is a lot.  These other things are gravy.  I think you want 
Mission Control to solve your problems.  They got more people and they are 
smarter. We are bobbing around and don’t know all that.   
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g. Chandler:  I’m fairly sure that is the case that you’ve got both.  But we want you to 
be able to talk to rescue guys too. 
 
h. Garriott:  I think I’d invert the priority.  First of all you want to be able to talk with 
the guys who can get you out safely.  The second is to let the Houston guys know 
what is wrong.  The highest priority is getting out safely. 
 
i. Bean:  I understand. 
 
j. Ross: One of the operational requirements at the time was that the ship had to be 
able to listen to what was going on between the CM, the helo and the UDT 
swimmers.  Now I don’t know how that totally worked but on the Skylab mission, 
the ship had to be able to listen for the condition of the crew prior to pulling them 
up.  The reason was the DoD surgery crew had to be ready to handle any adverse 
problems.  Once they got a thumbs up that there was no big time event, they could 
stand down. 
5.9.4 Is it necessary to communicate with MCC-H after landing?   
 
a. General Consensus: Yes. 
 
b. Kerwin:  I don’t know, Al, I guess I would have thought that after splash down that 
Mission Control would delegate to the recovery team leadership, which would be 
aboard the recovery ship, at least in the nominal case.   
 
c. Bean:  Maybe they do. 
 
d. Gillis:  Now, it’s been four years since I’ve been on a ship, but I think that the ships 
that will be involved in this recovery will have networked radio communications 
that tie into the internet.  As senior medical officer on a carrier, I could talk with 
other ships, I could talk with people back in the states, and get a printed record of it 
all.  Certainly by the time that we will be doing these flights, the net-centric warfare 
resources will be mature to the point that none of this will be a problem and it will 
be in place for general use.   
 
e. Bauer:  In terms of talking back to Houston, I know with the shuttle you have a 
fairly extensive system shutdown checklist after wheels stop.  I presume it was a lot 
quicker and simpler on Apollo.  Did you really have anything that you would foresee 
that would go wrong post-splashdown where you might need to troubleshoot with 
Houston before shutting down or was it pretty much just a matter of “get us hoisted 
out of here?”   
 
f. Weitz:  Well as it was just mentioned, you are going to have worldwide 
communications anyway, so what’s the harm.  I mean if they are there, you get a 
hold of them if you need them.   
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g. Lousma:  I think if you have a spacecraft problem, you want to talk with Mission 
Control.  If you have recovery problem, you want to talk with recovery.  So I think 
they both need to be there.  You’d like to have everybody that you’d like to talk to 
somewhere on the loop, but you don’t want them all talking to you at the same time.  
Crip [Bob Crippen], correct me if I’m wrong, but as I recall, Mission Control turns it 
over to the landing officer. 
 
h. Crippen:  From a comm standpoint, when you are on the water, MCC is there, but 
they are not talking to you.  They are available if you needed assistance, but they are 
just listening. 
 
i. Pogue (Written):  It would be desirable (if a problem is encountered after landing) 
because MCC can work through GSFC to coordinate all communication assets. 
5.9.5 Is it necessary to have communications access to medical personnel after 
landing? 
 
a. General Consensus: Yes, if there is a need.   
 
b. Ross:  I think this is covered by my previous answer on how we did it during Skylab 
2. 
 
c. Pogue (Written): If you have a link with MCC the medical support in MCC 
would be available to help. 
5.9.6 Crews returning in the Soyuz are equipped with a satellite phone and a 
GPS.  Do you have recommendations for localization and communication 
procedures or equipment? 
 
a. Crippen:  The satellite phone is a great idea for contingency. 
 
b. Pogue (Written):  I think having a satellite phone is a great idea.
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5.10 Water Landing and Recovery – Crew Activities 
5.10.1 After returning from a long-duration mission, what post-flight duties are 
acceptable?  Vehicle safing?  Hatch opening (side/top)?  Climb a ladder?  
Swim to stay afloat?  Climb in a raft? 
 
a.   Kerwin:  Certainly vehicle safing and hatch opening are reasonable.  Climbing a 
ladder?  I don’t know.   
 
b. Garriott:  If you are really thinking about adopting this, it might be worth a try with 
some of the folks who come back after 3 to 6 months [on orbit].  Really give it a try 
before making a commitment to it. 
   
c. Thornton:  Crip [Bob Crippen] and I were talking about getting into a survival raft.  
For me it was always harder getting into a larger raft.  When I was in great shape I 
found that it was a considerable workload.   
 
d. Bean:  I don’t know about the other two Skylab crews, but if we had to lift a heavy 
life raft out the top hatch, we’d give that job to Jack Lousma! [laughter] 
 
e. Crippen:  Climbing into a one man raft even when you are in good condition can be 
challenging in the open sea sometimes. 
 
f. Kerwin:  If we are talking deconditioned crewmembers, the optimum way is to 
egress the side hatch into a raft which is attached to the vehicle, so you don’t have to 
do a water ingress.  I’m with Bill [Thornton], in that I think that a water ingress into 
the raft might be impossible.   
 
g. Ross:  It seems to me that the last two items, swim to stay afloat and climb into a 
raft – we are assuming that they have successfully gotten out of the Command 
Module, but do they have personal floatation devices already hooked up?  
 
h. Kerwin:  How soon after long-duration flights do the water rehab sessions start? 
 
i. Alexander:  Anywhere from 3 to 5 days. 
 
j. Kerwin:  It would be very interesting on their first water rehab session to just have a 
raft in there and have them try to get in. 
 
k. Bean:  Where does the raft come from?  I don’t remember them. 
 
l. Kerwin:  Yes, there were personal life rafts and personal life vests but we never 
broke them out. 
 
m. Bean:  I remember the vest, but I don’t remember the rafts. 
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n. Lousma:  I think you ought to go down that list and get a vote on yes or no.  It 
seems to me the last two, you can just forget them. And the first one is yes, vehicle 
safing.  As for hatch opening, if the side hatch has an assisted boost once you push it 
open it continues on its own, you could do that.  The top hatch is marginal and 
climbing a ladder is marginal too.  The last two are drowners, right there.  I think 
you could climb in a raft if it was outside the hatch, you could fall into it without 
being in the water.  [There is general consensus from the group on this assessment] 
 
o. Bean:  Sometimes we do things at NASA because they were a good idea long ago, 
like in Mercury when we didn’t know where people were going to land.  So we said, 
we need to get a raft and some other things in case they land like Scott Carpenter, 
way out.  He wasn’t even supposed to be out in his raft, by the way, but he did get in 
it.  He was supposed to stay in the capsule.  Okay, then we come to Gemini.  We 
have an emergency on Gemini 8 and we land where we are not supposed to.  They 
didn’t get out in their raft.  They wait until the ship comes along side until they get 
out.  We didn’t do anything like that in Apollo.  We didn’t do this thing in Skylab or 
anywhere else.  They didn’t need a raft in Shuttle.  We should think about getting rid 
of these rafts.  We are better at putting people down where we want them.  We are 
not going to put anybody down in an unknown spot.  That’s something that might 
have happened in Mercury or even Gemini maybe.  We are not doing that anymore.  
We could maybe get rid of that. I think you all ought to think about this.  To carry up 
a hundred pounds to the Moon and back for a raft…we’ve to rethink these things.   
 
p. Pogue (Written):  In my opinion the most difficult tasks would be 
opening/removing the top hatch (Is it hinged?) and climbing a ladder. Remember 
that a deconditioned crewmember also has a poor sense of balance and a ladder 
climb might cause disorientation. Acceptable tasks would be vehicle safing, 
swimming to stay afloat (the arms are deconditioned the least) and getting into the 
raft.   
 
q. Lousma (Written):  I disagree.  Having to swim to stay afloat is not a good idea. 
 
r. Gibson (Written):  All activities other than climbing (ladder, raft) are OK. 
Climbing with deconditioned legs and shaky vestibular equipment could be a 
challenge.  Assumes a g-suit is worn. 
 
s. Pogue (Written):  Small rafts are easy to get into because the sides (rims) are small.  
One pulls the raft under his chest down to his belly and rolls into the life raft.  
Obviously, you can’t do that with a six-man raft because the sides are so high.  I’ve 
done it with a fully inflated Mae West (life vest).  To deploy a large raft and get a 
deconditioned crew in it from a side hatch that’s, say, six feet above the water will 
not be easy.  However, consider the inflatable slides used to evacuate passenger 
aircraft.  The slides incorporate sides that also inflate and they’re stiff enough to 
keep passengers from rolling off the slide and falling to the ground.  The idea is to 
combine such a slide, which is integral to the raft and deployed from the side hatch 
after attaching it to internal structure near the hatch.  The whole assembly would 
enable crewmembers to slide in sequence from the side hatch and be delivered to the 
center of the raft.  The only exertion required of the crew is to climb out the side 
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hatch and get into the slide.  There are a lot of problems with this concept.  How do 
you keep the raft in the right relative position to the spacecraft, especially in a rough 
sea?  Once everyone is in the raft what do you do with the slide?  It would have to 
be removable. 
5.10.2 Much has been written with regards to the physiologic deconditioning 
seen after long-duration spaceflight.  Crew debriefs made frequent 
reference to an “awareness of the gravity vector” and neurovestibular 
issues. 3, 7 In your experience what is the most operationally limiting 
component of deconditioning (neurovestibular dysfunction, muscle 
weakness, orthostatic intolerance)? 
 
a. Thornton:  This is highly individualized process.  You can’t rank it.  Some 
individuals aren’t going to be bothered by one thing, others may be incapacitated by 
it.  That’s been my experience. 
 
b. Kerwin:  I agree with you Bill [Thornton], but I went ahead and ranked them 
anyway as an individual.  For me orthostatic intolerance was number 1, because I 
felt excellent as long as I was horizontal.  Muscle weakness, #2 and neurovestibular 
#3. 
 
c. Thornton:  Well I had muscle weakness. An initial strength inhibition was my 
worst problem while I had relatively little neurovestibular problem and virtually no 
orthostatic intolerance.     
 
d. Lousma:  You’re saying neurovestibular dysfunction, that’s a big word for a 
Marine.  I call it recalibration of the sensory system and I think that’s a big one.  We 
weren’t weak in a muscular sense.  We did a lot of exercise and it’s just that when 
you got down to one gravity it felt a lot different.  Orthostatic intolerance was next, 
and muscle weakness was last.      
 
e. Thornton:  Well, there you have 3 people with 3 different ideas about this. 
 
f. Garriott:  I would put the recalibration of the neurovestibular system #1, just like 
Jack [Lousma] did.  And orthostatic intolerance, I would put near the bottom, if you 
would give us a couple of hours to rehydrate.    
 
g. Pogue (Written):   Neurovestibular dysfunction. For the first few days my body 
wanted to turn to the right while I was trying to walk straight. I also drove off the 
right side of the road twice in the first three days after return. Thankfully, it wasn’t 
to the left. 
 
h. Gibson (Written):  1. muscle weakness, 2. neurovestibular dysfunction, 3. 
orthostatic intolerance (would be number 1. If no g-suit is worn). 
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5.10.3 If 2-3 pieces of life support equipment, each weighing 50-60 lbs. needed to 
be deployed, do you feel that neurovestibular or musculoskeletal 
decrement post-mission would have prevented you from doing so? 
 
a. Pogue (Written):  I think both of these would have made the task difficult if one 
person were trying to do it. Use two people or prepare a mechanical assistance 
device for deployment. 
 
b. Lousma (Written):  Neither would prevent, but would make the job more difficult. 
5.10.4 Would you have been able to assist in the egress of an ill or injured 
crewmember? 
 
a. Carr:  You do what you have to do. 
 
b. Pogue (Written):  I think so unless the individual was incapacitated. A 150 pound 
crewmember would be a lot to handle. We donned a hyperbaric garment before 
reentry to offset the post-landing orthostatic intolerance.  It worked fine; we were 
able to walk when we got out of the spacecraft (84 day flight). 
 
c. Gibson (Written):  Assist, yes. Totally carry, no. 
 
d. Lousma (Written):  Yes, but more by pulling and shoving vs. lifting because the 
capsule quarters are cramped and crowded. 
5.10.5 Many crewmembers suffered from seasickness after landing, how did 
that affect your post-landing operations? 
 
a. Carr:  Not on board. 
 
b. Kerwin:  It didn’t in our case.  It could if you were in a survival situation.   
 
c. Pogue (Written):  We did not experience seasickness. 
 
d. Lousma (Written):  No problem for our crew – Bean, Garriott, Lousma 
5.10.6 Were crew directed to take anti-motion sickness medication prior to 
landing?  Did you take it?  If you did, did you get sick? 
 
a. Ross:  Joe [Kerwin] is absolutely correct.  The only Scope-Dex that was used during 
Skylab was his one capsule that was used on launch day.  There was no other Scope-
Dex used.  However, I’d like to make one comment about vestibular adaptation.  We 
all know that we have some crewmembers that are affected in the first 2-3 three days 
on launch.  And I think that’s one of the reasons that it is 2 days before you dock.  
Everybody’s basically got their head back by that time.  When we looked at the 
M131 [vestibular experiment] on Skylab and the great results we were getting.  We 
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thought we had arrived, because we were getting such benign information back.  
Yet, to be fooled again, when we got people coming back, we began to see 
vestibular effects.  I don’t think there is any doubt, and I wouldn’t try to rank what 
was first second or third, because we had muscle weakness, we had neurovestibular 
effects and we had orthostatic intolerance.  But the combination again proves 
somewhat disconcerting as to how to operationally handle these people upon 
immediate return and putting them through tests.  It seems to me that when you are 
coming back and you are going to have a water landing, the sooner you can get them 
out of the capsule and on to the ship, which I am hoping can happen so close to 
landing that we won’t have to have them in the capsule very long, the better it will 
be to assess these parameters.  I don’t think we can say that we can be totally 
comfortable in keeping the vestibular effects from occurring.  I think we are going to 
need some countermeasures to again address this situation. 
 
b. Pogue (Written):  We were not directed to take anti-motion sickness medication. 
 
c. Gibson (Written): We did not take any as best as I can recall and did not get sick. 
 
d. Lousma (Written):  The crew were not directed to take it.  Used it for the first two 
days on orbit, but not used after that for orbit ops, pre- or post landing.
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5.11 Water Landing and Recovery – Capsule Environment 
5.11.1 Cabin temperature (namely heat) is a major concern to CEV planners 
right now.  In a crew technical debrief, one crewmember stated that after 
landing “…the vehicle was cool.”3  Another crew commented that “the 
environment inside the spacecraft was very acceptable.”7  This is in 
contrast to the comment previously noted that the vehicle became hot 
with the hatch closed.  Please provide any additional comments regarding 
the post-landing cabin environment – temperature, humidity, etc. 
 
a. Lousma:  Was the overheated one a capsule that came back from the moon? 
 
b. Lindgren:  No this was from the Skylab 2 debrief. 
 
c. Weitz:  All I remember is that it got humid.  But I’ve always been sensitive to 
humidity.  It was uncomfortable, but I don’t remember it getting warm or hot. 
 
d. Kerwin:  Me neither.  It was probably on the warm side of neutral, but we weren’t 
in there for very long.  It was a non issue for us, and therefore we can’t comment 
fruitfully on what that temperature environment would be like for 36 or 48 hours.  
 
e. Lousma:  What did returning lunar crews say about this question?   
 
f. Scheuring:  They said it was humid and they couldn’t get any cooling.  I don’t 
recall any comments related to the heat in the cabin.   
 
g. Lindgren:  There was an interesting comment in one of the responses that was 
returned to me suggesting that the vehicle that settled in stable 2, there was a sense 
that maybe with the heat shield not in the water cooling, that with the heat shield 
exposed, that contributed to making the cabin a little bit warmer.  Any thoughts on 
that?   
 
h. Weitz:  How much heat does the heat shield absorb?  It gets rid of most of it, 
correct?   
 
i. Ross: On Apollo 16 for example, we landed in the South Pacific in warm water.  I 
don’t want to say that I can remember that it was 90 degrees, but it was darn hot and 
humid.  I know that Young, Duke and Mattingly were anxious to get out of there.   
 
j. Pogue (Written):  The post-landing environment was acceptable. I don’t remember 
having any discomfort.  I think landing site location and the season of the year has a 
lot to do with the heating and relative humidity problem. 
 
k. Gibson (Written):  It felt hot and humid. Might depend on outside environment. 
 
l. Lousma (Written):  Neither heat nor humidity were noticeable. 
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5.11.2 Given a deconditioned state, motion-sickness, temperature concerns – 
please comment on what you think would be needed to make the suited 
capsule environment tolerable for up to 36 hours.  Ventilation? Active 
cooling? 
 
a. Weitz:  Well I think the answer to that question is active cooling.   
 
b. Kerwin:  Well, being that this is a contingency.  I hate to ask for a room air 
conditioner given that this is a contingency.   
 
c. Weitz:  No, I’m answering the question.  I didn’t say it was a good idea.  [laughter]. 
 
d. Garriott:  Well if you are going to stay for 36 hours, why would you stay in the 
suit? 
 
e. Bean:  I can’t imagine that you wouldn’t get out of the suit.  I can’t think of a reason 
to stay in the suit.  You are going to be safer if you are out of the suit, if you are 
going to abandon the ship.  You shouldn’t struggle with this issue, because nobody 
is going to do it.  Nobody is going to do that, so you shouldn’t spend any money or 
time on that issue. 
 
f. Lindgren:  Clearly you all are in favor of getting out of the suit as soon as possible.  
[laughter] 
 
g. Bean:  Even if we weren’t, everybody would still be getting out of their suit, I can 
tell you that right now.  They would say, I’m not going to stay in this suit, I’m back 
on Earth, Mission Control is 2000 miles away – they can’t bother me, and they’d 
take their suit off.   
 
h. Lousma:  I think you are right Al. 
 
i. Lindgren:  If the suited requirement stays, we’d like to encourage the suit designers 
to design a suit that somebody would be able to get out of in a deconditioned state in 
a cramped space like the CEV.   
 
j. Pogue (Written):  Fans for ventilation, active cooling would be great, using a 
modified LCVG may be more efficient, lighting at night. If you are assuming all 
crewmembers are suited then active cooling is mandatory. One really gets hot fast 
even if you’re passive or inactive. 
 
k. Lousma (Written):  Ventilation – yes. Active cooling – no.  And I don’t think we 
should splashdown wearing a pressure suit. 
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5.11.3 Do you have a sense of how much re-entry heating contributed to the 
cabin temperature? 
 
a. Pogue (Written):  I didn’t think it had any effect. 
 
b. Gibson (Written):  I thought it was significant because it was only 70 – 75 outside. 
5.11.4 The loss of the micrometeoroid shield caused temperatures in the OWS to 
soar up to 160°F.4  Attitude adjustments and the parasol reduced 
temperatures to 90 – 100 °F.4  Please comment on working conditions and 
operational impact. 
 
a. Weitz:  It was 140 degrees when we got there, because they did the pitching 
maneuver.  Pete and I first stripped down to our skivvies to go inside and it didn’t 
take long to realize why folks wear a lot of clothes in the desert.  So we ended up 
putting our shirts, trousers and jackets back on to work in. We would make short 
excursions into the workshop to extend the parasol.  We didn’t stay down there very 
long.  We worked until we felt uncomfortable.  I tell you, it was about 60 degrees in 
the MDA.  It was nice and cool in the MDA and it was cool in the Command 
Module.  So we had a place to come back to and keep Joe posted on what was going 
on.  I was going to argue with you on that 90 – 100 degrees because it did come 
down and you can see in those photos that the parasol did not deploy quite correctly, 
which is why these folks put out the twin-pole sunshade.  That made it better when 
they got all of the hotspots on the workshop covered up.  I don’t think it affected our 
working conditions at all, do you Joe [Kerwin]? 
  
b. Kerwin:  Once we achieved equilibrium, which I recall was low to mid 80’s, 
everything was fine.   
 
c. Weitz:  Yeah and that was about day 4 or 5. 
 
d. Carr:  When you first went down there, how long did you stay before you came 
back up, 10 minutes? 
 
e. Weitz:  It depended on the job.  First I went down and made an inspection.  Then 
Pete and I went in and once we started extending the parasol I would guess that it 
wasn’t much more than 15 minutes.  Jack Kinsler designed a good system and it 
didn’t take much to get that parasol out.   
 
f. Lousma:  Did the inside temperature change day to night? 
 
g. Kerwin:  Didn’t change that much day to night.  It had soaked into the structure of 
the workshop, and it was radiating such that you had to wear clothes.  It was too hot 
to touch on the sun side.   
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h. Weitz:  The water tanks on the sun side never did cool off the whole time we were 
there.  I could always feel heat radiating from those practically until the day we left.   
 
i. Crippen:  Did the sail make any difference as far as total temperature?  I was 
thinking that the parasol started to degrade after a period of time. 
 
j. Garriott: True and true. 
 
k. Bean:  I can remember that the beta angle made a lot of difference to us.  When it 
would get right, boy it would cool off in there and really be great.   
 
l. Pogue (Written):  By the time we arrived the corrective devices worked quite well 
except at times when the beta angle was high.  At those times we were in continuous 
daylight for over 80 hours and the workshop area below the parasol and sail really 
heated up.  If you were within 10 feet you could feel the IR from the workshop.  Ed 
Gibson’s sleep compartment was also under the hot area and he had to move his 
framed sleeping bag into area of normal temperature.  Aside from that there was 
little effect on operations. 
 
m. Gibson (Written):  They were great by the time we got up there. The first two 
crews did a great job of erecting sunshades. But what’s so bad about 160? It was a 
dry heat! 
5.11.5 The OWS humidity was reportedly kept fairly low resulting in chapped 
lips and dry mucosa.7  Any other impacts?  Did low humidity make the 
heat more tolerable?   
 
a. Kerwin:  Low humidity made the heat more tolerable and there were other 
beneficial effects as well.  The surfaces remained dry, moisture didn’t condense on 
surfaces and the spacecraft therefore stayed cleaner I think and smelled better.  
Except in the command module where all kinds of condensation took place.   
 
b. Bobko:  One thing that hasn’t been mentioned, at least in SMEAT, we had the 5 psi 
atmosphere and your airflow didn’t carry heat away from your body as quickly as it 
does in a 14.7 atmosphere.  And so at 10.3 there’s probably going to be some of that 
in the CEV.   
 
c. Gillis:  At the low humidity, was there any problem with static electricity? 
 
d. General Consensus: No. 
 
e. Pogue (Written):  I had chapped lips and dry skin for the first two weeks but after 
that it wasn’t too bad.  The low humidity affected the hematometer, which we were 
supposed to use to get a red cell count.  It didn’t work properly in the low humidity 
environment.  During the periods of high beta angle the heat had little effect on me 
because I stayed away from hot areas. 
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f. Gibson (Written):  I had no problems. 
 
g. Lousma (Written):  I had a split lip for the last couple of weeks due to the dryness.  
The low pressure and humidity made showering a cold experience due to the high 
evaporation rate. 
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5.12 Water Landing and Recovery – Environmental Concerns 
5.12.1 How did weather drive or impact operations? 
 
a. General Consensus:  Weather was not a problem. 
5.12.2 How did sea states drive or impact operations? 
 
a. General Consensus:  There was no impact. 
5.12.3 Please comment on sea conditions during your landings.  Skylab 2 
reportedly had 2-3 foot waves, but with 6 foot swells.25  Skylab 3 
reportedly had 6 foot waves.25 How did this affect recovery operations? 
 
a. Carr:  Skylab 4 sea conditions were pretty calm.  We had very little wind and very 
little swell or waves. 
 
b. Jones:  So there were no weather delay on return? 
  
c. Kerwin:  We had no weather delays, at least for us, and no impact on operations. 
 
d. Jones:  So they were able to pick you up within the timeframe regardless of the sea 
condition? 
 
e. Kerwin:  That’s correct. 
 
f. Jones:  And were 6 foot seas accurate for you landing conditions? 
 
g. Weitz:  Like I said before, swells are pretty easy.  You can take a nice swell in a 
rowboat, especially along the length.  I don’t remember us moving around much at 
all.   
 
h. Kerwin:  Bad weather had just moved out of the area where we landed, it was still 
cloudy. 
 
i. Weitz:  So the bottom line is, whatever the conditions were, they weren’t 
bothersome. 
 
j. Pogue (Written):  It didn’t affect the recovery operation for Skylab 4. 
 
k. Lousma (Written):  No effect for SL3. 
5.12.4 According to CM specifications, the vehicle could handle wave heights up 
to 8.5 feet in the first 48 hours.14  The “rescue” crew (Brand, Lind, 
Lenoir) got to experience 6 foot waves during CM sea worthiness trials in 
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the Gulf of Mexico.4  How confident were you in the vehicle’s 
seaworthiness?  Did you participate in any other integrated training with 
recovery forces? 
 
a. Lousma:  None of them ever sank. 
 
b. Ross:  I think the point is on this one, I was assigned to the Skylab rescue crew and I 
was out on that session with those guys, and I can tell you it was a rough day.  I 
guess the point is that nobody sank and everybody did a professional job.  I think 
they did get beat up that day. 
 
c. Crippen:  I’ll tell you, they had 6-8 foot seas, not swells – waves and it was pretty 
cotton pickin’ rough.  I don’t take my boat out in that.   
 
d. Lousma (Written):  I was not particularly confident in the vehicle’s seaworthiness 
due to previous reports.  We did not participate in any integrated training with 
recovery forces. 
5.12.5 Do you recall how the CM was modeled/tested for worst case sea 
conditions? 
 
a. Gibson (Written):  No. 
 
b. Lousma (Written):  No. 
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5.13 Water Landing and Recovery – Recovery Forces 
5.13.1 Skylab recovery forces hoisted the command module onto the deck of the 
recovery ship, crew and all.  What role did swimmers, and small 
watercraft play in the recovery effort? 
 
a. Weitz:  I think the guys operated out of motor launches to attach the hoisting gear. 
 
b. Kerwin:  We had swimmers that attached the flotation collar.  I don’t know who it 
was that attached the hoist cables to the command module, but they were key 
members of the team.  We couldn’t have done it without them.   
 
c.  Weitz:  Seems to me there were motor launches out there. 
 
d. Garriott:  Swimmers definitely.  
 
e. Ross:  It looked like there was plenty of support from my vantage point, as I was 
over on the point watching for the lift to take place.  But the safety people kept us 
away.  They had plenty of lines and the Command Module was 6 tons, so I’m sure 
that we had a 10 ton crane.  They had plenty of support personnel and it looked like 
they knew what they were doing.  There was no banging or buffeting of the 
command module against the ships side.  It went very smoothly. 
 
f. Pogue (Written):  On Skylab 4 we didn’t even open the side hatch until we were on 
the deck of the recovery ship but while we were waiting to be hoisted we saw the 
divers recovering the chutes and attaching the rig for the hoist. I don’t remember 
seeing their watercraft. 
 
g. Gibson (Written):  They checked on the crew. I’m not sure if they also put a 
flotation collar in place 
 
h. Lousma (Written):  Swimmers looked in the windows to verify our condition while 
we were in Stable 2.  They also attached the flotation collar. 
5.13.2 Were there protocols developed for removing the crew from the capsule 
prior to hoisting?  
 
a. Ross:  I don’t remember any protocol for removing them.  During Apollo we did of 
course.  For Skylab, I don’t remember them talking about “if such and such happens 
we’re going to have to take them out.”  I don’t think they were prepared to do that.  I 
don’t remember there being a Plan B.   
 
b. Carr:  We had no training in that area at all. 
 
c. Kerwin:  We didn’t do an exercise in the Gulf or anything.  We had water wings, 
we had one man life rafts.  Depending on what the problem was, I suspect that the 
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swimmers would have assisted us out into our one man life rafts and helped us to 
stay safe until we were hoisted onto the chopper or the ship eventually came.   
 
d. Weitz:  Once they got the flotation ring in place, there were swimmers all around. 
 
e. Bean:  So it wasn’t going to sink.  So you’d have to think of a reason as to why you 
would want to get out.  That was the whole idea, get that on there, it’s more stable 
and it won’t sink.  So why would you get out? 
 
f. Jones:  Well if you couldn’t hoist, if the hoist failed. 
 
g. Bean:  Oh I see.  Well, my guess is that the helicopter has got one of those big rafts 
like we had in Apollo, and another one has one of those hoists and they would drop 
it out and we’d get in it, although we never practiced that.  But it would be right next 
to the vehicle and we’d get in there and they’d come over and pick us up one by one.  
Because in regular survival training we’d practiced using slings and everything else.  
So I think we could have easily done the job.  That would be my guess.   
 
h. Crippen:  I would suspect, knowing the way NASA works, whether or not you guys 
were directly involved that the Navy or somebody had a plan if the hoist was 
broken, of how to get them out of there.   
 
i. Lousma:  I don’t know of any other protocols.  We were trained to lay down and 
wait.   
 
j. Pogue (Written):  Not that I’m aware of but the Apollo post splashdown procedures 
would have worked had they been needed. The only differences perhaps would have 
been special allowances/protocols for deconditioned crewmen. 
 
k.  Gibson (Written):  Yes, but I do not recall the details. 
5.13.3 Were there handholds and attach points on the CM for recovery forces 
or did they need to be placed? 
 
a. Lousma: They were already there.  
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5.14 Skylab Habitability 
5.14.1 The 56-day Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT) provided 
an invaluable assessment of Skylab protocols and equipment.    The SMEAT 
crew identified problems with experimental procedures and data-handling, 
experimental hardware (LBNP, Vectorcardiogram) and habitability 
equipment like the urine volume measuring system.26  One crewmember 
stated that “Skylab has a much better chance of success because of what we 
learnt in SMEAT”.4  Should all programs be preceded by testing like this?  
 
a.  Crippen:  It depends entirely on the specific program.  You certainly don’t need it for 
the station or the CEV.  The lunar hab might be something that people would look at.  
One of the reasons that we did SMEAT was that they wanted to isolate out the effect of 
the 5psi environment on medical experiments.  You have to look at the specific 
program to determine whether it would be useful or not. 
  
b.  Bobko:  I agree with that.  If you look at the urine collection device for shuttle, it went 
through a lot of changes in the early days.  Well if you had taken that original thing off 
to the moon, it would have been a problem.  If you are just going on the Shuttle for a 
couple of days, you can live with it.  With SMEAT, we identified some of the problems 
in their urine collection device, and so that meant that when they got on orbit for 28 
days, it was working much better than if we hadn’t done that.  I think if you are talking 
about a 2 or 3 day mission, you could probably get along even if something doesn’t 
work right.  If you are talking about a 60 day mission, you might want to have 
something like a SMEAT to make sure that it has been wrung out.   
 
c.  Garriott:  Joe [Kerwin] and I have interviewed a lot of people on this issue of 
habitability in relation to SMEAT in the last couple of years.  And they mostly talk 
about the urine collection device, the exercise bicycle, and the medical tests.  Had it not 
been for SMEAT, we wouldn’t have been able to do half the experiments onboard.  
Marshall Space Flight Center was responsible for the medical experiments.  Bill 
[Thornton] managed to break their exercise device not once, not twice, at least three 
times.  If it had not happened, we would not have had a successful experience.  The 
folks at Marshall came to that conclusion themselves.  They said “He really did us a 
favor.”  It was really important to have these guys doing the medical experiment tests 
on the hardware that was going to be used, to make sure that it was going to be working 
right for actual flight. 
 
d.  Thornton:  You can imagine my take on it.  Look at the things that changed.  First of 
all there was the diet.  The 2000 calorie diet that was going to be augmented with sugar 
cookies and lemon drops.  I still can’t eat lemon drops even though I loved lemon 
drops.  I still lost weight; I think I set the record for weight loss.  The flight surgeons 
finally said I don’t care what you want to do, you start eating.  Now it took all three 
missions, but I think Jerry Carr finally came off with no loss at all.  I’m not talking 
about fluid shift or rapid loss; I’m talking about the somatic loss that was caused by 
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diet.  So that was the first big war that we had.  I don’t even like to think about the 
urine collection system. Now remember what they did, they tested it with water, they 
had never tested it with urine, and that thing failed seven times.  That thing was totally 
redesigned.  I suppose I’m notorious for the flight qualification bicycle failures, but I 
simply rode it at what it was rated for.  Other equipment, like the metabolic gas 
analyzer was totally revised.   Now admittedly, this stuff was not ready to fly, and that 
was proven, so it depends on what stage the equipment is in.  If you have flown 
something a half a dozen times before, then there isn’t much point.  But I strongly feel 
that you are going to be better off running as realistic sims as you can, using actual 
hardware.   
 
e.  Kerwin:  I want to comment on the Apollo Command Service Module testing that was 
done in the vacuum chamber.  Both the Block I and Block II spacecraft were tested, 
with crew, for seven days in the big chamber in building 32.  The difference between 
the outcomes between those two tests was like night and day.  The Block I test was a 
sad story of multiple failures, problems and inadequacies.  The Block II was a beautiful 
success that paved the way for Apollo 7.  Very worthwhile. 
 
f.  Carr:  Bill, I just wanted to tell you that on SL-4 the sugar cookies were legal tender. 
 
g.  Ross:  Not only were the SMEAT crew the “canaries” in the 20ft chamber, the 
equipment were “canaries” as well.  We were running a 70% oxygen, 30% nitrogen 
mixture at 5psia.  We were maintaining CO2 levels as would optimally on Skylab.  We 
had a 21-day pre-chamber phase, a 56-day chamber test and 18-day post chamber 
phase.  The area of greatest test contribution was the impact on flight hardware.  During 
in-chamber testing, several items either broke or revealed operational degradation and 
had to be sent outside the chamber for re-evaluation, repair or engineering 
modifications or redesign.  Some of the problems had to do with the Urine Volume 
Collection Measuring System, the Metabolic Analyzer, the bicycle ergometer – which 
was also essential for crewmember exercise, which Bill Thornton did a heavy amount 
of work on.  Additional problems we encountered were with the blood pressure 
measuring system and the cardiotachometer.  Data were obtained for all of these items 
which could be used in their redesign to ensure complete acceptability for Skylab. And 
again we need to thank some of the efforts of Dr. Bill Shoemaker and Dr. John 
Stonesifer who were heavily involved in these activities.  The guys in SMEAT did an 
outstanding job interfacing themselves to the outside world.  I can’t give them enough 
credit, because they really put up with a lot of BS.  I wrote that there was no 
appreciable degradation of crew performance over the duration of the test.  Significant 
individual differences were noted however to selected features of the test environment.  
In the case of the SPT, the dietary requirements were well underestimated for his size 
and personal activity requirements.  And that created the need for those free calories. 
The thing that Bill did not say was, after we felt sorry for him with all of his lean body 
mass loss, the SPT opted for the free calorie supplementation, because he felt, that if he 
was actually on the Skylab, he would not be able to free change and add to his diet as 
he could in the altitude chamber which had an in and out lock.  So I wanted to put this 
in the perspective that not a lot of people are going to talk about SMEAT in the future, I 
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don’t think.  But I want to make sure that I have something on the record besides the 
SMEAT book. 
 
h. Gibson (Written):  There should be a wring out of the equipment that’s new and not 
yet demonstrated. Otherwise, we should know how to run a space station by now. 
 
i. Schmitt (Written):  Rather than just testing for habitability, the CEV and lunar 
habitats, both development and each flight vehicle, should be fully tested in flight 
crewed chamber runs to build confidence and to provide flight vehicle familiarization. 
5.14.2 Current CEV plans call for a WMS (instead of Apollo bags).  Aside from a 
few minor issues, the Skylab WMS was well-regarded.  One crewmember 
stated that “I thought we had a great urine and fecal system.”27  A lessons 
learned document suggested that higher airflow for fecal collection was 
desirable, that the seat should be fabricated of softer material and the 
outside diameter should be widened.  It was also mentioned that the lap belt 
and handholds were absolutely required.12  Do you have any other 
comments or suggestions? 
 
a.  Crippen:  Just a comment, having flown the first mixed gender crew, we had a lot 
more privacy on the shuttle than you are going to have on the CEV.  It is something 
you need to be worried about.  I also wanted to point out that the Skylab system 
probably would have failed on orbit if we hadn’t wrung it out.  The Shuttle system 
failed on orbit several times before we had a chance to finally resolve it, so whatever 
you do, there needs some kind of a “wring-out” test prior to flight.   
 
b.  Carr:  Crip, how would you rate the Skylab waste management system with the Shuttle 
system, once we got the bugs out of that? 
 
c.  Thornton:  Wait a second, unfortunately I got pushed into something that I never 
wanted to deal with and that was the fecal collection system.  Urine is one thing but 
fecal collection… Anyway, let’s face it, the shuttle system was a disaster.  Remember 
the concept was that it was going to sling around, and like concrete, stick to the walls.  I 
came down and one of the crewmembers said, “Bill, look at this.”  Periodically he had 
the shutter system on the fecal collection system open and periodically you would see 
this little object come flying out.  Well the first thing that they did, was to stop chasing 
food in-flight after that.  After that it started to sound like a concrete mixer.  What it did 
is it would knock off chunks, and it would amplify from there until it was just a floating 
mass.  I will not go through all of the, quote, fixes that they tried.  They ended up with a 
kitchen spatula on one flight where you would push the feces away to make room.  I 
won’t go further on that.  Unfortunately I don’t know what happened with the “Super 
Dixie Cup” collector on Space Station.  Now remember, a much more efficient system 
was designed, flown and recommended.  If there are mass problems on lunar missions, 
it should be looked at again.   
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d. Kerwin:  Let’s talk about the Skylab system a little bit.  I think it is fair to say that the 
system you had in SMEAT had to be so extensively changed for Skylab, that it wasn’t 
representative, is that right? 
 
e. Crippen:  Well, the basic techniques were all still there, so it wasn’t that different. 
 
f. Thornton:  Well, it is easy in gravity and it was a very simple but very effective 
system.  It was just a wire mesh with a bag.  But remember, you all had to bag and 
mass and everything else. 
 
g. Bobko:  And you [Skylab crewmembers] dried it, we didn’t dry it, we just shipped it 
outside.  As a matter of fact, they accused us once of not shipping everything outside. 
 
h. Kerwin:  The question before the house is, is the Skylab system, stripped of its mass 
measuring necessities, and the requirements to sample the urine and freeze dry the fecal 
material…if you strip all of that out, would it be a good system for CEV or is it still too 
heavy? 
 
i. Thornton:  If you are willing to put up with the bags…conversely, the system I was 
talking about, the efficient system, requires only one sheet between each, in contrast to 
the fairly complex bag.  Everybody uses the system, which when collected is 
compressed between two sheets.  Each time you add another sheet and you end up with 
a very compact, minimum mass.  Now if you can afford the mass of the bags, it would 
work quite well. 
 
j. Crippen:  Back to Jerry’s [Carr] question, in my opinion, the Skylab system was far 
superior to what the Shuttle ended up with. 
 
k. Bobko:  No question. 
 
l. Carr:  I feel the same way too. 
 
m. Ross:  One thing you should remember is that during Apollo we had a “shoot off” with 
three companies that were developing the Skylab waste management system.  I flew 
more parabolas than I want to think about with different personnel that urinated and 
defecated during those 30 second parabolas, until they finally got to the company that 
had the best design for Skylab.  My bottom line opinion was that based on listening to 
the crews from the three missions, it seemed like it was a satisfactory system on orbit. 
 
n. Carr:  I would say it was, and the other thing was that we didn’t have much of an odor 
problem in the Waste Management Compartment it was easy to clean.   
 
o. Bean:  I’m glad we’ve got astronauts like Bill Thornton, because we need those kind of 
guys around NASA, because they solve problems.  They get in and test this gear and 
keep talking about it and they’ve got original ideas.  I can remember when you solved 
the problem about balance.  After our flight we didn’t have much lateral balance and 
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you solved that problem with a simple device.  We need more guys like Bill Thornton, 
my hats off to you Bill, for everything you’ve done in this program. 
 
p. Thornton:  Coming from you, you have no idea how much I appreciate that. 
 
q. Scheuring:  How did the system handle off-nominal “output” so to speak, i.e. loose 
stools?   
 
r. Kerwin:  Good question!  I don’t know that we had any diarrhea episodes or problems. 
[General consensus that there were no problems] 
  
s. Thornton:  We had some diarrhea in SMEAT and the system handled it well. 
 
t. Gibson (Written):  I agree with these recommendations and thought the system 
worked well even as it was designed. There’s a mistake that you will only make once – 
forgetting to turn on the airflow when using the urine collection device. 
 
u. Schmitt (Written):  CEV facilities are not a critical as long term Lunar Habitat 
facilities.  Apollo level of hygiene provisions should be adequate for the CEV as it will 
not be require to support crew longer than did the CSM, but a Lunar Habitat must 
provide for stays much longer than the LM. 
5.14.3 Good odor control is desirable in the CEV (especially for the WMS). Odors 
were well controlled in Skylab.3  Do you attribute this to the charcoal filter 
system, the diluting effect of the large gas volume, or both? 
 
a.  Thornton:  There’s no question that it was the charcoal.  Activated charcoal is one of 
the most remarkable substances on Earth.  It is incredibly efficient at removing odors, 
because I promise you, one bad defecation, even in the Skylab volume would have 
fouled the atmosphere.   
 
b.  Weitz:  I believe one of the factors, personally, was the reduced pressure in Skylab, the 
5 psi.  My personal opinion was that when we were working, wearing those beta-cloth 
outfits that absorb zero sweat, so it would just lay there and get moldy after a little 
while.  It would get so that I could hardly stand myself, but I never smelled the other 
crewmembers.  I don’t know what that says…  My impression was that odors just 
didn’t carry that far.  I think charcoal had a lot to do with it, but I also think that it was 
the 5 psi.  
 
c.  Lousma:  I think one of the things on Skylab that kept odors and everything else down 
was that the in addition to the low pressure, the humidity was extremely low.  The place 
was built in a clean room, and we didn’t sweat that much, so everything was clean.  I 
don’t recall odor control being much of a problem at all, but I think it had something to 
do with the environment we were in, which is probably different than the one you have 
now. 
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d. Bobko:  I don’t know if it was the food that we ate or the reduced pressure, but there 
was quite a bit of gas generated during our stint, probably due to the food.  I don’t 
know how you guys felt.  [General agreement] 
 
e. Kerwin:  I think we’ve reached some consensus that the Skylab urine and fecal 
systems were miles better than Apollo and should be at least a candidate for use on the 
CEV if the weight could be stripped, by taking out the mass measurement 
requirements. 
  
f. Garriott:  Agreed but Bill Thornton did have an alternative system that ought to be 
looked at, because it could be lighter and smaller and more convenient than Skylab, but 
based upon the same kind of a principle.  And you also need to think about using 
vacuum drying, if you have that available, to further reduce the volume. 
 
g. Lousma:  The Skylab WMS had a sealed compartment with a tightly fitting door, so 
odors were contained within the small volume, with less chance to have an odor 
problem than you might with just a curtain for example.   
 
h. Lindgren:  There was also a trash airlock on Skylab, and an ability to move trash into 
the vacuum and out of the habitable volume which probably contributed to odor 
control.   
 
i.  Kerwin:  Jerry [Carr], didn’t your crew experience some odor out of the trash airlock at 
the end of your mission? 
 
j.  Carr:  Yes we did.  There got to be an odor after a while and so we ended up going 
down and doing a little cleaning job, because apparently one or two of the bags leaked 
a little bit.  We cleaned it up and it was ok. 
 
k.  Bobko:  The Shuttle has 2 or 3 trash levels and the worst trash level went into a “lock” 
or volume that has a bleed outside. 
 
l. Gibson (Written):  Both. Plus I am no longer sure if our sense of smell was reduced in 
0-g. Maybe it was because body odors were not even a problem. 
5.14.4 Lessons learned were applied to the layout of the Skylab internal volume.  
For example, do not co-locate waste management equipment with the galley.  
What lessons related to general layout or habitability should be applied to 
the lunar habitat? 
 
a.  Carr:  Well in the pictures I’ve seen, I’m glad to see that there will be a mud room in 
the lunar habitat.  Because, apparently that was a real problem in the Apollo program, 
with tracking dirt in the spacecraft.  Having an airlock or a mudroom out there is a 
really good idea.  Anyone that lives in New England knows the value of a mudroom. 
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b.  Crippen:  What about your sleep area and having your own little private spot?  Now I 
don’t know if any of you ever used it since you slept all over the vehicle…  
 
c. Garriott:  We all used it.  We all appreciated having our own space.  It was a telephone 
booth sized compartment.  It was so good that this guy wrote a 60 to 80 paged diary in-
flight, neither Jack nor I knew anything about, till about 30 years later.  And so it really 
did provide a lot more privacy than one might expect.  And so I think it was very 
important if you can have it, you ought to.  
 
d. Carr:  I agree with Owen.  I wrote a diary too and having the privacy of your own 
quarters in a spacecraft is important.  Bill Pogue and I lobbied for years with Boeing 
and NASA to get quarters in the habitat section on ISS, but it didn’t happen.  I haven’t 
heard anything recently from the ISS program, but I suspect that there are folks that 
wish they had a private place they could go to.   
 
e. Kerwin:  I’m trying to think of criticisms and a minor one was that if someone used the 
urine system in the middle of the night, you’d probably wake up your crewmates, 
because the compartments were adjacent.  I don’t know if there is anything you could 
do about that in CEV. 
  
f. Lousma:  I was going to mention that you want to keep both noise and light away from 
the sleep compartments.  One thing that caused a real problem on Skylab was that 
equipment failed that was behind compartment walls.  Some of the engineers thought 
that the stuff they built were never going to fail and so the compartment walls were 
screwed in with permanent type screws, so we had to be creative on how to get the 
screws out.  It was a tough thing to do, but we did it.  You need to make sure things are 
accessible.  Don’t put covers on so tight so that you can’t get them off in space, even if 
the engineers think you’ll never have to do it, because it’ll happen. 
 
g. Lousma:  It was also nice to have things that could be fixed with the tools you have in 
your garage.  If you have to have special tools for everything, you are just loading up 
the toolkit with things you shouldn’t have to bring up.  We should build things that can 
be repaired with standard tools.  
 
h. Thornton:  This may be out of place, but I didn’t really see another place for it and I 
think it is very relevant.  Planning for spending six months on Space Station versus 
going to the lunar surface as both of you alluded to…it is a whole different ball game.  
That 1/6th gravity offers you all whole new set of opportunities.  Mass measurement 
becomes trivial.  Exercise, fluid shifts…all of these things are a whole different game 
on the lunar surface.    
 
i. Carr:  We were talking about maintainability and access to things.  We had that 
Coolanol, that magically disappear and we had to reservice the Coolanol system.  We 
would have been in deep trouble if we hadn’t had access to those Coolanol lines.  And 
we basically used a good old saddle valve on it, in order to reservice that system.  So 
this is a case that speaks well for having accessibility.  
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j. Kerwin:  Going back to Jerry Carr’s comment regarding the trash airlock.  Be sure that 
you design the spacecraft so that all of the nooks and crannies can be cleaned or it will 
eventually catch up to you.   
 
k. Bobko:  There is nothing about food in the habitability section.  The Skylab food was 
significantly better than how the Shuttle food started out.  Some of that is because you 
didn’t have the free water that you had on the shuttle and so a lot more things were 
dehydrated on the shuttle menu compared to the Skylab menu.  And of course you had 
a freezer on Skylab, which had things like ice cream and steaks, which were great.  
Many of you have flown Shuttle too, what do you think? 
 
l. Garriott:  The Skylab food was much better.  It’s the best that has been flown in space.   
 
m. Carr:  On the last mission, because of the food quantity situation, it was clear that we 
were going to need to augment our diet.  You remember we got into the food bar 
business.  We endured it because we wanted to make sure that the experiment got done 
properly, so that we ended up with the right kind of nutrition, but boy, if you can avoid 
doing that to a crew…  Don’t put people in a position where they have to subsist on 
food bars, even if it is one every three or four days. 
 
n. Gibson (Written):  Put the sleep compartments as far away from other living facility 
noise sources (comm. center, galley, exp. facilities, exercise area). Separate the exercise 
area from the galley. 
 
o. Schmitt (Written):  Be careful about over-doing “comfort” versus what is fully 
adequate for long-term exploration.  Remember that explorers are highly motivated 
and, historically, require less comfort than settlers. 
5.14.5 There have been many comments regarding the Skylab shower.  Please 
comment on its use, clean up, etc.  Is a shower needed in the future?  
     
a. Lousma:  The shower in Skylab was actually added after the fact, after the whole 
Skylab and all of the plumbing as designed.  Well somebody thought, we ought to have 
a shower.  It was bolted to the floor with a fabric cylinder that latched around a fitting 
at the top.  You had to mix water in a 3-quart container – so much hot, so much cold.  
You had soap that was probably better used in a veterinary practice, because it made 
you itch.  We sprayed water on ourselves with a sprayer and then had to vacuum it off 
with a suction device.   One thing worth noting is that we were in this low-pressure 
environment and so whenever you got that water on you and went to dry yourself off, it 
got extremely cold because it was evaporating so rapidly.  It took a lot of vacuuming to 
get all of the water out from inside of cylinder.  You had to use a lot of towels to get 
dry.  During our mission we usually just took sponge baths every night with a wash 
cloth and a towel.  We probably could have done without a shower, since it was low 
humidity and low pressure environment.  It’s different on ISS and perhaps in the habitat 
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with higher pressure and more humidity, so you may want to have a shower.  I don’t 
know about the other guys, but Al [Bean] took two showers and I took one.   
 
b. Carr:  Well, I took a shower every 10 days whether I needed it or not.  But I found the 
shower to be quite refreshing and I enjoyed it.  The only downside was that it just took 
too doggone long to do all that stuff.  So if they can find a way to take a shower a little 
more quickly, they’d be on the right track.   
 
c. Garriott:  The average time for a shower was about 1 hour.  You can clean up with a 
wash cloth in 10 minutes or less.  To me, I would skip the whole thing.  You don’t need 
a shower, even on ISS.   
 
d. Thornton:  We didn’t have a shower when I grew up, like many other Americans at the 
time.  The sponge bath works.  Frankly, I consider it a luxury item in spaceflight.   
 
e. Kerwin:  Well you certainly don’t need one on CEV, but I agree with Jerry [Carr] that 
it was a pleasant experience.  On a really long trip you might want to have one.  The 
physics of recycling the water is something you need to look at.  We used towels and 
hung them up around the workshop afterward.  Eventually, the water evaporated in the 
air and was recycled by the life support system.  If your system can tolerate that I think 
it’s great.   
 
f.  Lousma:  One more thing about the shower.  On the moon, lunar dust is going to get 
into everything.  It gets into all of the equipment, it’s going to get into the habitat and it 
is going to get on you, just dealing with your suits.  You’re going to want a way to get 
that dirt off and I think that shower is going to be a good idea. 
5.14.6 How much humidity do you need to prevent skin chafing, cracking, etc?  
What duration of exposure do you expect to have before you begin to see 
some adverse effect on crew performance? 
 
a. Ross:  That’s something that needs to be considered too.  First the low humidity effect 
and also the issue if you are going to wash enough to examine your skin.  Some of the 
documents that Joe [Kerwin] and I put together for a presentation discussed the dryness 
with some fissuring of the skin – the lips, palms and soles, due to the low relative 
humidity.  You need to consider this in the lunar habitat.  For prophylaxis you may 
need to use skin moisturizers.   
 
b. Lousma:  It’s not a lot different than what you see on the ground.  I lived in Michigan 
in the winter and when you’ve got the heat on, the humidity would get down to about 
40%.  Your nose starts to get dry and cracked inside.  I developed a pretty severe lip 
crack on Skylab.  So I think the humidity got down to about 30% on Skylab, but I’m 
not sure.  It seems to me that 70% too high; you start to sweat when you don’t want to.  
So maybe somewhere between 50-60% is about right.   
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c. Thornton:  I think that 45-50% is an accepted rule of thumb.  Cracking of the skin is 
not necessarily benign.  I had an example of that and came out of SMEAT with a pretty 
good infection, because of such cracking. 
 
d. Crippen:  I guess having lived for 5 years in Utah, where the humidity is around 10%, 
you can get a lot of problems.  You know if it is just getting low at the night time and 
you are keeping it around 50% while the crew is up and moving around, I wouldn’t 
think that would be much of a problem, personally.  
 
e. Garriott:  Perhaps you can quantify it, but a lot of water vapor comes from just 
exhalation and not necessarily exercise activity, so I wouldn’t expect there to be that 
much of a diurnal variation.  And don’t forget what Bill said moments ago about 
showering necessity between weightlessness and 1/6th gravity.  It might be a definite 
requirement for the moon and you might not need it for ISS, which was my comment 
earlier.  
5.14.7 Was there any concern about the 5 psia system and the oxygen 
concentration for any 24 hour time period?  Could it have led to some form 
of overt or subclinical hypoxic episode?   
 
a. Kerwin:  Absolutely not.  My judgment would be that we were normoxic.  Our 
alveolar oxygen partial pressure was normoxic.  All of the experiments that were run, 
including the exercise experiments, show results perfectly commensurate with the 
ground based baseline.  There was no adverse effect on our medical condition or on the 
research that was done.  
 
b. Thornton:  With regards to that, I did 300 watts on the bike ergometer for 45 minutes 
and it was not bad.  I can tell you that there was no performance decrement. 
 
c. Gillis:  I just wanted to make a short comment about the limit on the hypoxic end of the 
oxygen issue.  You may tolerate a given level of hypoxic gas mixture well.  The 
downside occurs during exercise.  The limiting factor becomes the passive diffusion of 
oxygen across the capillary alveolar border.  That is a passive, not active process.  As 
the cardiac output increases with exercise, the pulmonary capillary transit time 
decreases because of the higher blood flow rates.  The partial pressure drops to the 
point that the passive diffusion time is not adequate during the shortened transit time to 
saturate the hemoglobin.  The hemoglobin oxygen saturation subsequently falls and you 
end up with mixed venous blood with a lower oxygen content.  There is an interaction 
between the partial pressure of oxygen and the level of exercise.  That’s why the 
incidence of mountain sickness isn’t decreased that much by being in good physical 
condition, which actually allows you to drive to higher cardiac outputs; shorter 
pulmonary transit times and gets you into trouble quicker, even though you are in better 
shape. 
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5.14.8 Skylab had a nice wardroom, an area where the crew could congregate, eat, 
and do work.  It also served as an entertainment area.  Is a wardroom 
important?  
 
a. Garriott:  Look at that picture behind you with that window there, it’s very important. 
 
b. Weitz:  It took us a long time to convince those engineers at Marshall to put that 
window in there.  I think it was very significant, very important to have a wardroom.   
 
c. Lousma:  I think we’ve already been through that with the ISS.  I remember in the 
early design stages that issue was debated long and loud.  The answer is that you need 
it.  The answer to that question is that you need a separate area.   
 
d. Kerwin:  All the previous studies, and I’m probably generalizing beyond the data a 
little bit, have reached a conclusion that on that Mars mission you need a place to be 
alone and a place to be together.  You need them both.   
 
e.  Carr:  Yeah, I’d agree with that too. 
5.14.9 What did you think about the provisions for exercise on Skylab? 
 
a. Carr:  Well, I recall the treadmill that Bill Thornton invented for us to get that kind of 
exercise on SL-4.  And Bill, I wanted you to know that on our mission we referred to 
that as “Thornton’s Revenge.” 
 
b.  Thornton:  [laughing] I deserved it. 
 
c. Ross:  Jerry [Carr], didn’t your crew ramp up to an hour and a half of exercise a day?   
 
d. Carr:  Yes we did. 
 
e. Ross:  That’s probably why you guys returned in exceptionally good shape as 
compared to the other two missions.  Not that they were in bad shape, but you could see 
decrements in their operations and reasons for it.  Obviously, the first mission, with all 
the repair work that had to be done…  You guys had the time to do an hour and a half, 
is that right? 
 
f. Carr:  We made time to exercise, although it wasn’t always easy.  Sometimes we had 
to fight for it.  We did return in good condition.  Ed Gibson went out and ran a mile the 
third day after splash down.   
 
g. Lousma:  I think that was a recommendation we made on the second mission.  We 
confined our exercise to about an hour, and that was what was planned.  I think we 
made the recommendation that it ought to be upped a little bit and it looks like an hour 
and a half was about right.  
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h. Carr:  I agree with that.  Also, I’ve heard talk about splitting the exercise period.  They 
wanted to do that on SL-4 when we were starting to have schedule problems and we 
fought that.  I understand that it’s been done on ISS.  I don’t think that makes a lot of 
sense. 
 
i. Pogue (Written):  If you have two exercise periods, do you have two clean-up periods 
or do you stay grungy between and wait until the last exercise period to clean up? 
 
j. Kerwin: Jerry, I ran into cosmonaut Titov and we got to talking about long duration 
flight and exercise.  He said that they owed a lot to Skylab, because they noticed how 
much exercise you guys did and adapted that to their program.  He was up there for a 
year in the late 80s.  They did an hour in the morning and an hour in the afternoon; they 
broke it into two halves.   
 
k. Thornton:  One of the great things about Skylab was its adaptability.  We started off 
with a lot of programmatic misconceptions.  The crew worked hard and freed up time 
and allowed development and studies to improve exercise.  They weren’t about to let 
me put on any real exercise devices.  The changes that occurred in the exercise program 
turned out to be a beautiful experiment.  At first, there was no upper body exercise 
equipment.  For Al’s [Bean] flight I was able to get some pretty crude upper body 
exercise devices on.  By the last mission, the lower body protocol was markedly 
reducing the rate of leg [volume] loss.  So the first Skylab mission was very different 
from the last mission.  The ability to add things as you went along is absolutely 
invaluable.   
 
l. Carr:  Who took the seat off of the bicycle and put the padding on the ceiling?  Was 
that the first crew?  I tell you, I think we blundered into a good thing there, because we 
were standing up with our head against the ceiling as we pedaled the bike and we were 
able to stress the skeleton which we weren’t able to do anywhere else. 
 
m. Weitz:  As I remember Joe [Kerwin], I think we both maxed out in 7-8 minutes, trying 
to use those restraints.  It was Pete’s idea. We took the seat off and removed the harness 
from the bike. 
 
n. Thornton (Written):  The only reason that your neck was able to sustain such loads is 
that the bike produces such low force loads.  If you want to load the truncal skeleton 
properly, add reasonable counter forces with bungees and a harness.  Rigidly attaching 
the harness restricted respiratory exchange and rapidly increased CO2 and reduced pH. 
5.14.10 Was noise pollution a problem in the Orbital Workshop? 
 
a. Weitz:  The Marshall folks who designed most of the fans in there did a great job on 
muffling the sound from the fans.  I don’t remember being close to a fan.  I used to go 
look out the window of the MDA all the time and it felt like something out of an Arthur 
C. Clarke book, because there was no sound at all.  You were basically scooting around 
the Earth.   
   99 
 
b. Kerwin:  I know the low pressure made sound propagation less and therefore we had to 
raise our voices to be heard at 10ft.  And if you were at the other end of the workshop 
you really had to get on the intercom.  That was the downside of the low pressure.  The 
upside of it was that the vehicle was nice and quiet, which is a good thing to have. 
 
c. Lousma:  Made it hard to whistle too. 
 
d. Ross:  It was constructed for a 55 to 65 decibel level.  And not to exceed a 72.5 decibel 
level I think that would be pretty acceptable.   
 
e. Kerwin:  From memory, the workshop would be in the mid to low 50s and the only 
place significantly noisier than that was the aft end of the structural transition section of 
the MDA, which was in the low 60s.   
5.14.11 What is the minimal amount of habitable volume needed for a long duration 
orbital or planetary based research facility? 
 
a. Garriott:  Are we talking for lunar habitat? 
 
b. Jones:  Mainly for lunar habitat, for planetary surface operations.  So, since you won’t 
be floating around, how much habitable surface area, including room for sleeping, 
eating, hygiene and science, how much room is needed for you to be effective and 
efficient in your tasks, for a minimum 6 month-long mission? 
 
c. Kerwin:  Clearly the answer is going to be much more than the command module and 
quite a bit less than Skylab. 
 
d. Ross:  Let me give you some actual numbers here that I came up with.  From Mercury 
through Apollo, you went from 1 to 8 cubic meters of habitable volume.  For Skylab, 
the Orbital Workshop was 294 cubic meters. 
 
e. Kerwin:  What I was going to suggest to my fellow Skylab crewmembers is that we 
use our imaginations and ask, could we do that in volume of the downstairs part of 
Skylab?  Could we do it in the MDA? 
 
f. Bobko:  What about the Shuttle? 
 
g. Kerwin:  I didn’t fly in the Shuttle.  But it is a valid question for those who did.   
 
h. Bobko:  I think 2 people could work in the Shuttle middeck, but that was about all.  
Once you get more than that you’ve got trouble getting into lockers and things, causing 
problems. 
 
i. Garriott:  The question related to more than just the Spacelabs, which were 2-3 week 
missions.  We’re talking 6-24 months, including all of the other activities that you’ve 
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got to do.  I would think Spacelab was still too small.  You could do it, but it would be 
tough.   
 
j. Bobko:  You’re including the Shuttle volume as well? 
 
k. Garriott:  Yeah, I think the whole Shuttle, including the payload bay, with the 
Spacelab is not enough for a 6 month mission.  Also the architecture is wrong; you’d 
have to completely redesign the architecture.  So I think you are going to have to have 
something between that and Skylab, if you really want to plan a decent mission doing 
reasonable kinds of science. 
 
l. Bobko:  Course you typically had 7 people on a Spacelab mission. 
 
m. Garriott:  We had 6, but of course you’d get up to 7 or 8.   
 
n. Weitz:  What Jeff [Jones] just said would satisfy requirements and based on what you 
said, in my mind I just conjured up two big motor homes. 
 
o. Jones:  Two motor homes is enough for 4 crew?  Because we’re talking a minimum of 
4 crew for these missions. 
 
p. Lousma:  Somebody once told me that Skylab was equivalent to 2 sixty foot house 
trailers, volume wise. 
 
q. Kerwin:  I would guess, off the top of my head that the Skylab Experiment 
Compartment, which contained our sleep stations, our bathroom and our ward room 
and a substantial experiment area, might be adequate for 2 or 3 people for periods that 
long and if you added the Multiple Docking Adapter volume to that you’d probably 
have more than sufficient space for good science for long periods of time.   
 
r. Weitz:  Ok, but you’re talking volume for a lunar stay it’s not going to be volume, it’s 
going to be floor area, so you’ve got to do that conversion. 
 
s. Garriott:  Maybe another reason that we are thinking too short on this issue.  Think of 
Bigelow, he can provide lots of volume at minimal cost.  So I don’t think that volume is 
necessarily the real problem deciding what we want to do for the Moon or Mars.  I 
think we can have larger volumes, and if we need to we can have inflatable things like 
Bigelow is doing for Earth orbit.  So if you go with a larger volume, it is a question of 
how you implement it, what architecture do you use inside to make it comfortable to 
live in, work in and do the experimental work that you want to do.  So go with a larger 
volume if you have reason for it.  I don’t think that should be the major constraint in 
settling the overall architecture.   
 
t. Crippen:  Does any of the Antarctic data for their stayovers give you any of that kind 
of data?   
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u. Jones:  Yeah, we are looking at that.  In fact one of our team members just got back, 
they did a inflatable structure type experiment just recently, looking at that volume for 
their crew – they had 6 in that particular mission, a little more than we were planning 
on for these exploration flights.  And that was for a short stay.  A six month winter-over 
is another paradigm that you could use as well as submarine tours.  However, the 
ability of individuals to effectively conduct missions is limited by the mission profile.  
These mission profiles are very narrow with a very strict set of activities.  They don’t 
have the wide range of activities that we are going to expect these crew to participate 
in, EVAs, suit maintenance, geoscience, planetary science, life science, plus the 
habitability concerns that you guys have already expressed.  We think that the volume 
is going to be more than any experienced in those kinds of scenarios, because the range 
of activities and the range of expectations are going to be broader, and the performance 
level is going to be high in terms of expectations.   
 
v. Kerwin:  If it is too big, you still have to heat it and cool it and there are ECLSS 
impacts.  While you guys were talking I was trying to convert volume into floor area 
for the Experiment Compartment.  I think about 300 square feet, and the MDA maybe 
another couple hundred.   
 
w. Garriott:  I’ve visited Antarctica twice and for the winter over down there, they only 
had about 28 to 30 people.  As you know they’ve just commissioned a brand new one 
and they’ll probably jump that up to 60 to 100 people for the winter over personnel.  
Far larger area and volume than we are talking about for these space trips.  In the end I 
think your answer is somewhere between the full volume of Shuttle/Spacelab and the 
volume of Skylab. 
 
x. Lousma:  For 4 people, you need the volume of Skylab at least. 
 
y. Garriott:  But the internal architecture is going to be very critical. 
 
z. Ross:  Just a quick extrapolation, if you are looking at 6 crew for ISS, and what I put 
out is the number cubic meters of habitable volume, you are looking at around 500?  
Just extrapolating, the Shuttle is 71? 
 
aa. Hamilton:  The shuttle is at 71.  Right now the ISS is at around 425, but when 
Columbus and JEM go up, it will be well above 600.  The lab has around 99 and the 
Service Module has 91. 
 
bb.  Lindgren:  So maybe 100 per person? 
 
cc. Jones:  You had about a hundred cubic meters per person on Skylab if I remember 
right.  And they are talking about trying to push that number to 80 for planetary surface 
ops, for the habitat. 
 
dd. Hamilton:  Skylab had a huge volume. 
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ee. Kerwin:  It was more volume than we needed; it was just what we had.  We don’t need 
to start there, we might end up there, but we sure as heck don’t need to start there. 
 
ff. Bean:  Do you have any tests in progress where people go live in trailers? You don’t 
need anything too complicated.  I’m just talking about NASA renting some trailers and 
having 4 guys live in it for 3 or 4 days.  I tell you, I think they could have a better idea 
about what we need than at least I could ever guess.  A final thought is that you can’t 
make it too big.  Because it is going to fill up.  Any of those things are going to fill up 
with experiments and places for equipment.  I have a hard time relating the volumes of 
spaceships into something that is sitting on the moon and how much you need to work 
around.   
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6.0 LIMITATIONS 
 
The purpose of the Skylab Medical Operations Summit was to gather operational insights 
from Skylab/SMEAT crewmembers and medical operations personnel.   While the 
recommendations generated by the summit represent the consensus opinion of the 
participants, there are limitations to this methodology.   
 
First of all, the crew and flight surgeon participants represent a small fraction of the 
Skylab program community.  Mission planners, scientific investigators, flight directors, 
mission managers and numerous others may have diverging opinions on many of the 
questions we presented.  The scope of participation was limited in the interest of focus 
and efficiency. 
 
This summit was dedicated to a program celebrating its thirty-fifth anniversary.  As such, 
some recollections may have been subject to recall bias.  Indeed, some summit comments 
occasionally diverged from opinions voiced in post mission crew debriefs.  This is a 
benefit to the users of this document, as the recommendations and opinions voiced at the 
summit have been tempered with post-Skylab experience in Shuttle operations, space 
station design and program leadership.  
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7.0 GLOSSARY 
 
ACES  Advanced Crew Escape Suit  
ACRV Assured Crew Return Vehicle 
ATM  Apollo Telescope Mount 
CAPCOM Capsule Communicator 
CEV   Crew Exploration Vehicle, also known as the Orion 
CM  Command Module 
CMP  Command Module Pilot 
CMO  Crew Medical Officer 
COMTEC Communications Technician 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
Coolanol Trade name for silicate ester industrial coolant used on Skylab 
CPR  Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 
CSM  Command and Service Module 
EVA  Extra-vehicular Activity 
IMSS  In-flight Medical Support System 
IP  International Partner 
ISS  International Space Station 
IVA  Intra-vehicular Activity 
JOP  Joint Observing Program 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
LPU  Life Preserver, Underarm 
MCC-H Mission Control Center - Houston 
MD  Medical Doctor 
MDA  Multiple Docking Adapter 
MSC  Manned Spacecraft Center, now Johnson Space Center 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
MSOB Manned Spacecraft Operations Building 
Orion  Name for the Crew Exploration Vehicle 
OWS  Orbital Workshop, the largest component of the Skylab Vehicle 
PCU  Pressure Control Unit 
PI  Principal Investigator 
PMC  Private Medical Conference 
SL-2  Skylab 2 
SL-3  Skylab 3 
SL-4  Skylab 4  
SMEAT Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test 
Stable-1 Post-landing position with the apex of the capsule pointing up 
Stable-2 Post-landing position with the apex of the capsule pointing down  
TDI  Toluene Diisocyanate 
TEC  Trans-Earth Cruise 
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UDT  Underwater Demolition Team 
URI  Upper Respiratory Infection 
USAF  United States Air Force 
WMS  Waste management system 
 
 
   106 
8.0 REFERENCES 
 
1. Belew LF, Stuhlinger E. Skylab: A Guidebook. EP-107. Huntsville. AL: Marshall 
Space Flight Center; 1973. 
2. Biomedical Results from Skylab. Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration; 1977. 
3. SL2 Crew Technical Debrief [Limited Release]. Houston, TX: Johnson Space 
Center. 
4. Shayler DJ. Skylab: America's Space Station. Chichester, UK; 2001. 
5. NASA Space Flight Human System Standard Volume 1: Crew Health. 
Washington D.C.: NASA; 2007 March 3. Report No.: NASA-STD-3001. 
6. Inflight Medical Support System Checklist. Revision A. . Houston, TX: Johnson 
Space Center; 1973. 
7. SL3 Crew Technical Debrief [Limited Release]. Houston, TX: Johnson Space 
Center. 
8. Drexel RE, Hunter HN. Apollo Experience Report - Command Module Crew-
Couch/Restraint and Load-Attenuation Systems. NASA TN D-7440. Houston, 
TX: Johnson Space Center; 1973 September. 
9. [HS6084] The system shall provide a designated medical area with patient 
electrical isolation. Rationale: To protect both avionics of the vehicle and other 
crewmembers from inadvertent electrical shock, the patient will need to be 
electrically isolated from the vehicle in the event defibrillation is required. In: 
Constellation Program Human-Systems Integration Requirements. Revision A. 
10. SL4 Crew Technical Debrief [Limited Release]. Houston, TX: Johnson Space 
Center. 
11. SL2 Crew Medical Debrief [Limited Release]. Houston, TX: Johnson Space 
Center. 
12. Lessons Learned on the Skylab Program. NASA TM-X-72920. Houston, TX: 
Johnson Space Center; 1974 July. 
13. McCullough JE, Lands JF. Apollo Command Module Land-Impact Tests. NASA 
TN D-6979. Houston, TX: Manned Spacecraft Center; 1972 October. 
14. Apollo Command and Service Module System Specification (Block 1): North 
American Aviation; 1964 1 October. Report No.: NAS 9-150. 
15. Compton WD. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo Lunar 
Exploration Missions. NASA Special Publication-4214. Washington, D.C.: 
NASA; 1989. 
16. McAllister FA. Apollo Experience Report - Crew provisions and equipment 
subsystem. NASA TN D-6737. Houston, TX: Manned Spacecraft Center; 1972 
March. 
17. [HS3017A] The system shall provide each member of the crew a contingency 
breathing apparatus, which provides breathable air that meets the quality 
specifications defined in HS3004B, HS3004C and HS3004D. Rationale: In the 
   107 
case of a medical or off-nominal condition, each crewmember will require 
delivery of uncontaminated and appropriate oxygen containing breathing gas. This 
requirement does not apply to suited operations. In: Constellation Program 
Human-Systems Integration Requirements. Revision A. 
18. Samonski FH, Tucker EM. Apollo Experience Report - Command and Service 
Module Environmental Control System. NASA TN D-6718. Houston, TX: 
Manned Spacecraft Center; 1972. 
19. Mask Breathing System for the Apollo Command Module. NASA Working Paper 
No. 1319. Houston, TX: Manned Spacecraft Center; 1967 June. 
20. White RD. Apollo Experience Report - Command Module Uprighting System. 
NASA TN D-7081. Houston, TX: Manned Spacecraft Center; 1973 March. 
21. Newkirk RW, Ertel ID, Brooks CG. Skylab: A Chronology. NASA SP-4011. 
Washington D.C.: NASA; 1977. 
22. Middleton WA, Breshears HF. Apollo Experience Report - Development and use 
of specialized radio equipment for Apollo recovery operations. NASA TN D-
7587. Houston, TX: Johnson Space Center; 1974 February. 
23. Chase WR, Middleton WA. Apollo Experience Report - The AN/ARD-17 
Direction Finding System. NASA TN D-7886. Houston, TX: Johnson Space 
Center; 1975 March. 
24. Lattier EE. Apollo Experience Report - Command and Service Module 
Communications Subsystem. NASA TN D-7585. Houston, TX: Johnson Space 
Center; 1974 February. 
25. Cromie WJ. Skylab: The Story of Man's First Station in Space. New York: David 
McKay Company, Inc.; 1976. 
26. Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT). NASA TMX-58115. 
Houston, TX: Johnson Space Center; 1973 October. 
27. SL3 Crew Medical Debrief [Limited Release]. Houston, TX: Johnson Space 
Center. 
 
 
